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Abstract 
 
 
Given that one-million species are currently threatened with extinction and that humans are 
undermining the entire natural infrastructure on which our modern world depends (IPBES, 
2019), this dissertation will show that there is a need to provide an alternative approach to 
wildlife conservation, one that avoids anthropocentrism and wildlife valuation on an 
instrumental basis to provide meaningful and tangible success for both wildlife conservation 
and human well-being in an inclusive way. In this sense, The Value of Being Wild will 
showcase the concept of eco-phenomenology as an important non-anthropocentric alternative 
to the current approach to wildlife conservation, namely sustainable development.  
 
The problem with this dominant paradigm, as Chapter Two  will reveal, is that sustainable 
development has not only failed to provide humans and future generations of humans with their 
own needs but, as per the latest IPBES report, failed in arresting the freefall decline of wild 
species. The situation currently requires a radical overhaul of the current system. 
 
 As emerged from the later work of French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-
1961), eco-phenomenology is particularly well-suited as a practical alternative to sustainable 
development. The core reason is that eco-phenomenology moves away from a human-centred 
framework toward a far more inclusive approach that embraces the conservation of wild 
animals as well the wild environment they dwell in, beyond any human needs (although 
humans are embraced within the approach too). Merleau-Ponty helps us to move away from 
anthropocentrism to a more inclusive approach in conserving wildlife, since his 
phenomenology does not consider the human animal’s relationship in the world as exclusive 
(to use and exploit wild animals solely for their benefit), but inclusive (as an interconnected 
biological component in a broad ecological system). The strength of Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of phenomenology is that it facilitates an understanding of all living and even non-living 
entities, such as air, water and soil, as interconnected and interrelated within a broad biosphere. 
While Merleau-Ponty did not address the concept of wild animals or the biosphere directly, his 
later work points to the fact that human animals cannot exist outside a world that provides life-
giving force to all living beings.  
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Phenomenology, as developed by Merleau-Ponty, is a concept that recognises the axiological 
qualities of the natural world are inherent and ineliminable from the discipline of traditional 
phenomenology, hence the term ‘eco-phenomenology’, developed in one reception of his 
thinking.  Eco-phenomenology offers a return to a world that humans have tried hard to alienate 
themselves from, in that it approaches the natural environment and wild animals, not as a 
complex set of objects and objective processes, but rather as they are experienced and lived 
from within by the attentive animal who is entirely a part of the world that he or she 
experiences. Merleau-Pontian eco-phenomenology thus emphasises a holistic dialogue within 
a more-than-human world (Abram, 1996: 65). 
 
Eco-phenomenology is a concept that points toward an applied strategy but so far this has not 
been attempted in earnest. This is specifically true when it comes to wildlife conservation. The 
Value of Being Wild, therefore, sets out to employ the concept of eco-phenomenology in order 
to provide a new practical wildlife conservation approach that challenges, and potentially 
replaces, the current prevailing policies as employed by global governmental and inter-
governmental agencies. In particular, this alternative frame is posed as a replacement for the 
failing anthropocentric conservation practices currently in place in South Africa. This 
dissertation will therefore conclude by exploring strategies where conservation of wildlife is 
not taken as instrumentally-valued, or even intrinsically-valued, but rather as wild-valued in 
that the existence of wild animals as wild is conserved within a broader, more inclusive overall 
ecology that supports the survival and flourishing of all living beings that include plants, wild 
animals and human beings. 
 
Abstrak 
 
 
Een miljoen spesies staar tans uitwissing in die gesig en mense ondermyn die totale natuurlike 
infrastruktuur waarvan ons moderne wêreld afhanklik is (IPBES, 2019). In die lig hiervan, sal 
hierdie proefskrif aantoon dat daar ‘n behoefte is aan ‘n alternatiewe benadering tot die 
bewaring van wildlewe, naamlik ‘n benadering wat antroposentrisme vermy, sowel as die 
waardering van wildlewe op ‘n instrumentele basis, ten einde betekenisvolle en tasbare sukses 
te verseker vir beide wildbewaring en menslike welsyn op ‘n inklusiewe manier.  The Value of 
Being Wild bespreek die konsep van eko-fenomenologie as ‘n belangrike nie-antroposentriese 
alternatief tot volhoubare ontwikkeling.  
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Die probleem met hierdie dominante paradigm, soos wat in Hoofstuk Twee aangetoon word, 
is dat volhoubare ontwikkeling nie net gefaal het om in die behoeftes van mense en toekomstige 
menslike geslagte te voorsien nie, maar soos vervat in die jongste IPBES-verslag, ook gefaal 
het om die vryval van wildspesies te voorkom. Die situasie benodig ‘n radikale transformasie 
van die bestaande stelsel.  
 
Soos wat in die latere werk van die Franse fenomenoloog Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) 
na vore kom, is eko-fenomenologie besonder geskik as ‘n praktiese alternatief tot bestaande 
wildbewaringspraktyke. Merleau-Ponty beweeg weg van ‘n mensgesentreerde na ‘n veel meer 
inklusiewe benadering tot wildbewaring. Dit is omdat sy fenomenologie nie die menslike dier 
se verhouding met die wêreld beskou as eksklusief nie (om wilde diere te gebruik en uit te buit 
tot sy voordeel), maar eerder as inklusief (as ‘n interverweefde biologiese komponent in ‘n 
breë ekologiese stelsel). Die krag van Merleau-Ponty se konsepsie van fenomenologie lê daarin 
dat dit ‘n siening bemiddel van alle lewende dinge en nie-lewende dinge, soos lug, water, en 
grond, as interafhanklik en verweef binne ‘n breë biosfeer. Alhoewel Merleau-Ponty nie die 
konsep van wilde diere of die biosfeer direk aangespreek het nie, dui sy latere werk op die feit 
dat menslike diere nie kan bestaan buite ‘n wêreld wat lewegewende krag aan alle lewende 
dinge verskaf nie.  
 
Die fenomenologie wat Merleau-Ponty ontwikkel, erken dat die natuurlike wêreld aksiologiese 
kwaliteite besit en dat hierdie insig gewortel is in die dissipline van tradisionele fenomenologie; 
vandaar die term eko-fenomenologie wat deur een resepsie van sy denke ontwikkel is. Weens 
die onontkombare en inherente ekologiese aspek van fenomenologie, bied eko-fenomenologie 
‘n terugkeer tot ‘n wêreld waarvan mense hard probeer het om hulleself te vervreem.  Merleau-
Ponty se fenomenologie beskou die natuurlike omgewing en wilde diere, nie as ‘n komplekse 
stel objekte en objektiewe prosesse nie, maar fokus eerder op hoe dit ervaar en geleef word van 
binne uit deur die aandagtige dier wat heeltemal deel is van die wêreld wat sy of hy ervaar. 
Merleau-Ponty se eko-fenomenologie beklemtoon dus ‘n holistiese dialoog binne ‘n meer-as-
menslike wêreld (Abram, 1996: 65). 
 
Eko-fenomenologie is ‘n konsep wat vra om ‘n toepassingstrategie, maar dit is tot dusver nog 
nie in erns aangepak nie. Dít is veral waar ten opsigte van wildbewaring.  The Value of Being 
Wild is dus daarop gemik om die konsep van eko-fenomenologie te gebruik om ‘n nuwe 
praktiese wildbewarings-benadering voor te stel. Hierdie benadering daag die heersende 
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beleide uit wat tans wêreldwyd deur regerings- en inter-regeringsagentskappe gebruik word en 
mag hulle selfs uiteindelik vervang. In die besonder word hierdie alternatiewe raamwerk 
voorgestel as ‘n plaasvervanging vir die mislukkende antroposentriese bewaringspraktyke wat 
tans in Suid-Afrika gebruik word. Hierdie proefskrif kulmineer daarom in ‘n verkenning van 
strategieë waar wildbewaring nie onderneem word aan die hand van óf ‘n instrumentele óf ‘n 
intrinsieke waardering van wildlewe nie, maar eerder aan die hand van wild-waardering. 
Hiermee word bedoel dat die wilde bestaan van wilde diere as sodanig beskerm word binne ‘n 
breër, meer inklusiewe en omvattende ekologie wat die oorlewing van alle lewende wesens ten 
doel het, insluitend plante, wilde diere en mense.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Only within the moment of time represented by the present century has one species – man – 
acquired significant power to alter the nature of the world. 
 
(Rachel Carson, Silent Spring) 
 
 
1. Rationale 
 
It is the grim reality that wild places and animals are being destroyed at catastrophic levels by 
human action. A recent report, The Living Planet Index (2018) prepared by the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Zoological Society of London, found that global wild animal 
populations have dropped by 60% (almost two-thirds) between 1970 and 2014 (World 
Wildlife Fund, 2018: 7). This has occurred largely as a result of unregulated and 
unsustainable anthropogenic (human-generated) activities like over-harvesting of natural 
resources, over-exploitation of wildlife due to trading, hunting, poaching; or from human-
induced climate change, natural habitat loss and widespread pollution (World Wildlife Fund, 
2018). A year later, an even more dire warning was issued. In May 2019, a global assessment 
by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES, 2019) found that one-million species are currently threatened with extinction and that 
humans are undermining the entire natural infrastructure on which our modern world depends. 
 
Based on these reports (and others), it is common knowledge that human population expansion 
and human behaviour have triggered what scientists and commentators refer to as the Sixth 
Great Extinction event in the history of Earth (Kolbert, 2014). 
 
Earth’s five previous mass extinctions were: 
The First Mass Extinction at the End-Ordovician was 443 million years ago. This was a severe 
ice age that led to sea levels falling by 100m. It wiped out 60-70% of all species which were 
predominantly ocean dwellers at the time. Then soon after, the ice melted leaving the oceans 
starved of oxygen. 
The Second Mass Extinction was the Late Devonian around c 360 million years ago. This was 
a messy prolonged climate change event, again hitting life in shallow seas hard, killing 70% of 
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species including almost all corals. The Third Mass Extinction during the Permian-Triassic 
was c 250 million years ago. This was a big one – more than 95% of species perished, including 
trilobites and giant insects – strongly linked to massive volcanic eruptions in Siberia that caused 
a savage episode of global warming. The Fourth Mass Extinction occurred during Triassic-
Jurassic at c 200 million years ago. Three-quarters of species were lost, again most likely due 
to another huge outburst of volcanism. It left the Earth clear for dinosaurs to flourish. The Fifth 
Mass Extinction was during the Cretaceous-Tertiary around 65 million years ago. A giant 
asteroid impact on Mexico, just after large volcanic eruptions in what is now India, saw the 
end of the dinosaurs and ammonites. Mammals, and eventually humans, took advantage 
(Carrington, 10 May 2017). 
The Sixth Mass Extinction is the only one created solely by an earth-dwelling species – 
humans. It is also referred to as the Anthropocene epoch1. It is a term that defines earth’s most 
recent geologic time period as being human-influenced, or anthropogenic. The definition of the 
Anthropocene is based on overwhelming global evidence that the atmospheric, geological, 
hydrologic, biospheric and other earth system processes are now altered by humans 
(Carrington, 29 August 2016). The word combines the root word ‘anthropos’ (human) with the 
root word ‘-cene’ (the suffix for ‘epoch in geologic time’). 
Until recently, human awareness of their destructive actions was limited. The slow realisation 
that humans may be doing irreparable damage to the planet and other species only really began 
in the 1960s when Rachel Carson published her rousing exposé The Silent Spring (1962). 
Carson had focused her attention on environmental problems and the destruction of wildlife 
that were caused by pesticides and widespread use of chemicals. It was the first time someone 
had brought environmental concerns to the global public and helped to inspire the 
environmental movement (Paull, 2013: 1-12).  
 
It was in the late sixties and early seventies, also as a direct reaction to the publication of Silent 
Spring, when philosophy began to seriously address environmental and non-human animal 
issues in what is now the discipline of ‘Environmental Ethics’ (Brennan & Lo, Winter 2016). 
Essays were produced by the pioneering thinkers like Richard Routley, Holmes Rolston III, J. 
 
1 In January 2015, 26 of the 38 members of the International Anthropocene Working Group published a paper 
suggesting that 1945, when the first nuclear test was conducted on July 16, was the starting point of the proposed 
new epoch. 
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Baird Callicott, Joel Fineberg, Arne Naess, Clare Palmer and Peter Singer who raised 
awareness on the ethics of environmental and species destruction and the possibility of 
affording rights to non-human animals and even plants (Callicott & Palmer, 2005). Driven by 
a growing groundswell with both the voting public and in academia, especially in the sciences 
and philosophy (Brennan & Lo, Winter 2016), the 1960s saw global governments and inter-
governmental organisations realise that something urgent  needed to be done to reverse the 
extinction of plants and animals (CITES a.).  
 
However, the desire to conserve species at government and inter-government level was and 
still is a human-centred one in that the preservation of wild species was predominantly seen in 
terms of sustaining human economic benefits of utilising rather than conserving wildlife simply 
for the sake of wildlife. In other words, the thinking of policymakers always centres on the 
importance of instrumental value over intrinsic value. The former is the value of things as 
a means to further the ends of some external telos or goal, in this case human well-being as 
something external to the wild species themselves. Whereas the latter is the value of wild 
animals and plants (animals and plants in the natural environment, as opposed to domesticated 
animals) as ends in themselves regardless of whether they are also useful as a means to human 
well-being (Brennan & Lo, Winter 2016). This is a point I address in detail in the opening 
chapter of this dissertation where I show that where wild animals are conserved, this is mostly 
with the singular aim and rationale to further the economic benefits of humans. Wild animals 
are in our current era, in fact always and solely regarded and treated as resources and 
commodities for human consumption and utility. And it is therefore also only in relation to 
human (extrinsic) benefit that their conservation is contemplated.  
 
Driven by this framework of instrumental value, in 1963 a resolution was drafted by eighty 
countries in Washington D.C. for the establishment of the future Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora or CITES, an organization under the umbrella of 
the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) that came into effect a decade later 
(CITES a.). The very title of the Convention revealed its instrumental nature, that is: the 
continuation and sustainability of the human trade in endangered wildlife.  
 
Ostensibly, CITES was the organization to safeguard species of plants and animals from human 
over-exploitation at an international level (CITES a.). I say ‘ostensibly’ because given the 
chilling findings in the latest reports, in the four and half decades since its inception, CITES 
 15 
has failed in its mandate to do so. The main reason for this failure, as I will demonstrate, is the 
fact that instrumental value is founded entirely on anthropocentrism.  
Anthropocentrism can be defined as follows: 
 
Anthropocentrism refers to a human-centered, or ‘anthropocentric,’ point of view. 
In philosophy, anthropocentrism can refer to the point of view that humans are the 
only, or primary, holders of moral standing. Anthropocentric value systems thus 
see nature in terms of its value to humans (Padwe, 6 May 2016). 
 
Anthropocentrism in its strong sense favours human existence and well-being over and often 
at the expense of the survival of wild species. In this sense, anthropocentrism is also implied 
in a purely instrumental valuation of wild species.  This type of anthropocentrism declares the 
human animal to be exceptional because it is the only source of valuation. This is why the 
stance is also sometimes called ‘human exceptionalism’.  
 
Back in the 1960s and 1970s, anthropocentrism had already been identified as the overriding 
problem in the destruction of the natural environment and extinction of species by the 
aforementioned pioneering philosophers (Callicott & Palmer, 2005: vol I, i-ix). These early 
thinkers immediately posed a challenge to the dominant anthropocentric paradigm by 
questioning the assumed superiority of human beings to members of all the other species on 
earth and investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the 
natural environment and its non-human inhabitants (Brennan & Lo, Winter 2016). Yet despite 
serious reservations raised decades ago by these thinkers, anthropocentrism as a dominant 
paradigm is a problem that still persists today, albeit in a weaker sense. By ‘weak 
anthropocentrism’ I mean that conservation of wildlife is still seen in purely instrumental terms 
(thus exclusively in terms of serving human interests), but instead of over-exploitation, wildlife 
is treated as a sustainable resource where species are conserved up to the point where they can 
provide continued benefit of humans and well-being into the foreseeable future.2 In other 
 
2 As will be discussed in the first chapter, Bryan Norton distinguishes between a ‘felt’ and a ‘considered 
preference’. A considered preference “is any desire or need that a human individual would express after careful 
deliberation, including a judgement that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted worldview – a 
worldview which includes fully supported scientific theories and a metaphysical framework interpreting those 
theories as well as a set of rationally supported aesthetic and moral ideals” (Norton, 2005: 229). Thus, instead of 
simply reacting to a subjectively felt desire, careful investigation of one’s felt preferences enables human 
individuals to adopt a more considered approach, which for Norton amounts to weak anthropocentrism in the 
case of environmental concerns. 
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words, while the purely instrumental valuation from a purely human perspective remains in 
place, the anthropocentrism is somewhat tempered in this weaker version of the theory. 
Immediate human benefit is limited for the sake of longer-term human benefit. 
 
Among today’s government, non-government and inter-governmental circles, weak 
anthropocentric conservation of wildlife is euphemistically referred to as ‘sustainable 
utilisation’ (the prolonged use of wildlife for sustaining human economic well-being) or, more 
broadly, ‘sustainable development’ (the prolonged use of wildlife for improving human 
economic well-being). The United Nations Brundtland Report, the result of a commission set 
up by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, regards 
‘sustainable development’ as the best mechanism for conserving wild species from over-
exploitation and destruction. The broad definition of the term ‘sustainable development’, as 
per the report, is to:  
 
…balance local and global efforts to meet basic human needs through the use of 
wild animals and natural resources without destroying or degrading the natural 
environment so that future generations [of humans] can meet their own needs (UN 
General Assembly, 1987).  
 
The notion of sustainable development with its implied instrumentalism has subsequently 
become the endorsed system for policy makers at both an international and national level. It is 
central to all United Nations environmental organisations such as UNEP and CITES and other 
inter-governmental environmental organisations like the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the world’s largest nature conservation organization, as well 
as global non-governmental environmental organisations like the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF). Almost all national governments have followed UN international policy in adopting 
these weak anthropocentric policies. This is evident in the fact that 183 out of 193 of the 
world’s nations are members of and participate in CITES. In this dissertation, I will specifically 
focus on South Africa as one such member government.  Among multiple reasons for focusing 
on South Africa, is the fact that sustainable development is officially enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights of the South Africa and the Constitution (1996) and therefore makes a useful case-study 
when it comes to a critique of the current practice of wildlife conservation. Other reasons 
include the way in which South Africa is held up as an exemplar for wildlife conservation 
across the globe (Cruise, 1 September 2016: personal interview a.). 
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Given that anthropocentrism and its reliance on instrumental value conserves wildlife 
population numbers simply to sustain human trade and consumption, the major problem that 
my study wishes to raise is the fact that there is no regard that wildlife is an integral and 
interconnected combination of vital organisms in a broader ecological system. This failure 
follows from a purely instrumental view on wildlife, which, as I will show, includes a failure 
to appreciate what the wildness of wild animals contributes to the flourishing of the broader 
natural system. In other words, preserving numbers is usually achieved at the expense of the 
broader natural environment in that wild animals are bred and stocked on ranches that are more 
akin to domestic livestock farms than wilderness areas.3 The Value of Being Wild: A 
Phenomenological Approach to Wildlife Conservation will show that the destruction of 
wildness, is not only detrimental to the survival and continued flourishing of the targeted 
species, but to all species, including humans. This then is the key to my dissertation since 
conservation has to include not just the individual animal or species but the environment or 
natural habitat as a whole. 
 
My study will show that the need therefore is to provide an alternative approach to wildlife 
conservation, one that avoids anthropocentrism and wildlife valuation on an instrumental basis 
in order to provide meaningful and tangible success for both wildlife and human well-being in 
an inclusive way. In this sense, The Value of Being Wild will showcase the concept of eco-
phenomenology as an important non-anthropocentric alternative to sustainable development 
and a framework for radically redefining our undertaking of what it means to be wild.  As 
emerged from the later work of French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-
1961), eco-phenomenology is particularly well-suited as a practical alternative to sustainable 
development and the resultant rider of instrumentalism.  
 
Phenomenology, in a traditional sense, takes its starting point in the world as we experience it 
– literally the study of ‘phenomena’: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our 
experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings that things have in our direct 
experience of them. “Traditional phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced 
 
3 33 wild species including lions, cheetah, rhinos and zebras, have been reclassified as farm animals as of May 
2019 when the South African Government approved a brief amendment to the Animal Improvement Act (AIA) 
which governs livestock breeding. 
 
 18 
from the subjective or first-person point of view” (Smith, 2018: online). However, Merleau-
Ponty moves phenomenology away from the first-person to something more interchangeable 
and reversible. He shows that our embodied subjectivity is never located purely in our bodily 
presence in and experience of the world, but in the intertwining between ourselves and the 
world in a non-subjective way (a point I’ll describe in detail shortly). 
 
At the same time, Merleau-Ponty helps us to move away from anthropocentrism to a far more 
inclusive approach in conserving wildlife. This is because his phenomenology deals with the 
interconnected relationship between humans and wild animals in a broad ecological system. 
The strength of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of phenomenology is that it regards all living and 
even non-living entities, such as air, water and soil, as interconnected and interrelated within a 
broad biosphere.  
 
Phenomenology, as developed by Merleau-Ponty, is a concept that recognises that the 
axiological qualities of the natural world are inherent and ineliminable from the discipline of 
traditional phenomenology, hence the term ‘eco-phenomenology’ that was developed in 
response to his thinking. Due to the inherent ecological aspect of the human involvement with 
the world within traditional phenomenology, eco-phenomenology offers a return to a world 
that humans have tried hard to alienate themselves from. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
directs us toward the natural environment and other living bodies, not as a complex set of 
objects and objective processes, but rather as they are experienced and lived from within by the 
attentive  animal who is entirely a part of the living, material world that he or she experiences. 
It also directs our attention to the perceptions and agency of other living bodies for whom we 
are part of their experience. Merleau-Ponty's eco-phenomenology thus emphasises a holistic 
dialogue with and within a more-than-human world (Abram, 1996: 65). 
 
Eco-phenomenology is a term that has become fashionable in environmental philosophy in 
recent years, as is evident by the current analyses of Merleau-Ponty’s later works combined 
with environmental ethics, notably by American philosophers David Abram, Ted Toadvine and 
David Wood. Each has produced books, papers and collections of essays expounding on 
Merleau-Pontian based eco-phenomenology (see Bibliography). However, eco-
phenomenology is yet to be considered in an applied sense (Brown & Toadvine, 2003). The 
concept points toward an applied strategy but so far this has not been achieved, or at least, not 
attempted in earnest. This is specifically true when it comes to wildlife conservation. The Value 
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of Being Wild, therefore, sets out to investigate the concept of eco-phenomenology in order to 
provide a new practical wildlife conservation approach that challenges, and potentially 
replaces, the current prevailing policies as employed by global governmental and inter-
governmental agencies. In particular, this alternative frame is proposed as a replacement for 
the failing instrumental and anthropocentric conservation practices currently in place in South 
Africa. This dissertation will therefore conclude by exploring strategies where conservation of 
wildlife is not taken as instrumentally-valued, or even intrinsically-valued, but rather as wild-
valued in that the existence of wild animals as wild is conserved within a broader, more 
inclusive overall wild ecology that supports the survival and flourishing of all living beings, 
including plants, animals and human beings. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
Since this is a dissertation in philosophy, the critique on instrumental value will focus primarily 
on the theoretical substratum of prevailing policies that govern our anthropocentric treatment 
and uses of wildlife. The Value of Being Wild is a quest for an alternative paradigm that will 
occur through a combined analysis of evaluative philosophical critique with actual in-field 
experiences. The discussion of lived experiences is necessary to reinforce the philosophical 
analysis since phenomenology originates in action, observation and documentation before it 
migrates into, and enhances, the theoretical analysis.  
 
At this point, I will lay out the methodology in sub-headings to illustrate the process as it 
progresses through the different  chapters of the dissertation. This will begin with a critique of 
the dominant paradigm of instrumental valuation of wildlife conservation, then an exposition 
and critique of the counter-argument of moral consideration will be given followed by the 
introduction, relevance and application of the alternative paradigm of eco-phenomenology. 
 
2.1. The problem with instrumental value 
 
The Value of Being Wild will begin by dismantling the purely instrumental and thus economic-
centred foundation of sustainable development first by using a theoretical economic critique 
and then a pragmatic economic critique. The purpose is to show that even from an economic 
(non-philosophical) perspective, anthropocentrism is foundationally and functionally 
incapable of conserving wildlife.  
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This will be followed by a philosophical deconstruction4 of the notion of sustainable 
development and in particular its adherence to anthropocentrism. The deconstruction will show 
how the infamous seventeenth century French philosopher, René Descartes’ theoretical 
separation of the ‘Subject’ from the object; or mind from body, underscores the totality of our 
anthropocentric endeavours in terms of instrumental valuations of dealing with (other)5 
animals. He does this by firmly establishing human exceptionalism: we are an exception to all 
other species on earth, because we are in possession of a rational mind, which has a completely 
distinct nature from ‘dead’ or inert matter. 
 
Descartes’ line of questioning begins when he takes over Aristotle’s original definition of the 
human as a rational animal, the zōon logon eschon. By eliminating all that is not indubitable, 
the philosopher embarks on a reductive ontology that ultimately separates the rational (mind) 
from the animal (body). The philosopher then sets about rejecting everything that he does not 
consider indubitable, which is almost everything, including all sense perception, until he 
arrives at the epicenter – dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum: the existence of the mental act of the 
doubting doubter. This is the full presence of the ‘Subject’ – the lone, reduced, purely cerebral, 
doubting entity that has been detached from the world of objects and stripped of the ebullience 
of corporeal life. The detached, autonomous mind of the ‘Subject’ is the core of Descartes’ 
reductionist thesis and has since become the kernel of modern Western philosophical 
methodology and epistemology, and of the current anthropocentric approach to all that is not a 
human ‘Subject’. The enquiry into Descartes as the origin of our strong and pervasive, 
anthropocentric bias toward (other) animals will be conducted as a means to provide  
philosophical clarity about the root problem of our current conservation practices, and overall 
attitude toward (other) animals and resultant failure to conserve them. It is with Descartes that 
the charge is squarely laid for our current crisis of the Sixth Extinction in the Anthropocene. 
 
2.2. The problem with moral consideration 
 
With anthropocentrism duly discredited as an adequate conservation paradigm, I will move 
 
4 A deconstruction will take the concept of anthropocentrism apart along its philosophical ‘fault lines’ that are 
created by the ambiguities inherent in Descartes’ key arguments in order to reveal the equivocations and 
contradictions in anthropocentrism.  
 
5 The use of the word ‘other’ in brackets ( ) will be used from now on to emphasise humans are animals too. 
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toward an analysis of the prevailing alternative paradigm (although it must be said that 
phenomenology does not reject anthropocentric thought outright, but finds ways in which 
anthropocentric approaches to conservation  can be reconfigured and included  as allies. ). 
Before I do, it must be said that this dissertation is not about shutting out anthropocentric 
ethicists, but rather, in true phenomenological discourse, about reconfiguring their projects so 
as to avoid the pitfalls inherent in anthropocentric conservation. The aim is to provide rigour 
rather than rejection.  
 
The most prominent alternative to instrumentally-valued anthropocentrism is the obvious 
counter-argument that rejects instrumental value for moral consideration, specifically as it 
relates to the sentience and interests of (other) animals. One could argue that the moral 
consideration argument is one among more attempts to overcome the dominant instrumental 
paradigm. In other words, it is one attempt at granting to (other) animals some form of intrinsic 
value. For practical reasons, I focus only on this one version of ‘intrinsic value’ reasoning. 
With the moral consideration  approach, the utilitarian view championed by many of the earlier 
environmental thinkers, was thoroughly challenged. Animal rights philosopher Peter Singer 
(1946-), professor of bioethics and one of the intellectual founders of the modern animal rights 
movement, is prominent in this school of thought. He  argues against  commodification and 
exploitation, and instead for moral consideration for individual non-human animals based on 
their ability to feel pain and suffering (Singer, 2005: 75-90).  
 
On the surface, equal moral consideration appears to be the solution to protect wildlife, since 
it elevates the status of (other) animals above merely instrumental value, by taking into account 
their subjective experiences of pain and suffering. However, I will show that the concept of 
equal moral consideration of suffering remains shackled to anthropocentrism as it only 
considers some members of the non-human community as worthy of moral consideration. 
Higher-order mammals, like dolphins, elephants, lions and, to a lesser degree, buffalo, 
pangolins and impala, are considered more ‘human-like’ than lower-order animals like bats, 
puff-adders, mosquitoes and crocodiles. This is because the assumption is founded on the 
degrees of capability of non-human animals to suffer like humans. The problem with applying 
Singer’s notion of moral consideration as a conservation tool, as will be demonstrated, is that 
it is difficult to define precisely what suffering is. Furthermore, even with a limited definition, 
suffering can only be measured against human suffering. This is why moral consideration while 
moving away from instrumentality, remains anthropocentric since all non-human life is 
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measured against the benchmark of human life. Thus, any non-human life deemed incapable 
of human-like suffering is not morally considered and therefore excluded from the Club of 
Consideranda6 and as it happens, this goes for the vast majority of non-human life forms. As a 
result, their existence and well-being are all but ignored, or worse, endangered, because of the 
insistence on preserving ‘higher-order’ animals at the expense of ‘lower-order’ animals. This 
latter point will be addressed in detail in the dissertation. 
 
2.3. The possibility of phenomenology as the alternative paradigm 
 
With moral consideration as an alternative to sustainable development (instrumental 
anthropocentrism) now also discarded, the next step in this dissertation is to find an approach  
that does in fact treat wildlife from an unreservedly non-anthropocentric perspective.  
 
The philosophical discipline of phenomenology is one that looks most likely to achieve this.7 
In its traditional sense, phenomenology as introduced by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and 
then developed inter alia by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), attempts to dismantle the hierarchical and dichotomous 
nature of Cartesian dualism, which views the disembodied mind as the superior opposite of the 
mindless body, for example. Overall, traditional phenomenology opposes Cartesian dualism 
(and the resultant manifestation of anthropocentrism) in that it takes everything in the world, 
including the human ‘Subject’8, as entities equally acting and reacting to and with one another. 
Phenomenology, in this traditional sense, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection 
on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of 
 
6 This is phrase coined by Thomas Birch in his thought-provoking essay Moral Considerability and Universal 
Consideration (1993) where he distinguishes between non-human animals deemed capable of human-like 
suffering and those deemed incapable. It is a point I will explore in more detail in this dissertation.  
7 Phenomenologists are not the only philosophers to reject anthropocentrism. Renowned animal and 
environmental ethicists like Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Clare Palmer, J. Baird Callicott, Arne Naess, Richard 
Sylvan (Routley), Val Plumwood (Routley), Holmes Rolston III, James E. Lovelock and many others have, 
since the emergence of formal animal and environmental philosophical enquiry in the early 1970s, begun to 
question the pervading anthropocentric dominance in Western traditional thought. Editors J. Baird Callicott and 
Clare Palmer have claimed in the general introduction to their voluminous five-volume work entitled 
Environmental Philosophy: Critical Concepts (2005) that “in the finest tradition of Western Philosophy” most 
environmental philosophers have taken “a non-anthropocentric turn” (Callicott & Palmer, 2005: Vol 1, xxxvi). 
That said, as this dissertation will show, eco-phenomenology tends to go the farthest in terms of rejecting 
anthropocentrism since it considers the interconnectedness between human existence and being with the 
existence and being of wild animals and the natural environment as a whole. The current ecological crisis is not 
just about the extinction of wildlife but of human societies too. 
8 The power of phenomenology is that it de-centres the Cartesian subject for something less egotistic and more 
inclusive. 
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consciousness such as perception. The discipline can be clearly differentiated from 
the Cartesian method of analysis where the human ‘Subject’ regards everything else in the 
world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another. 
 
However, I will show that while the overriding concern was to confront and dismantle the 
dominant Cartesian paradigm, the various and distinct versions of phenomenology of Husserl 
et al were still unable to completely untangle from the anthropocentric web. For all these 
traditional philosophers, the world of phenomena remains experienced from the first-person 
perspective, and does not fully detach from the philosophical and Cartesian ‘Subject’. This is 
anthropocentric in that the ‘Subject’ remains as the human ‘experiencer’ of the world, 
endowing it with the meanings that it has. It is therefore not surprising that, because of this 
entanglement with the foundations of the Cartesian subject, for Husserl, and to a lesser degree 
Heidegger, Sartre and Levinas, (other) animals still remained in their minds at least part of that 
outside world while humans, although no longer quite as transcendental and disembodied as 
Descartes would have them, remained at the epicentre of such an ontological worldview. It is 
important to note that while these philosophers adequately broke down the Cartesian Subject 
in human terms, (other) animals, as we shall see in Chapter Three, were still regarded as Other. 
 
2.4. Merleau-Ponty’s break-through 
 
It is only with Maurice Merleau-Ponty that we find a complete albeit gradual break from the 
anthropocentric contagion of Western thought and practice. It is also only in his later works, 
specifically the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible published posthumously in 1968 that 
Merleau-Ponty successfully, managed to escape the grip of anthropocentrism and point the way 
towards the radical insights of eco-phenomenology.  
 
Merleau-Ponty maintains that living beings are shaped primarily by their perceptual (and more 
broadly sensory) experience of their surrounding environment, or their ‘embeddedness’ in the 
world. The key to Merleau-Ponty’s break-through was the focus on the primacy of the living 
body, rather than the consciousness of the transcendental mind. In brief, as Merleau-Ponty’s 
analysis shows, the corporeal, living, breathing, tactile body is in fact the solution to the 
anthropocentric distortion. It is the material body alone, standing open towards its 
surroundings, that enables one to enter into relations with other beings, for without the body’s 
eyes, voice, hands, paws, snout or skin, a being would be unable to see, to hear, smell and touch 
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things; or be seen, heard, smelled and touched by them. In other words, without the body, the 
part that Descartes dismissed as a part of the merely material, objective world, there would be 
no possibility of experience, consciousness, agency or knowledge. For Merleau-Ponty, it is the 
insight that the body (initially called the ‘body-subject’) and not the transcendental mind or the 
first-person experiencer, founds all human knowledge and consciousness, that starts to 
dismantle the bedrock of anthropocentrism.  
 
Merleau-Ponty, therefore, argues for a radically inter-subjective, inter-corporeal or relational 
conception of consciousness where, instead of an aloof transcendental being analyzing the 
surroundings from an incorporeal distance, the body of the so-called ‘Subject’ or rather living 
self-engages physically with, and is indeed thoroughly shaped by, its material surroundings. 
Merleau-Ponty explains that the body is an entity at the point between the divergence of the 
experiencer and the experienced, between the ‘Subject’ and the object. Yet rather than a simple 
dualism, and this is the key to the later Merleau-Ponty’s ontological thinking, this divergence 
(or rather ‘dehiscence’9) between experiencing and the thing-being-experienced also allows for 
the possibility of overlapping and encroachment between the two ‘divergent’ terms (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968: 123). Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that experiencing and experienced are 
reversible entities, i.e. one can both experience and be experienced at the same time. For 
example, in the action of my hand touching the hand of another, one does more than merely 
represent the body's capacity to be both perceiving object and subject of perception. The hand 
of another person is not merely another 'object', but the same fleshy substance that is capable 
of reversing the situation back to my hand, capable of perceiving my hand. We cannot touch 
somebody else’s hand without recognition of our own tangibility and capacity to be touched 
by others.  
 
Importantly, it is not only about the touching of flesh on flesh in the literal sense. The generality 
of Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term ‘flesh’, in his own words, also embraces the seer and the 
seen in the same vein. The ‘flesh’ as introduced in The Visible and the Invisible (1961: 139) 
 
9 “Dehiscence” is a name respectively used in Merleau-Ponty’s  Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and in 
The Visible and the Invisible (1961). It means a divergence without a separation, a split along a seam or small 
gap. To quote Merleau-Ponty: “dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body looked at and 
my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we 
must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 123) He refers to it as 
“the two leaves of my body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 263). 
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“is not matter, is not mind” but a “general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal 
individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there 
is a fragment of being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139) For Merleau-Ponty ‘the flesh’ is an 
“element of Being” in the sense of “the old term ‘element’” of water, air earth and fire 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139). Merleau-Ponty here refers to the chiasmic intertwining and 
interconnection between a being and that being’s surroundings. Indeed, this is true of all the 
senses and all perception – hearing, tasting and smelling. Importantly, though, there is also an 
‘inter-corporeity’ of the flesh (Toadvine, 2018: online). Sensible flesh — what Merleau-Ponty 
calls the ‘visible’ — is not all there is to flesh, since flesh  transmutes itself into an ‘invisible’ 
dimension too, the flesh of ideas. This, however, is not a relapse into a transcendental ego. 
These are notions that cannot be ‘seen’ but in these cases the ideas “cannot be detached from 
the sensible appearance and be erected into a second positivity” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 149). 
The ‘invisible’ passions of love and distrust, destitution and suffering, as examples, are all 
grounded in and arise out of  what we, our bodies, have first experienced sensibly in the world.  
Merleau-Ponty's ontology establishes that in some sense the ‘other’ is always already 
intertwined with(in) the ‘Subject’ in a far more complex reciprocity than just two-halves 
exchanging with one another, and he explicitly suggests that self and non-self are always, at 
the same time, the obverse and reverse of each other. The Cartesian notion of ‘Subject’ 
completely disappears. Merleau-Ponty therefore affirms a dynamic interdependence of self and 
other that involves these categories crisscrossing and intertwining with one another, shaping 
and framing each other, but without ever being reduced or reducible to each other.  
The generality of ‘flesh’ embraces an inter-corporeity, an anonymous sensibility shared out 
among distinct bodies: just as our two hands communicate across the lateral synergy of our 
bodies, I can touch the sensibility of another, even as I cannot do so without being touched in 
turn. Merleau-Ponty, therefore, expertly finds in this ontology a new departure for describing 
the relationship between the body and the world, self and other, facts and ideas, sensibility and 
language. He insists that the body is the seat of consciousness and that the living flesh of the 
body is always already in and of the world, in dynamic interaction with it, and never set apart 
from it. Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine ultimately paves the way for a completely different 
relationship between humans and the natural environment, since it is one that is not constructed 
on hierarchical sovereignty or binary opposites that, in turn, are used to justify the instrumental 
exploitation of (other) animals. Even though Merleau-Ponty never addressed (other) animals 
directly, his phenomenological framework drawn up at the beginning of the Anthropocene can, 
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as I will show, be applied to rethinking the dimension of the relation between the living body 
and lived environment that we call wild(er)ness or being-wild.  
 
2.5. From phenomenology to eco-phenomenology 
 
It is no coincidence that Merleau-Ponty’s ideas reflect those of an earlier ecologist named Jakob 
von Uexküll (1864-1944). Uexküll’s in-field studies of ticks and sea urchins (among others) 
gave Merleau-Ponty most of the foundational concepts for advancing his own ideas. Uexküll 
provides an alternative way of thinking about wildness and how it establishes an 
interconnection between humans, wild animals and the natural environment. Given that 
Merleau-Ponty based his doctrine on the human position in the world on the study of non-
human animal mutual interrelatedness in the first place, it is an easy step to loop the doctrine 
from the human back to a phenomenological application of wild animals. The primacy of the 
body can be applied to any creature interacting with its world, something Uexküll demonstrated 
time and again in his seminal book A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (1934).  
 
The strength of Uexküll’s approach is that he speaks of so-called ‘lesser’ organisms that include 
animals such as ticks and sea urchins, which means the supposedly insuperable line10 dividing 
those within and without the Club of Consideranda has for him never been tenable in the first 
place.  For Uexküll, the being of any organism, from tick to tiger, is that of a continuously 
changing, interconnected, mutually responsive relationship with(in) its environment or 
meaningful world. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology follows directly on from this, only that he 
included human beings into the interwoven mix. In essence, this is what eco-phenomenology 
is about – the chiasmic interrelation of human and (other) animals living interdependently and 
interrelatedly with one another and within the natural (and humanly built) world they find 
themselves in.  
 
To flesh out further the main tenets of eco-phenomenology (which is phenomenology applied 
to ecology or a phenomenological analysis of the natural environment) – given that Uexküll 
was no phenomenologist and did not directly include the human animal in his thinking; and 
given that Merleau-Ponty was no ecologist and did not directly include (other) animals in his 
 
10 This was a term first used by philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1789 to emphasise the divide between humans 
and (other) animals. 
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thinking – it is necessary to introduce Aldo Leopold. He was the father of modern ecology and 
acknowledged pre-cursor to the discipline of environmental ethics in philosophy (Callicott & 
Palmer, 2005: vol I, iii), and I detect a kind of proto-eco-phenomenological stance in his 
writings. It is Leopold who unintentionally combined the approaches of Uexkull and Merleau-
Ponty , in such a way that he opened up  the path toward the future development of eco-
phenomenology.  
 
Leopold, as an American field ecologist, most likely did not read Merleau-Ponty or Uexküll. 
Yet his philosophical views on conservation and the human separation from nature were 
undoubtedly Merleau-Pontian and Uexküllian in spirit. Leopold wrote that “a thing has its 
origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. 
The ecologist calls these ‘symbioses’” (Leopold, 1970: 238). Merleau-Ponty calls it 
‘intertwining’ or ‘chiasm’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1961), which amounts to the same thing. Chiasm, 
for Merleau-Ponty, is a crisscrossing or a bi-directional becoming or exchange between the 
body and things that justifies speaking of a ‘flesh’ of things, a kinship between the sensing 
body and sensed things. (Merleau-Ponty, 1961: 139) Leopold spoke of the importance that 
every living creature has in an ecosystem, from the grouse of the north woods, the wolf of the 
mountains, the blue jay of the hickory groves, and the whiskey jack of the muskegs, to  the 
piñonero of juniper foothills (Leopold, 1970: 146-147). Take any one out of the ecosystem, 
and the whole thing dies, he said. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty and Uexküll were 
getting at when they said that a being is inextricably mutually intertwined with, and co-
constitutive of, his or her surroundings.  
 
The interesting aspect to a Merleau-Pontian-based eco-phenomenology is that it was a similar 
understanding and ethos not only expressed in the prescient writings of Aldo Leopold but has 
been practiced by indigenous human communities since the dawn of time. In southern Africa, 
especially among the Shona traditions in Zimbabwe, there is an ancient world-view called 
Ukama that is still applicable to rural Shona communities today. Ukama means the 
‘interdependence of all that exists.’ According to the ancient Shona tradition, Ukama is the 
reality that all things are closely related and depend on one another for existence (Murove, 
2009). Humans exist in a community that depends, not only on other humans, but also on the 
natural world of animals, plants and other elements in the universe including the community 
of ancestors and future generations to come, which is basically everything. Ukama is concerned 
about the environment and human relationship within the biosphere as the concept affirms 
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human relatedness with the earth and all life (Murove, 2009: 316). Since all living beings are 
dependent on the biosphere – the air, soil, water, and (other) animals – for their survival, it 
stands to reason they ought not to destroy it. Being human and (other) animal, therefore, is 
intricately connected with participating within the biosphere, without which all species 
(including humans) are doomed. What’s more, Ukama is not just a Shona concept, but one that 
supports a traditional African ontological worldview (Murove, 2009). In fact, some scholars 
have gone as far as to say that in fact all indigenous and ancient cultures across the globe 
support a concept of interdependence with the wild environment (Ikeke, 2015). In other words, 
humans are not only dependent on the wild environment, but the wild environment is affected 
by human action, which then calls for a moral response. This means humans are dependent on 
the wild environment as much as the wild environment is dependent on us. This becomes a 
moral issue since our actions affect the wild environment, which ultimately it affects us.  
 
The solution as will be presented in more detail in The Value of Being Wild is to rediscover 
Ukama and begin an eco-phenomenological process of rediscovering the human 
interconnectedness with the natural environment.  
 
2.6. Applied eco-phenomenology 
 
An alternative conservation approach must clearly be a non-anthropocentric and non-
instrumental valuation of wild animals, yet the intrinsic value and moral consideration theories 
we do have that move away from instrumentalism tend to remain tethered to an anthropocentric 
stance, as will show. The alternative to both these broad approaches to environmental ethics, 
as I will explain in more detail below, is offered by an eco-phenomenological framework which 
proposes the full immersion of animals, and humans, in wild nature itself. As I hope to 
demonstrate, a wild animal ceases to be in some key dimensions unless it is being-wild. 
Conservation therefore needs to focus on the ontological valuation and application of being-
wild and one way to do this is by protecting biodiversity rather than commodifying and 
domesticating wild animals simply to maintain their numbers. This notion progresses to the 
intertwined and inextricable human setting within wild nature – the ecosystem in its variety 
and variability. 
 
Since it centres on the world as we experience it in real-time, phenomenology naturally adapts 
to the pragmatic. Phenomenology is the study of experience, action, activity and physical acts, 
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not just cerebral musings. Eco-phenomenology follows this process too as we will see with 
Merleau-Ponty’s foundational theory based on Uexküll’s in-field studies of wild animals, as 
well as Leopold’s descriptions of a functioning ecosystem and the human involvement and 
attachment to that ecosystem. Even our language structures, as described by Merleau-Ponty 
(and discussed in this dissertation) and traditional belief systems like Ukama, speak of a 
practical approach to the natural environment. What follows then are a number of key applied 
eco-phenomenological strategies that are specific to the conservation of wildlife in South 
Africa.  
 
Critically, and given that an eco-phenomenological enquiry insists on the chiasmic – or variable 
and interconnected – nature of species within their natural environment, the successful 
conservation of wild species – and humans – comes down to just a single notion and task: 
recreating the space for biodiversity to thrive. Eco-phenomenology therefore is about the 
commitment toward and the protection of the interconnected and inseparable web of life that 
includes all living beings (plants, wild animals and humans) and even non-living entities 
(water, soil and air). Protection of the biodiversity or the wild environment as a whole, will in 
turn, protect wild animals and provide human well-being. Biodiversity is the variety of life on 
earth, in all its forms and all its interactions and is the most complex feature of our planet, and 
it is the most vital.  
 
One pragmatic strategy in increasing space for biodiversity is the process of ‘rewilding’. 
Rewilding, as the name implies, is about restoring ecosystems that have been under plow, or 
cement. Rewilding is also a “re-involvement”, an “opportunity for people to engage with and 
delight in the natural world” (Monbiot, 2013: 11). The natural environment is not simply a 
collection of species but, in the spirit of Ukama and a Merleau-Pontian eco-phenomenology, 
“of their ever-shifting relationship with each other and the natural environment” (Monbiot, 
2013: 9). Rewilding is an applied and tried approach that permits ecological processes to 
resume by themselves, like allowing trees to naturally repopulate deforested land; or 
mangroves, salt marshes and seagrass beds to grow back after being destroyed. Rewilding is a 
concept that fundamentally recognises that the ecosystem restores itself. It is not simply adding 
a collection of animals and plants to an area, as is often the case with private reserves and game 
ranches in South Africa, but rather of allowing their shifting relationships with each other and 
their surrounding environment to re-develop autonomously by themselves with little human 
‘management’ and thereby re-construct themselves ‘wildly’. So, instead of attempting to 
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manage wildlife – as is prevalent in South Africa (erecting fences, removing predators or 
elephants or vegetation) – conservation ought to think in terms of increasing the broad natural 
environment where every animal from dung beetle to elephant is allowed to naturally thrive in 
order to enhance the ecosystem. Examples of actual rewilding will be explored in this section 
of the dissertation. 
 
It is important that rewilding does not exclude humans. Neither is it about conflict between 
humans and wild animals in an ecosystem. Anthropocene-era humans can still participate in a 
meaningful way with the natural environment while still enjoying the benefits of technology 
and civilization. As I hope to show in this dissertation, an eco-phenomenology recognises that 
all living beings are not stand-alone entities to be taken individually, but together as a great 
interconnected web of life that depends on each other for their existence. And since wildness 
is a valuable aspect of every living organism, it is something that humans must also reconnect 
with, for the sake of their own and others’ flourishing on earth. 
 
3. Chapter layout 
 
Chapter One will introduce and define the current wildlife conservation paradigm adopted 
globally by governments and other policy makers. Notions of anthropocentrism and its reliance 
on instrumental value (otherwise known as sustainable development) will be defined and 
discussed. In particular, this chapter will explore why sustainable development has become the 
preferred model for global wildlife conservation.  
 
Chapter Two will highlight the weaknesses and fundamental flaws of this anthropocentric 
model of wildlife conservation. These weaknesses will be presented both from an economic 
and philosophical perspective. The second part of this chapter is particularly relevant as a 
critique of the dominant Cartesian construct in Western thought that is the bedrock of 
anthropocentrism. There will also be a critique of the main alternative paradigm – namely the 
moral consideration theories for non-human animals, with a focus on animal rights movement 
associated with Peter Singer. The critique will show that instead of providing an alternative to 
anthropocentrism, these concepts are themselves anthropocentric. 
 
Chapter Three is about providing a genuine non-anthropocentric alternative in wildlife 
conservation. The development of phenomenology is potentially best suited for this purpose. 
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The chapter will briefly introduce the main concepts of phenomenology as relevant to wildlife 
conservation. The main protagonists of  phenomenology will be highlighted, showing just how 
effective phenomenology is in breaking down the Cartesian hierarchies and dichotomies  that 
lie at the heart of the anthropocentric problem. However, the chapter will also show that as far 
as traditional phenomenology goes in being anti-Cartesian and thus non-anthropocentric, it 
doesn’t go far enough. 
 
Only in Chapter Four do we see the final break-through for a completely non-anthropocentric 
understanding. This chapter will explore the phenomenological development and evolution of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who in his final work The Visible and the Invisible (1962) provides 
the foundation for a radical approach to wildlife conservation. This chapter is important in that 
it lays the foundation for a completely new way of looking at the conservation of wildlife.  
 
Chapter Five will apply Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological concepts to a more natural 
setting. It will explore the works of Jakob von Uexküll, a biologist whose in-field studies and 
concept of the natural Umwelt had a major influence on Merleau-Ponty himself. Uexküll’s 
work will be enhanced and highlighted by another early ecologist and founder of modern 
conservation, Aldo Leopold. Leopold’s version of wildlife conservation was proto- 
phenomenological in nature and showed clear parallels with Merleau-Ponty’s way of thinking. 
In Leopold we see an early development from phenomenology to eco-phenomenology – 
applying phenomenology to ecology. This chapter will also explore Merleau-Ponty’s idea of 
how language is important in an eco-phenomenological development. 
 
Chapter Six, the final chapter, will look at strategies that apply eco-phenomenology in a 
practical sense. This is where the new, eco-phenomenological wildlife conservation paradigm 
is explored. The dissertation will wrap up with a conclusion that I hope ties it all up and 
provides a summary of what this dissertation has set out to achieve – a meaningful, practical 
alternative through a philosophical development to provide a new conservation approach to 
wildlife. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE DOMINANCE OF ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM IN WILDLIFE 
CONSERVATION  
 
What a piece of work is man,  
How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty,  
In form and moving how express and admirable,  
In action how like an Angel, 
 In apprehension how like a god,  
The beauty of the world,  
The paragon of animals… 
 
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet: Act II, Scene II) 
 
 
In this first chapter, I discuss the prevailing and globally applied economic-centred policies of 
sustainable development in the conservation of wild animals in the Anthropocene era. This is 
a system that is grounded in human-crafted hegemony – anthropocentrism – since the 
conservation of wild animals is only maintained in order to sustain human existence, 
gratification and well-being. At the heart is the view that wild animals are valued purely 
instrumentally, that is, as a means to further the ends of an external goal, in this case, human 
well-being. This chapter, therefore, explores the dominance of economic pragmatism and the 
utlisation of instrumental value behind this widely accepted anthropocentric conservation 
approach.  
 
For this purpose, and from a philosophical frame of reference, I distinguish between ‘strong’ 
anthropocentrism, which is an unbridled over-exploitation of wild animals and the natural 
environment, and a more pragmatic, long-term ‘weaker’ anthropocentric approach that 
supports a sustainable rather than an over-exploitative utilisation of wildlife and wildlife 
products. Weak anthropocentrism also promotes development and growth of wildlife 
population numbers for future utilisation. The concept as it relates to the natural environment 
is best described by Bryan Norton, Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and Policy 
in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, who argues that a weak 
anthropocentric approach provides a more than adequate tool in preventing wild species from 
going extinct. For him, the best way to conserve wildlife is through this limited version of 
anthropocentrism. This is a method that is widely accepted by government and international 
policy makers because it is the easiest pragmatic response to a variety of situations in which 
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wildlife is under threat (Norton, 2005b). I will lay out Norton’s arguments in full and integrate 
them with an evaluation as to why an economic-centred conservation strategy is so widely 
accepted and applied. Specifically, I shall examine in depth the apparent success South Africa 
has had with conserving (some) wild species, as well as concentrating on the perceived market-
related benefits for South African humans flowing from an economically-centred policy of 
weak anthropocentrism.  
 
This chapter will also focus on the perceived success of policies of sustainable development. 
While statistically positive in terms of preserving numbers, the weak anthropocentric model, 
as I will show in more detail in Chapter Two, is largely inadequate in providing real 
conservation benefits to wild animals in wild places and ignores the fundamental tenet of 
holistically sustaining the environment and overall biodiversity within it. Furthermore, weak 
anthropocentric sustainable development, as executed by the South African Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA), falls far short of providing meaningful benefits for the 
livelihoods of humans that plays a central role in justifying this model.  
 
In this chapter I shall: 
- Provide a definition of sustainable development as laid out by the United Nations’ 
Brundtland Commission as well as those of other global agencies and nationally as 
defined in the South African Bill of Rights.  
- Introduce the philosophical perspective on sustainable development, namely the 
concept of methodological pragmatism as it relates to instrumental value and wildlife. 
- Provide an overview of weak versus strong anthropocentrism as an example of 
methodological pragmatism. 
- Provide governmental policy examples of weak anthropocentrism notably the notion of 
a green circular economy and global trade in endangered wildlife. 
- Provide the South African-specific employment of weak anthropocentrism as it relates 
to wildlife conservation. 
 
1. Sustainable development of wildlife: definition 
 
As stated in the Introduction of this dissertation, the notion of ‘sustainable development’ is 
defined by the United Nations Brundtland Commission’s findings in 1987. The definition has 
laid down guiding principles for environmental conservation that, by implication, includes wild 
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fauna and flora. As per the Brundtland Commission’s report, the broad definition of the term 
‘sustainable development’ is that it “strives to meet basic human needs without destroying or 
degrading the natural environment so that future generations of humans can meet their own 
needs” (United Nations General Assembly, 1987). Under ‘natural environment’ the report 
includes wild species of fauna and flora. This guiding principle is explicitly  anthropocentric  
in that it places current and future needs of humankind at the epicentre. The natural 
environment, and wild species, are protected from destruction only insofar as they provide 
food, water, gratification and capital for the benefit of human well-being. 
 
Following this anthropocentric guiding principle, the official position of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN: website), is almost the same. This is an 
organization that is involved in global environmental data gathering and analysis, research, 
field projects, advocacy, and education. The IUCN’s mission is to "influence, encourage and 
assist societies throughout the world to conserve nature and to ensure that any use of natural 
resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable" (IUCN: website). For wild species in 
particular, the IUCN Species Programme, in conjunction with the IUCN Species Survival 
Commission (SSC), states that they “are driving the fight to save species for people and nature” 
(IUCN Global Species Programme, 2016: website). Note the mention of ‘people’, and then 
‘nature’. Also note that saving species is not framed to target the species themselves but for 
humans and the broad environment that humans exist in. Ignoring the interests of wild species 
is an important omission as we shall see further on in this chapter when I deal with the question 
of moral consideration. 
 
The IUCN statement continues to reinforce an anthropocentric model with this statement:  
 
Species are the building blocks of life, the natural resources that humans rely on 
every day. They provide us with food; fuel; clothes and medicine. They purify 
water and air; prevent soil erosion; regulate climate and pollinate crops. They also 
provide a vital resource for economic activities – such as tourism, fisheries and 
forestry (IUCN Global Species Programme, 2016). 
 
Again, everything points to the central theme that a preserved environment is good for the 
benefit of human health and well-being through the use of sustainable utilization of wildlife. 
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Staying with international organizations, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 
which incorporates the Convention on the Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) follows similar anthropocentric guidelines. CITES focuses its mandate on wild 
species of animals and plants rather than the broad environment. Endangered wild species, as 
per CITES definitions, are either those “threatened with extinction” or those that “are not 
necessarily now threatened with extinction but that may become so unless trade is closely 
controlled” (CITES b.). In form and structure, CITES functions within the United Nations 
treaty system, which is a non-binding agreement between nations. Because of its 
comprehensive international standing, CITES therefore serves as an authoritative advocate for 
global conservation policies but since the organization regulates the trade in endangered 
species, CITES likewise endorses an anthropocentric sustainable development approach. 
 
Pursuant of the view of these global institutions, the notion of sustainable development has 
been adopted by South African policy makers and enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the South 
African Constitution (1996), which states:  
 
Everyone has the right— (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health 
or wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that — 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996: Chapter 2, 24). 
 
Again, this is an anthropocentric text in that the environment cannot be harmful to human 
health and wellbeing; the environment is protected for present and future human generations; 
and it aims to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources for 
human economic and social development. 
 
It is clear and without any doubt that global and national legislative policy favours an 
anthropocentric approach to sustainable development. Wildlife conservation is simply a means 
to conserve and secure human benefits and therefore is a purely instrumentally valued 
construct.  
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2. Anthropocentrism as it relates to sustainable development 
 
Anthropocentrism is not interested in preserving the survival of wild species per se but for 
meeting human needs using simple economic models based on instrumental value. The most 
basic of the economic models is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). This is highlighted by Bryan 
Norton, whose research concentrates on sustainability theory and on problems of scale in the 
formulation of environmental problems. Norton stresses that in terms of sustainable 
development: “A Cost-Benefit Analysis is made on the basis of calculations of costs and 
benefits based on benefits for human beings only.” (Norton, 2005a: 87) Under CBA, wild 
animals are viewed to have value – but specifically instrumental value in that they are traded 
or utilised “to render human existence more materially comfortable” (Rolston III, 2005b: 324). 
Markets act impartially as they ignore individual preferences and values and form into a 
collective preference ordering of broad social states.  
 
CBA is not bogged down by nebulous and complex notions like intrinsic value of wildlife. 
CBA completely circumvents any ethical enquiry into conserving wildlife yet is still able to 
conserve through a basic economic valuation of wildlife. It is an approachable and 
understandable construct that is also easy to implement in practice. Essentially, a government 
employs CBA to a particular wildlife situation, weighs up the economic cost versus the benefit 
and concludes the action to follow. 
 
• African elephants 
 
A concrete example – one that is common throughout many parts of Africa where they roam 
freely – is the calculation of cost versus benefits of preserving Africa’s elephants. African 
elephant populations have declined by around a third of their population in the last decade. 
(Chase et al. 2016) Consequently, there is an urgent need to preserve them from going extinct, 
but elephants do not mix well with humans. They require a lot of space and plenty of food, 
which means that as human populations expand and develop deeper into Africa’s remaining 
wild spaces, humans invariably come into conflict with them. In these areas, elephants destroy 
crops and water reservoirs, break huts and houses and in some cases kill humans who retaliate 
in kind. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species states that while “poaching for ivory and 
meat has traditionally been the major cause of the species' decline, currently the most important 
perceived threat is the loss and fragmentation of habitat caused by ongoing human population 
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expansion and rapid land conversion. A specific manifestation of this trend is the reported 
increase in human-elephant conflict, which further aggravates the threat to elephant 
populations” (IUCN, Red List of Threatened Species, Loxodonta africana).  
 
Therefore, as human interests require more land for development and agricultural use, the 
preservation of elephants becomes less important at a local grass-roots level. According to 
CBA, preserving elephants, or any endangered species for that matter, is an act of balance – 
between the costs to humans only (limiting agricultural and development space, loss of income, 
food and enduring the death of a family member by an elephant) and the tangible benefits to 
humans only (preserving elephants as an income from a regulated trade in ivory; or proceeds 
from sustainable trophy hunting; or proceeds from wildlife-watching tourism). Only if benefits 
of elephants to humans (higher financial income) continues to outweigh the costs (trampled 
crops), then it is more likely they would be preserved in terms of pure CBA approaches.  
 
Thus, according to a decision-making process of methodological pragmatism, an 
anthropocentric economic-based conservation model of maintaining human benefits over 
human costs is a good one. In this pragmatic sense, the process produces a win-win solution 
because elephants could be prevented from extermination if and only if they continue to provide 
greater long-term benefits for humans against potential costs.  
 
2.1. Weak versus strong anthropocentrism  
 
2.1.1. Strong anthropocentrism 
 
According to Norton’s definition, strong anthropocentrism takes ‘felt preferences’ of human 
individuals as the determining value, as opposed to the ‘considered preferences’ characterizing 
his notion of ‘weak anthropocentrism’. A felt preference “is any desire or need of a human 
individual that can at least be temporarily sated” (Norton, 2005b: 229). In its crude form, what 
makes a human decide to act is based on a sensory desire for transaction or exchange. Decision-
making is simply a matter of responding to desired, subjective and immediate preferences and 
“public policy is determined by the extent to which it works toward the satisfaction of most – 
or the most urgent – preferences” (Holland, 2005: 371).   
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An example of this would be the current demand for rhino horn in Asia. The demand is fueled 
by a felt preference. It stems from the desire for an animal product that is perceived to have 
aesthetic, cultural and perceived powerful medicinal qualities.. The latter is mainly the case 
with consumers in Vietnam. In China it’s a different felt preference. Rhino horns, like ivory, 
are desired as carved objects often in the form of jewelry or figurines. In Yemen, rhino horn is 
coveted for the handles of traditional daggers called Janbiyas worn as a clothing accessory by 
Yemeni men.  
 
Whether for medicinal or other use, the widespread demand for rhino horn is driven by felt 
preferences without any consideration that the resource may be over-exploited and depleted 
and without any consideration for future use. This catering to a felt preference has now 
occurred to the point that the demand threatens the future survival of rhinos, and their value as 
a future resource for human generations yet to come. Already, all three species of Asian rhinos 
– the one-horned, Sumatran and Javan – are teetering on the brink of extinction in the wild 
(WWF website, Asian Rhinos),  while Africa’s last male northern white rhino died amid 
frenzied press coverage in March 2018 thus rendering the species functionally dead. Since 
2008, as a direct result of rhino populations crashing in Asia, traders in rhino horn have begun 
to heavily target the two remaining African rhino species.  
 
This over-exploitation as a result of collective unrestrained felt preferences is an excellent 
example of the  strong version of anthropocentrism. This approach of letting the market decide 
is having a devastating impact on the future survival of most wildlife species from fish to 
elephants. Government policy in consumer countries, especially democratic ones, once tended 
to follow this collective felt-preference desire primarily because it satisfies most voter 
preferences and therefore bolsters government’s approval ratings. However, with the future of 
the resource at stake, these governments have belatedly begun to dilute felt preferences for 
something more considered, as I shall demonstrate now:  
 
Norton distinguishes between a ‘felt’ and a ‘considered preference’. A considered preference 
“is any desire or need that a human individual would express after careful deliberation, 
including a judgement that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted worldview 
– a worldview which includes fully supported scientific theories and a metaphysical framework 
interpreting those theories as well as a set of rationally supported aesthetic and moral ideals” 
(Norton, 2005: 229). Thus, as can be seen, instead of simply reacting to a subjectively felt 
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desire, careful investigation of one’s felt preferences enables human individuals to adopt a 
more considered approach, which for Norton amounts to weak anthropocentrism in the case of 
environmental concerns. The notions of felt and considered preferences of course have much 
wider implications, e.g. one might have a felt preference for fatty foods, but upon careful 
deliberation of scientific theories (around nutrition) and metaphysical frameworks (such as the 
body is ‘a temple of God’), one might decide to no longer consume fatty foods. One would 
then have a considered preference for healthy food which would trump the felt preference. But 
here we focus on the implications of the distinction for Norton’s weak anthropocentrism in 
matters ecological. 
 
2.1.2. Weak anthropocentrism 
 
Weak anthropocentrism, therefore, finds that value, while still centred on humans, is not 
restricted to the raw satisfactions of immediate felt preferences of human individuals but 
adjudicates between preferences to be considered. According to Norton, stances of 
consideration for the environment “can be divided into ones concerning distributional fairness 
within generations and others concerning longer-term, cross-generational issues” (Norton, 
2005b: 237). Most environmental concerns, claims Norton, can be resolved as issues of such 
fairness. 
 
A typical example of this is if a landowner pollutes a river upstream. It raises a question of 
fairness between the landowner and her downstream neighbours. In other words, this is a moral 
issue, which, says Norton, is resolvable “using the categories and rules of standard, 
individualistic ethics” (Norton, 2005b: 237). It is obviously wrong for the upstream landowner 
to pollute a river that will negatively affect her downstream neighbours. She must, therefore, 
halt the activity and, if necessary, compensate for damage caused to her downstream 
neighbours. These standard rules are common in most non-environmental issues (Norton, 
2005b: 237).  
 
More difficult, are issues across time, but they are likewise effortlessly applied. If resources, 
such as the supply of rhino horn, are used up they no longer provide benefits. A considered 
preference would seek ways to maximise both the benefits for the greatest number (the 
utilitarian principle) and the longevity of those benefits. In the case of rhino horn, there are two 
possible scenarios under the weak anthropocentric model:  
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Firstly, given that most rhino species have become critically endangered, there is a realisation 
that there is a need to take drastic measures to secure their survival for future human use, 
through a more governed trade. CITES operates like this. In the case of rhinos, in 1977 the 
member countries voted to ban international trade on rhino horn (CITES d.). Using 
recommendations from a number of scientific conservation bodies, like the IUCN Species 
Survival Commission, the CITES Secretariat in 2016 has found that rhino numbers have yet to 
recover to a level where international trade is again permitted. This by no means implies that 
rhino horn may never again be traded. CITES’ reasoning is that when rhino populations have 
recovered significantly enough as a result of a ban, a trade may once again be permitted (CITES 
d.). The moral concern here is not the well-being of the rhino, or their possible intrinsic value, 
but rather one of fairness towards future humans who might otherwise be deprived of rhino as 
a source of different kinds of instrumental value. This reversal on trade is what happened with 
African elephants, whose products, namely ivory, were banned from international trade in 
1989. These were partially lifted in 1997 when their numbers were thought to be sufficient in 
some countries for a regulated trade. In this case, three African countries – Botswana, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe – were allowed to internationally trade in ivory again in what was then termed 
a ‘once-off’ sale (CITES, 16 July Press Release). The ivory – which weighed almost 50 tons 
and represented 5,446 tusks – was sold to Japan in 1999 and earned the countries some USD 
5-million. The funds were recycled back into elephant conservation activities (CITES, 12th 
November 2002). As with elephants, the current rationale behind the total ban in rhino horn 
trade, therefore, is to safeguard a potential resource for future human utilisation. 
 
The other scenario, instead of banning a trade in an animal product, ensures the product remains 
available to trade in order to produce a steady flow of benefits in the present as well as into the 
future. This is more about a regulation of trade. Relating to rhino horn, this is the thinking of 
many wildlife ranchers in South Africa as well as the South African government (International 
Rhino Foundation). Unlike elephants, rhinos do not need to be killed in order to extract their 
horn. Horns can be painlessly sawed off and then allowed to regrow therefore supplying a 
continued trade resource. One can also easily farm rhino, like cattle. Rhino ranchers are 
therefore intensively breeding rhino, stockpiling rhino horn and petitioning CITES to down-
list rhino so that their horns can be traded, at least from South Africa where population numbers 
are still healthy (Rhinosalive.com, 2016). The ranchers hope they could eventually create a 
steady supply chain to Asia. Meanwhile, in the United States, there is a company that is 
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producing bio-fabricated synthetic rhino horn, also with an aim to maintain a flow of supply to 
meet the demand and to provide benefits to a larger human population (Pembient: website). 
 
Thus, a weak anthropocentric approach has two scenarios: a distribution scenario about the fair 
treatment of human individuals with felt preferences living in the present as well as a 
considered resource allocation principle scenario that has reference to the long-term future of 
human generations. Using this approach, Norton believes there is a basis for favouring weak 
anthropocentrism “without the questionable ontological commitments made by non-
anthropocentrists in attributing intrinsic value to nature” (Norton, 2005b: 227). Weak 
anthropocentrism, therefore, provides a basis for curtailing human consumptive needs in an 
effort to preserve, manage and regulate the use of wildlife resources across extended time.  
 
2.2. Circular ‘Green’ Economy 
 
As purported by Norton, for governments and legislators, when faced with whether to conserve 
wild animals, it is difficult to register and aggregate voter preferences over ostensibly 
subjective ethical notions of ‘intrinsic value’ of animals and equal consideration. Instead they 
make decisions “which are more systematic, more scientific, which often means more 
economic” (Rolston III, 2005b: 321). As a result, most of the world’s governments and global 
organizations justify the existence of wild animals based on the tangible human utility of  weak 
anthropocentric sustainability as discussed above – taking only human utility into consideration 
but with a combination of a long-term perspective.  
 
Governments and inter-governmental organisations have no compunction about valuing wild 
animals instrumentally like this – highlighted by the fact there is no mention of intrinsic value 
of wild animals in any preamble, mission statement, bill of rights, charter, canon, code or 
constitution, anywhere in the world. With a focus on market (instrumental) value the issue 
centres on sustainability, i.e. future use. The question simply concerns ‘how much can they 
take without destroying the resource?’ In the Anthropocene, concerned about the ever-
decreasing natural resources and resultant socio-economic problems, inter-governmental and 
governmental agencies are turning to what is referred to by the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) as circular ‘green’ strategies that create a cycle of renewable or sustainable 
natural resources, or at least rationing non-renewable ones, so that humans can enjoy long-term 
benefits. (UNEP: website) 
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As part of these strategies, UNEP launched the Green Economy Initiative (GEI) in 2008. UNEP 
has developed a working definition of a green economy as: 
 
…one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its 
simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low 
carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive. Practically speaking, a green 
economy is one whose growth in income and employment is driven by public and 
private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy 
and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services. These investments need to be catalysed and supported by targeted public 
expenditure, policy reforms and regulation changes. This development path 
should maintain, enhance and, where necessary, rebuild natural capital as a 
critical economic asset and source of public benefits, especially for poor people 
whose livelihoods and security depend strongly on nature (UNEP: website). 
 
In other words, the green economic model encourages economic growth through the 
sustainable and wider circulation of natural resources. It is weakly anthropocentric in that the 
livelihoods and security of people are always the central priority, yet, it functions as a 
conservation tool in that the system acknowledges that the prevention of the over-exploitation 
of the environment is essential to providing for those livelihoods and security into the future. 
Over the past decade, the concept of the Green Economy has emerged as a strategic priority 
for many governments and intergovernmental organizations. Sixty-five countries, including 
South Africa, have formally adopted UNEP’s Inclusive Green Economy and related strategies 
(UNEP: website). 
 
2.2.1. Saving Wildlife by Trading Them 
 
More comprehensive in terms of endangered wildlife was the vision behind the creation of 
CITES. This organization is a prototypical and well-established version of current green 
economic management systems. CITES was drafted as a result of a resolution adopted in 1963 
at a meeting of members of IUCN. The organisation eventually came into being at a gathering 
of representatives of 80 countries in Washington, D.C. on 3 March 1973, and on 1 July 1975 it 
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entered into force (CITES a.). Today, CITES is an international agreement between 183 
governments called Parties. It has a slightly different version of UNEP’s anthropocentric 
definition of the green economy in that wildlife appears to be given priority over human 
benefit: “to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not 
threaten their survival” (CITES a.). However, as the title suggests, CITES is foremost a trade 
convention rather than a wildlife conservation organization per se, so once again instrumental 
value for human benefit remains at the core of its function.  
 
The international trade in endangered wild animals and plants is estimated to be worth billions 
of dollars. The trade is diverse, ranging from live animals and plants to a vast array of wildlife 
products derived from them, including food products, exotic leather goods, wooden musical 
instruments, timber, tourist curios and medicines (CITES a.). It was realized in 1963, a year 
after Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, that levels of exploitation of some animal and 
plant species were unsustainably high. The trade in them began to heavily deplete their 
populations and, in many cases, brought some species close to extinction. Since the trade in 
wild animals and plants crosses borders between countries, the effort to regulate it required 
international cooperation to safeguard certain species from over-exploitation. Hence, it is a 
treaty among governments under the United Nations system.  In an effort to continue 
benefitting from the trade, the aim of CITES was to ensure the continued circulation of wildlife 
products in trade and simultaneously “safeguard resources for the future” (CITES a.). 
 
In line with what Sagoff has suggested, the main attraction of the trade model that produced 
CITES, is its neutrality among competing values in a global society of diverse ethical, aesthetic, 
cultural and other values. The trade model depends entirely on efficiency, gratification and 
wealth maximisation, which is achieved through perpetual utility of species that indirectly 
preserves their numbers.  
 
For policy-makers, the CITES trade model is easily applied: one can either trade or not; or one 
may trade up to a point. Through co-operation of its Parties, CITES accords varying degrees 
of trade regulation to more than 35,000 species of animals and plants. Of that number, 669 
endangered species of wild animals may not be commercially traded. Over 5,000 can be traded 
but only under specific guidelines (CITES c.). Endangered wild animals are either placed under 
Appendix I, meaning no commercial trade; or Appendix II, meaning a regulated trade of 
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varying degrees depending on the species (CITES b.)11. This trade model, therefore, is the 
simplest and easiest model for governments to apply, especially when it comes to justifying 
the (human costs of the) continued existence of wild animals. Democratic governments, whose 
mandates are handed to them by human voters, must prioritize human interests above those of 
wild animals. If the human interests lie in preserving wild animals for socio-economic well-
being, then governments can justify protecting them. If wild animals disappear, so do those 
human benefits.  
 
The legal trade model under CITES  seems to provide a buffer against illegal trafficking in 
wild animals and their products, but has been recognised as an important driver of biodiversity 
loss (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 3).  
 
• Rhinoceroses 
 
Let us return to the rhino scenario again. The impact of the demand for their horns on this 
endangered and threatened species has been well documented and the debate has been 
intensified by the accelerated growth in poaching rates of rhinos since the poaching crisis began 
in 2009, when the demand for rhino horn spiked in South-east Asia. This occurred as a result 
of Asian rhino species being pushed to unsustainable numbers causing traders and illegal 
traffickers to turn to Africa to continue to supply the market (Cruise, 2017). In the debate that 
has ensued in order to put a brake on poaching, the idea of legalising markets began to gain 
traction as a key policy option in saving the species (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 4). This scheme 
sprang from the idea that trade bans have become ineffectual in the struggle to ensure the long-
term survivability of rhinos. Banning the trade in rhinos, which has been in force since 1977 
(CITES d.), has been portrayed as the main cause behind the existence of large-scale 
underground markets with high prices and profitability. This led to the development of a suite 
of literature that supported the notion that legalising wildlife markets would be a better option 
in saving the species from rampant poaching (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 4). 
 
The basic argument in favour of a legal market solution to the rhino poaching crisis has been 
developed in full or in parts in Biggs et al. (2013), Conrad (2012), Eustace (2012), Lockwood 
 
11 There is an Appendix III listing but this serves for bilateral agreements between countries to regulate trade 
and does not require the cooperation of other CITES Parties. (CITES b.) 
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(2011), Martin (2011), Moyle (2007, 2013), 't Sas-Rolfes (2012) and Loon (2012). Their 
overarching justification for a pro-trade solution to the poaching crisis begins with the premise 
that poaching and trafficking are a consequence of high prices for rhino horn, estimated to be 
worth up to USD 60,000 per kilogram on the Black Market (Al Jazeera, 21st August 2017). 
Demand is assumed to be large and stable, rooted in modern medicinal, aesthetic and cultural 
patterns. Given that demand for wildlife products is persistent and relatively insensitive to price 
movements, the supply reduction provoked by the trade ban inevitably stimulates the black 
market and drives prices up. The high prices in the illegal markets constitute powerful 
incentives that compensate for the costs and risks of wildlife trafficking (Nadal & Aguayo, 
2014: 6). 
 
High prices of rhino horn are assumed to be the outcome of an insufficient supply derived from 
the international trade ban on rhino horn currently enforced by CITES (CITES d.). Various 
estimates have been presented showing that de-horning, confiscated horns and other sources of 
horn can adequately supply quantities large enough to meet the current demand and bring prices 
down. Suspending the trade ban would increase and stabilise the supply of horn and again, 
bring prices down, thus reducing the incentives to poaching and trafficking and providing an 
additional revenue source for private owners and public parks (Biggs et al., 2013, Conrad 2012, 
Eustace, 2012, Lockwood, 2011, Martin, 2011, Moyle, 2007, 2013, 't Sas-Rolfes, 2012 and 
Loon, 2012).  
 
A legal trade mechanism, according to all the aforementioned pro-trade justifications, would 
thus contribute to the conservation of rhinos by both reducing poaching and increasing 
revenues for continued conservation efforts. 
 
3. Weak anthropocentric sustainable development in South Africa 
 
In line with these market-centred, pro-trade policies, the South African government has 
endorsed a weak anthropocentric view of sustainable ‘green’ development. It is embedded in 
official national policy (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) as a means that 
“can be tapped into to contribute to radical socio-economic transformation in South Africa” 
(Department of Environmental Affairs, 8 March 2018). The country is a particularly good 
example, perhaps the type, of how the economically sustainable development of wildlife 
utilisation can be portrayed as a successful conservation model not only in preserving wild 
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animal numbers but in increasing them. On statistics alone, it seems South Africa may have 
discovered the most effective remedy against rampant decline in its wild species that has 
plagued much of the continent during the Anthropocene – wildlife ranching.  
 
3.1. Wildlife ranching 
 
The wildlife economy in South Africa centers largely on private ranching activities that relate 
to the stocking, trading, breeding, and hunting of wildlife, and all the services and goods 
required to support its economic value chain.  
 
In South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, there was a realisation that the sustainable use of 
wildlife could be more financially viable than unregulated harvesting from the wild (Taylor et 
al., 2015: 1).12 It was followed by the Game Theft Act of 1991, which provided certain 
ownership rights to landowners over wild animals held in adequately enclosed areas. The Act 
provided the incentive for a major shift in farming activities across South Africa and has led to 
the huge growth of wildlife ranching as a land use (Taylor et al., 2015: 1). Today, the South 
African Department of Environment (DEA) states that wildlife ranching in South Africa 
encompasses more than 9,000 commercial wildlife ranches that cover 16.8 % of the country's 
landmass (Department of Environmental Affairs, 8 March 2018). The DEA has also stated that 
“to date the Wildlife Economy has secured R138-million in private sector investment, whilst 
government has invested a further R66,6-million in the wildlife economy sector, through the 
Expanded Public Works Programme [sic] funding streams” (Department of Environmental 
Affairs, 8 March 2018). The DEA believes that the wildlife economy will contribute R5,7-
billion to the economy in the form of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and create 125,000 jobs 
with an expansion of 10-million hectares by 2030 (Department of Environmental Affairs, 8 
March 2018).  
 
According to a study by Taylor et al. for the Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT) entitled An 
Assessment of the Economic, Social and Conservation Value of the Wildlife Ranching Industry 
and its Potential to Support the Green Economy in South Africa (2015) there are 5,987-million 
 
12 Taylor et al are the only recent comprehensive study on this subject in South Africa. Consequently, I have 
relied heavily on this document in this section of the chapter. 
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large herbivores in the country.13 This number excludes small obscure difficult-to-count 
species, namely grysbok, klipspringer, oribi and suni, as well as warthogs and bushpigs. The 
figure represents a ten-fold increase since the boom in private wildlife ranching started in South 
Africa in the 1960s (Taylor et al., 2015: 2). Carnivores in South Africa were also found to be 
abundant. The most common species are jackals (occurring on 97% of properties), mongooses 
(96%), caracal (94%) and genets (90%). Leopards and brown hyaenas occurred on 62% and 
50% of properties respectively, while cheetahs, spotted hyaenas and African lions occurred on 
<20% of properties. Wild dogs were least common, occurring on only 4% of farms (Taylor et 
al., 2015: 4). 
 
The EWT study uses Kenya as a counter-example. In contrast to South Africa, Kenya, in 1977, 
banned the consumptive commercialisation of wildlife such as ranching and trophy hunting for 
fear the practices were unsustainable. Even though there has been no formal research into the 
effects, Taylor et al. (citing Norton-Griffiths) state: “…it’s no mere coincidence the East 
African country has experienced a precipitous decline in wildlife populations, both on private 
land and state protected areas, with this decrease possibly being as high as 70%” (Norton-
Griffiths, 2000, 2007; Ogutu et al., 2011 in Taylor et al., 2015: 73). Norton-Griffiths ascribed 
this “fundamental institutional failure” to the lack of property rights and use rights of 
landowners over wildlife and stated that the resulting market failure reflected the absence of 
financial incentives for landowners to conserve their wildlife resource (Norton-Griffiths, 2000 
in Taylor et al., 2015: 73). 
 
The terms ‘wildlife ranching’ and ‘game farming’, according to Taylor et al.: 
 
…both refer to the management of wildlife on private land for commercial 
purposes. They are often used interchangeably, although game farming generally 
(and subjectively) refers to smaller properties (<5,000 ha) where some form of 
constant management is necessary, while wildlife ranching generally refers to 
larger properties (>5,000ha) where management interventions are less necessary 
and frequent (and may be considered extensive) (Taylor et al., 2015: 10).  
 
 
13 This is a very different figure to that presented by the Department of Environmental Affairs (as mentioned 
above) of 20-million head of game (Department of Environmental Affairs, 8th June 2018) Taylor et al state this 
is due to different methods of calculation (Taylor et al., 2015: 4) but do not provide further explanation. 
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The criteria Taylor et al used to decide  the definition of a wildlife ranch are as follows: 
- It had to be privately owned (which could mean owned by an individual, company or 
consortium). They excluded any state-owned areas such as national parks.  
- It had to derive commercial benefit from wildlife. The extent of commercialisation was 
not important in the study (i.e. they did not have to be profitable), and they included a 
range of possibilities from full-time profit-making wildlife ranchers at one end of the 
spectrum, to part-time, mixed farming ranchers possibly making a loss from wildlife at 
the other (Taylor et al., 2015: 10). 
 
In addition to properties that would generally be referred to as ranches or farms, Taylor et al. 
also included private game/nature reserves, as long as they fulfilled the two criteria above 
(Taylor et al., 2015: 10). 
 
Apart from the non-consumptive role of wildlife-watching (or photographic) tourism, the 
wildlife ranching industry in South Africa is supported by these broad consumptive economic 
sectors:  
- Trophy hunting, biltong hunting and wing shooting 
- Live sales and breeding of high value species and colour variants 
- Game meat sales  
(Taylor et al., 2015: 10). 
 
Some 29,000 wild animals were sold at auctions countrywide during 2014. Live wild animal 
sales generated R4.3-billion the same year, hunting generated R2.6-billion (this figure only 
represents the value of the animals and excludes money spent by hunters on lodging, food and 
professional hunting fees); and game meat production generated around R610-million. Trophy 
hunting provided the highest average income out of these categories (with a mean of R43,000 
per property per year), while game meat production and biltong hunting provided R7,000 per 
property per year and R11,000 per property per year on average respectively. Overall, 65,170 
permanent jobs were supported during 2014. This figure excludes temporary employees and 
people working in wildlife ranching who were not employed by the ranchers themselves. Such 
industries include wildlife translocators, fencing businesses, and taxidermists (Taylor et al., 
2015: 5). 
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As one can see from these figures, weak anthropocentric sustainable development of wildlife 
ranching seems to have generated an increase of wild animal populations but is providing 
significant financial revenue for humans – not just for landowners but also for  the labourers, 
who are normally regarded as those subject to rural poverty and destitution. There also seem 
to be potential benefits for the livelihoods of those that were previously disadvantaged in terms 
of landownership and property rights during the Apartheid era.  
  
3.1.1.  Trophy hunting  
 
One of the key areas identified for contributing to economic growth and social transformation 
is the trophy hunting industry. The DEA has recognised this sector as: “One of the major 
contributors to wildlife tourism and the South African economy.” (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 8 March 2018) According to Taylor et al., “the total revenue generated 
from these animals on all wildlife ranches across South Africa was estimated to be R1.96-
billion” (Taylor et al., 2015: 3). 
 
Trophy hunting can be defined as the selective hunting of individual non-domesticated animals 
(primarily mammals), picked for specific traits such as large horns, tusks or body size and is 
performed by paying clients using a rifle or bow in the presence of a professional hunter 
(Lindsey et al., 2007; Van der Merwe, Saayman & Rossouw, 2014 in Taylor et al., 2015: 10). 
The primary products obtained from this activity are skins, horns and tusks, and these are often 
retained by the clients to be displayed as mounted trophies. 
 
Trophy hunting as a conservation tool seems to be a particularly good example of Norton’s 
weak anthropocentric model. The foundational premise behind hunting-as-conservation is that 
in order for trophy hunters to continue to enjoy the ‘sport’ of shooting wild, often iconic ‘Big-
Five’14 animals like elephants, leopards, lions, rhinos and buffalo, hunting needs to be regulated 
and managed. These animals that are favoured by trophy hunters are therefore conserved, and 
in some cases, their numbers deliberately increased in order to ‘cash in’ on greater numbers of 
wealthy foreign trophy hunters. Thus, by governing the consumptive gratification (‘felt 
 
14 A term originally used to describe the five most difficult African mammals to hunt on foot. Now also used to 
describe the large charismatic species most sought after by ecotourists.  
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preference’) of trophy-hunters, the practice is in fact conserving selected wildlife populations 
into the future.  
 
To this point, most of the world conservation bodies, such as CITES and IUCN, and 
governments endorse well-managed trophy hunting as a viable conservation tool. The IUCN 
Species Survival Commission’s (SSC) Guiding Principles on Trophy Hunting as a Tool for 
Creating Conservation Incentives states: “Trophy hunting is a form of wildlife use that, when 
well-managed, may assist in furthering conservation objectives by creating the revenue and 
economic incentives for the management and conservation of the target species and its habitat, 
as well as supporting local livelihoods” (IUCN SSC, 2012: 4). The CITES document on The 
Trade in Hunting Trophies of Species Listed in Appendix I or II likewise states:  
 
RECOGNIZING that well-managed and sustainable trophy hunting is consistent 
with and contributes to species conservation, as it provides both livelihood 
opportunities for rural communities and incentives for habitat conservation, and 
generates benefits which can be invested for conservation 
purposes…RECALLING that Resolution Conf. 16.6 (Rev. CoP17) on CITES and 
livelihoods recognizes that poor rural communities may attach economic, social, 
cultural and ceremonial importance to some CITES listed species, and 
RECOGNIZING the resources that trophy hunting provides to certain local 
communities (CITES: Res. Conf. 17.9). 
 
• Trophy hunting leopards 
 
The perceived economic benefits of trophy hunting can potentially reverse negative traditional 
perceptions toward wildlife in South Africa. Traditionally, leopards are seen by South African 
stock farmers as vermin as they pose a threat to livestock numbers. Leopards therefore have no 
value, market or otherwise. If anything, they have a negative market value as they impact 
negatively on the profits of  cattle ranching or goat and sheep farming. Consequently, leopards 
are indiscriminately trapped and killed to the extent that their numbers in South Africa have 
declined (Department of Environment of the Republic of South Africa, 16th January 2017). 
 
As a result, the DEA issued a two year-moratorium between 2016 and 2018 on any further 
killing of leopards. This was a blanket moratorium that also included banning the trophy 
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hunting of leopards (Department of Environment of the Republic of South Africa, 16th January 
2017). The moratorium caused an outcry among trophy hunting associations who argued that 
far from contributing to their demise, trophy hunters were in fact protecting leopard 
populations. The Professional Hunting Association of South Africa (PHASA) counter-argued 
the DEA’s decision stating that rather than saving leopards, the moratorium on hunting the 
animals as trophies was instead contributing to their demise (Professional Hunting Association 
of South Africa, 2017). 
 
Leopards are a Big-Five species, meaning they, along with lion, buffalo, rhino and elephants, 
are a primary draw-card for wealthy international trophy hunters who are willing to pay 
between USD15,000-USD35,000 to shoot an individual leopard (Democratic staff of the House 
Committee on Natural Resources, 2016: 10). PHASA believes that by placing such high market 
value on a leopard is helping preserve the species. (Professional Hunting Association of South 
Africa, 2017) Their point is if a stock farmer can earn good money to have overseas clients 
come shoot a leopard on his property, he will be less inclined to exterminate them and more 
inclined to preserve their numbers in the expectation of further financial accruement from 
trophy hunters. At the very least, the profit made from leopard hunting will offset the costs of 
allowing them to stay on the property (including stock losses).  
 
In this sense, with leopards having a net financial value, their overall population numbers are 
paradoxically maintained by killing the odd individual. Indeed, there is widespread evidence 
that farmers have even begun turning away from domestic livestock farming and reconfiguring 
their land into wildlife ranches in an effort to benefit from the greater profits of trophy hunting 
(Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014). 
 
National governments also benefit financially from the trophy hunting of leopards. In 2016, 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the department that permits the import 
of hunted trophies from South Africa, charged USD100 for a permit to import a trophy of a 
leopard, or any other species listed under their Endangered Species Act. The fees raised 
approximately USD400,000 per year for the department (Democratic staff of the House 
Committee on Natural Resources, 2016: 24). Likewise, the South African provincial 
departments who authorise permits to hunt a leopard, were charging around R2,000 to R2,100 
per leopard hunting permit (Moneybags, 2015). That is until the moratorium was put in place 
in 2016.  
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3.1.2. Live sales and breeding 
 
Breeding of high market value game species generally takes place in confined or semi-confined 
areas (Taylor et al., 2015: 48) and are similar to livestock farms where animals are bred either 
to be slaughtered (trophy-hunted or for game meat) or sold live to other game farms. In South 
Africa, wild animals are either intensively bred – confinement of wild species in small to 
medium sized camps or enclosures, where they are fenced in, protected from predators and 
provided with most of, or all their food, water and veterinary requirements - or allowed to roam 
naturally in more open larger confined habitats in private or public reserves. Consequently, 
wildlife population, especially among herbivores, has increased. The main species supporting 
the breeding and live sales industry over the last thirty years in South Africa have been sable, 
roan, African buffalo, blesbok, gemsbok, impala, springbok, and blue wildebeest (Taylor et al., 
2015: 48). Breeding is often conducted in fenced camps or enclosures of varying size. Live 
wildlife species may be bought from auctions (Taylor et al., 2015: 48). According to Taylor et 
al., “the total revenue generated by live sales on all wildlife ranches across South Africa was 
estimated to be R4.328-billion” (Taylor et al., 2015: 3). 
 
• Breeding lions 
 
Herbivores are not the only species whose numbers have benefitted from intensive breeding. 
Intensive breeding of lions for trophy hunting and international export in lion bones in South 
Africa is currently endorsed, supported and even encouraged by the DEA. The African lion is 
the only big cat in the world listed on CITES Appendix II (CITES: e.), and therefore the only 
one for which international commercial trade is permitted under CITES (CITES: b.).  
 
When she gazetted the Biodiversity Management Plan for African Lion (Funston & Levendal, 
2014), the late Environment Minister, Edna Molewa, outlined one of the key objectives, which 
was to “Encourage the development of opportunities for economic and social benefit from 
responsibly managed captive lion populations” (Department of Environmental Affairs of the 
Republic of South Africa, 4 December 2015). While the total figure is unknown, estimates 
suggest that upwards of 200 breeding facilities exist in the country, with one recent paper citing 
a figure of 297 (Van der Merwe et al., 2017). A total of 146 are registered with the South 
African Predator Association (SAPA), which funded the research. The same paper estimates 
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that the industry contributes R500-million annually to the South African economy and sustains 
1,162 jobs if multiplier effects of associated employment opportunities are accounted for. The 
lion breeding ranches in the country have mustered a standing population of over 6,000-8,000 
captive lions, (Funston & Levendal, 2014: 1), although more recent reports say it could be as 
high as 14,000. (Harvey, 2018: 8) This is three to five times the estimated population of wild 
free-roaming lions in the country, which includes those lions found in national parks, with 
populations estimated at over 2,000 individuals (Biodiversity Management Plan for Lion in 
South Africa, 2014).  
 
Captive lions are bred specifically for the purpose of trophy-hunting and the lion bone trade. 
Lion breeders are able to earn between R60,000 and R300,000 per lion shot by trophy hunters 
(Cruise, 22 July 2015), while additional revenue is made from tourist cub-petting opportunities 
before the lions are old enough to be shot. Then there is the selling of the skeleton passed over 
by the trophy hunters who usually take the head and pelt as a trophy. An annual quota of 1,500 
skeletons of captive bred lion was been determined in July 2018 (Department of Environment 
of the Republic of South Africa, 16th July 2018). The trade in lion bones is permitted under the 
Convention in the Trade of Endangered Species but only “if the trade will not be detrimental 
to the survival of the species in the wild” (CITES b.). This by-product of the captive-bred sport-
hunting industry nets a lion breeder another R12,000 to R24,000 per skeleton (Cruise, 22 July 
2015). 
 
Captive-lion breeding is hailed as a successful example of the green-economic approach. The 
Biodiversity Management Plan for Lion in South Africa states: “There are substantial economic 
advantages to many South African societies that accrue from the conservation and use of lions” 
(Funston & Levendal, 2014: 2). Most importantly, there is also a perceived conservation benefit 
for wild lions (Van der Merwe et al., 2017: 320–321). Proponents of the captive-bred lion 
industry argue that the practice has deflected trophy hunters away from the rapidly dwindling 
wild lion populations, although this link has not been verified through any research or 
documentation (Harvey, 2018: 10). Continent-wide, according to the IUCN Red data, “the lion 
population is inferred to have undergone a reduction of approximately 43% over the past 21 
years” (Bauer et al., 2016). The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species has cited unregulated 
trophy hunting has been a factor in the reduction of lions continent-wide. Their concern is “that 
management regimes have not always been sufficient to deter unsustainable offtakes” (Bauer 
et al., 2016). With its intensive captive breeding program, South Africa considers itself to have 
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in place an exemplary management regime by ‘sacrificing’ sustainably captive-bred lions for 
the protection of wild lion populations (Department of Environment of the Republic of South 
Africa, 16th July 2018). 
 
3.1.3. Game meat production 
 
The term ‘game’ loosely refers to any non-domesticated animals hunted for meat. In southern 
Africa, the meaning is mostly confined to terrestrial mammals including ungulate species 
(hoofed mammals including antelope species, giraffes, warthogs, bush-pigs and zebras) 
(Taylor et al., 2015: xi). 
 
The total mass of game meat that was produced on wildlife ranches during 2014 through trophy 
hunting and culling was 21,220 tons.  The total estimated number of jobs created by the wildlife 
ranching sector was 65,172 with a median salary per person per month of R3,441 (Taylor et 
al., 2015: 4). These estimates are only for people employed directly on wildlife ranches, and 
exclude people employed by industries reliant on the wildlife ranching sector but who are not 
employed by the ranchers themselves. Temporary workers are also not included (Taylor et al., 
2015: 4). 
 
Taylor et al. highlight a potential benefit that game meat production can have on food security 
in South Africa. It cites the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) definition of food 
security, which is as follows: “…the condition when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (United Nations Development Program, 
2012).  
 
According to the Human Development Index, South Africa scores higher in food security than 
most sub-Saharan countries, but lags behind North America, Europe, most of South America 
and Asia and even some African states such as Gabon, Botswana and Namibia (United Nations 
Development Program, 2012). During the period 2000-2010, 8.7% of children under the age 
of five years in South Africa were underweight, 23.9% were stunted due to chronic dietary 
inadequacy, and 4.7% experienced wasting from poor nutrition (United Nations Development 
Program, 2012). A recent report by the Departments of Social Development (DSD) and South 
African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) suggested that only 20% of 
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South African households are food secure, while >50% experienced some degree of hunger 
(DAFF, 2013b). 
 
Taylor et al. state that even though South Africa produces a large amount of animal protein 
through the domestic livestock industry for consumption every year, there is a shortfall (Taylor 
et al., 2015: 56). This, they assert citing DAFF, is partly due to the fact that the human 
population has doubled from 25-million to >50-million over the last 30 years (DAFF, 2013c in 
Taylor et al., 2015: 56), while the numbers of livestock have remained the same or declined. 
Cattle numbers have fluctuated around 13- to 14-million head during this period, while sheep 
numbers have dropped from nearly 30-million head to 22-million (DAFF, 2013c in Taylor et 
al., 2015: 56). There has also been an overall loss of agricultural land to non-agricultural 
activities such as mining and housing developments, and since 1994 the overall area under food 
production has declined by 30% (DAFF, 2013b in Taylor et al., 2015: 56). For Taylor et al. it 
“appears that the demand for meat may have outstripped the country’s ability to produce it, and 
with the growing human population, this situation is likely to get worse” (Taylor et al., 2015: 
56).  
 
One possible solution, according to Taylor et al, would be for South Africans to eat more game 
meat. McCrindle et al. (2013) suggest that, if game meat resources were used sustainably, 
thousands of tons of game meat could be produced on an annual basis to fulfil the growing 
protein requirements of the domestic consumer market, and thereby cover the shortfall from 
livestock farming.  
 
Game meat production in South Africa is run on a free-market basis, meaning there is little 
governmental interference or monopoly, which creates uncomplicated business opportunities 
for private wildlife ranchers with capacity to sell meat direct to the public (Hoffman et al., 2004 
in Taylor et al., 2015: 56). When compared with beef, game meat has a lower total fat content 
(Hoffman et al., 2004 in Taylor et al., 2015: 56) and is lower in total saturated fatty acids 
(Viljoen 1999 in Taylor et al., 2015: 56), making it an appealing choice for health-conscious 
consumers. Game meat is also considered more ‘organic’ than many domestic livestock 
products because it is generally free of antibiotics and hormones (D’Amato et al., 2013 Taylor 
et al., 2015: 56). 
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Taylor et al. have determined that wildlife ranchers across South Africa already produce over 
22,000 tons of game meat from a combination of trophy hunting and culling during 2014. 
Overall then, it appears there is strong potential for wildlife ranches to produce game meat to 
cover the shortfall of the livestock meat industry in order to satisfy some of the basic dietary 
needs of South Africans, while at the same time ensuring numbers of wildlife are maintained 
to satisfy those needs. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused its attention on the conservation benefits of weak anthropocentrism, 
specifically from a basic Cost-Benefit economic view of sustainable development, as well as a 
focus on a developing country in need of socio-economic transformation and a means to 
safeguard food security. The model is one that is widely applied and accepted by most policy-
makers both at a local and global level in that wildlife numbers are preserved in order to provide 
an economic and social benefit to humans, without which governments would ostensibly find 
no justification in preserving the natural environment. This pragmatic approach, while 
eschewing the intrinsic rights and moral consideration of wild animals, nevertheless seems to 
be an effective tool in preventing them from going extinct while at the same time providing 
significant economic, cultural and health benefits to humans. This is therefore seemingly best 
placed to be the model that holds in check the spectre of the Sixth Extinction since it continues 
to preserve wild animals even though they are utilised solely for human consumption and 
gratification. However, as I will now show in the next chapter, while the economic 
sustainability of conserving wildlife may seem like a workable solution it is in fact quite the 
opposite.  
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CHAPTER TWO: FOUNDATIONAL FLAWS WITH WEAK ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN 
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION  
 
…and yet, 
to me, what is this quintessence of dust?  
Man delights not me— 
 
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet: Act II, Scene II) 
 
To put all living things that aren’t human into one category is, first of all a stupid gesture – 
theoretically ridiculous – and partakes in the very real violence that humans exercise toward 
animals. 
(Jacques Derrida, 2008: YouTube) 
 
 
This chapter shall show that a weak anthropocentric approach to conservation grounded in 
economic pragmatism as described and discussed in Chapter One is foundationally flawed in 
that the underlying principle flounders when put into practice. The chapter consists of two 
broad sections:, that show respectively that (i) the dominant framework of  weak 
anthropocentrism in wildlife conservation fails in practice as well as (ii) fails theoretically, 
philosophically speaking.  
 
In the first section, I show that while in some cases (as demonstrated in Chapter One), the weak 
anthropocentric approach  of sustainable development maintains some animal population 
numbers (of those species deemed to have market value), the policy not only ultimately fails 
to save the majority of wild animals from over-exploitation and extinction, but in many cases 
worsens their plight. Furthermore, as I shall demonstrate, in many cases, the policy of 
sustainable development tends to generate the opposite results of what is intended, in that far 
from preserving the targeted species, the very mechanism of trading in wildlife instead 
accelerates their demise. This section will show through literature analysis and case-studies 
precisely how a weak anthropocentric policy can have catastrophic ramifications for the 
survival and flourishing of the majority of the planet’s faunal species.  
 
I shall demonstrate that a weak anthropocentric policy of commercialising wildlife to be cost-
effective tends toward something more akin to domestic farming practices than preservation of 
wild animals in wild spaces in ways that allow them to flourish. This will be demonstrated by 
the discussion  of widespread breeding practices such as of physical variants to create higher 
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market value of individuals, as well as quantitative breeding for higher trade profits with 
animals confined in enclosed spaces with little or zero concern for dynamic biodiversity, i.e. 
the diversity of ways of life represented by the various life forms.  
 
The second section of the chapter, Philosophical Flaws, presents a philosophical evaluation of 
the dominant approach to wildlife conservation. This section will be an analysis of the 
theoretical substratum of prevailing policies that governs our treatment and uses of wildlife. 
This will be achieved with a thorough critique of the anthropocentric stance underlying the 
dominant paradigm.  
 
In sub-section 2.1. (The cataclysm of dualism), I will begin by deconstructing the philosophical 
bedrock of anthropocentrism, namely Cartesian dualism. This is to show how the infamous 
seventeenth century French philosopher, René Descartes’ theoretical separation of the subject 
from the object; or mind from body, underscores the totality of our anthropocentric endeavours 
in terms of purely instrumental valuations of (other) animals. The enquiry will be conducted as 
a means to provide  philosophical clarity about the root problem of our current conservation 
practices, and overall attitude toward  (other) animals.  
 
I will also show that a weak anthropocentric approach to sustainable development not only fails 
in preserving species from strong anthropocentric over-exploitation but is inadequate in 
providing that which is central to its core, namely in providing meaningful gratification and 
welfare benefits for the human recipients it is meant to focus on. I will reveal that the latter 
point specifically breaks down, from an anthropocentric utilitarian perspective, in that instead 
of abiding by the core utilitarian principle of greatest happiness for the greatest number, only 
small, elite groups of humans benefit, and mostly at the expense of the majority of the intended 
human recipients. In other words, Cartesian hierarchies translate into human-on-human 
dualisms, where only some benefit and often at the expense of the majority. This manifests 
conspicuously in South African circumstances of private land ownership. Most wildlife spaces 
in South Africa are privately owned by a small number of mainly white landowners. The 
number of game farms is growing with many farmers converting from agricultural to less costly 
game operations (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014). Private game farms and hunting operations in 
South Africa tend to result in spatial rearrangements that disconnect rural non-white labourers 
from the land and further entrench power hierarchies between white landowners and landless 
black and coloured workers. I will emphasise that while providing lip-service to land reform, 
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in practice the South African Government demonstrates an ambiguous stance towards the 
processes of consolidating private property, specifically ones that accompany shifts to game 
farming and the concomitant strengthening of re-emerging geographies of inequality as will be 
shown with a case study of the Karoo region of the Eastern Cape (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014). 
 
In sub-section 2.2. (Exclusionary logic in moral consideration and animal rights practices), a 
similar critique into the notion of moral consideration, and specifically the seminal theories of 
Peter Singer, will be undertaken. I will demonstrate that this second approach, paradoxically, 
is also mired in conceptual anthropocentrism and in essence generates similar problems of 
dichotomy.  
 
It is necessary to point out at this juncture that while I will go into relative detail in dismantling 
the bedrock of our anthropocentric bias in wildlife conservation, it is more to present its case 
as a lead into the alternative concept (which will take up the bulk of the next three chapters) 
rather than provide a rigorous and lengthy critique of conceptual anthropocentrism itself, which 
in any case was the core thread of my Master’s thesis.15 
 
1. Practical flaws with weak anthropocentrism in wildlife conservation 
 
1.1. An economic critique of trading in wildlife 
 
In Chapter One, I outlined the benefits of a sustainable circulation of wildlife products. As 
discussed, it is weakly anthropocentric in that the livelihoods and security of humans are 
always the central priority, yet it functions as a conservation tool because the system 
acknowledges that the prevention of the over-exploitation of the environment is essential to 
keep on providing for those livelihoods and security. In terms of utility, a regulated trade in 
wild species and their products is seen as the best means (?) of conserving them since the trade 
model depends entirely on efficiency and wealth maximisation – a maximisation that is 
achieved through perpetual utility of species that preserves their numbers. Furthermore, a weak 
anthropocentric (regulated) trade model seems to provide a buffer against illegal trade in wild 
animals and their products (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 3). This was discussed in Chapter One 
 
15 For more information see: Cruise, A. (2015) Delinearizing the Insuperable Line: Deconstruction as an 
Animal Ethic (Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University) https://scholar.sun.ac.za/ 
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when I presented the case study of rhinoceroses. The case study gave the perception that a legal 
trade in rhino horn from farmed rhinos would increase and stabilise the supply of horn to Asia. 
In theory, this would effectively drive prices down thus reduce the incentives to poaching and 
illegal trade while at the same time provide an additional revenue source for private owners 
and public parks. 
 
However, a review in 2014 by economists Professor Alejandro Nadal of the Centre for 
Economic Studies at El Colegio de Mexico and Francisco Aguayo, a PhD Fellow at the 
Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology 
(UNU-MERIT) at Maastricht University, comprehensively revealed that the basis of 
advocating commercial trade as a conservation solution for endangered species “relies on 
models that are based on simplistic and/or extremely restrictive assumptions.” (Nadal & 
Aguayo, 2014: 1) “In most cases,” according to the two economists, “these models also rely 
on conceptual tools that have been theoretically discredited.” (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 1) 
 
In the first in-depth economic analysis of its kind, Nadal and Aguayo state that one of the most 
striking features of the pro-trade model, specifically as it pertains to wildlife conservation, is 
the high level of misinformation:  
 
To anyone who comes in contact with the corpus of literature on wildlife trade, and 
in particular the literature recommending the use of market-based policies, the 
uncritical use of theoretically discredited analytical instruments is a striking 
revelation (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 2). 
 
Nadal and Aguayo attest that the most important issue with such discredited misinformation is 
the false conviction that markets behave as self-regulating mechanisms that smoothly lead to 
economic efficiency while at the same time preventing animals from going extinct. The 
economists show that during the past forty years, economic theory has developed and evolved 
beyond the basic Cost-Benefit Analysis so touted in wildlife conservation into a series of highly 
complex theoretical models. They note that in almost every field of economics, “from industrial 
organisation, to evolutionary, institutional and behavioural economics, and from debates in 
macro-economic theory to work on complex and non-linear systems,” such complexities have 
“had vital implications for theoretical, empirical and policy-oriented research” (Nadal & 
Aguayo, 2014: 3). And yet, they point out, “the economic analysis of wildlife trade seems to 
 61 
be an exception: it appears to have been trapped in the backwaters of textbook economics” 
(Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 3). Nadal and Aguayo maintain that wildlife economics based on 
weak anthropocentrism is wholly inadequate in preserving wildlife. I will discuss their 
theoretical arguments in the section to follow (1.1) and then apply practical examples to back 
up the theory (1.2). 
 
1.1.1. A theoretical economic critique of trading wildlife  
 
The pro-trade economic models based on simple Cost-Benefit Analysis clearly show that the 
argument in favour of wildlife trade “only holds logically when competition is perfect (in the 
sense that suppliers are unable to set prices), supply is vertically integrated, laundering and 
stigma effects are inexistent, there is no product differentiation, and agents do not behave 
strategically” (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 14). These simplistic assumptions, according to Nadal 
and Aguayo, “eliminate all sources of instability, overshooting and maladjustment in price 
formation processes.” They warn that removing these assumptions reinforces a cautionary 
recommendation against legalising wildlife trade (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 14). 
 
• Rhinoceroses 
 
Let me once again return to the justification for legalising the rhino horn trade as discussed in 
Chapter One in order to show that the application of these simplistic economic theories 
ultimately fails to preserve the species. 
 
Speaking before the Committee of Inquiry (COI) to deliberate on matters relating to a possible 
trade of rhino horn at the Department of Environmental Affairs in South Africa on May 30, 
2015, Nadal stated: “If the objective of this policy is to put out of business incumbent firms 
[criminal syndicates], it is essential to know how these firms will compete with the new entrants 
[legal traders] in the emerging market environment” (Department of Environmental Affairs in 
South Africa, 30th May 2015: 6). The argument for a trade in rhinos is based on the idea that 
legal supplies will out-compete illegal sources. It is assumed this goal is achieved through price 
reduction. Since poaching efforts are proportional to expected revenues, any mechanism that 
reduces those revenues is automatically assumed to reduce poaching (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 
23). However, Nadal told the COI that an increased supply is neither a necessary, nor a 
sufficient condition to bring the price of a commodity down. What actually leads to price 
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reductions, he reasoned, is additional competition (Department of Environmental Affairs in 
South Africa, 30th May 2015: 6). In their review of the common economic analysis of the 
wildlife trade, entitled Leonardo’s Sailors16, Nadal and Aguayo argue that typically, “new 
competition will bring down prices if it has succeeded in abating costs and if it finds it in its 
interest to actually offer a substitute product at a sufficiently lower price” (Nadal & Aguayo, 
2014: 22). Thus, new competition should put lower prices on the shelf for the benefit of 
consumers. However, the economists warn that there are many reasons why legal suppliers of 
wildlife products may not outcompete illegal traders from the market:  
 
Firstly, the assumption that illegal supply is inherently more costly than legal supply and that 
the first can only survive if prices remain high, “is an assumption made with no empirical 
grounds” (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 22). The costs of bribing, smuggling, and laundering should 
be compared to the costs incurred by legal export, import, selling, and advertising activities. 
“Without attention to more detailed geographical and regulatory conditions, relative cost 
advantages become more and more difficult to predict ex-ante” (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 22).  
 
Therefore, Nadal and Aguayo believe any variability in agents’ cost structure cannot be simply 
assumed away. Without adequate information it becomes very difficult to predict the effect of 
a legal flow of wildlife products entering the supply chain. They affirm that it is not obvious 
that prices will fall and, if they do, that this will entail a reduction in the incentives for poachers. 
In the event of a new flow of supply from a legal source, market conditions will be shaken, and 
shares will be redistributed. The incumbent traffickers may start to find their monopoly rents 
begin to fall if other agents succeed in establishing direct contact with retailers and final 
consumers at lower costs. The market shares of suppliers that offer a smaller price will grow, 
but only to an extent proportional to their supply capacity. This may not necessarily exhaust 
all rents and market niches for illegal products (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 22).  
 
Moreover, legal and illegal supplies may not even compete with each other but actually expand 
reciprocally, with illegal suppliers acting as occasional contractors for legal traders if there is 
excess demand. The presence of laundering may as well be taken as an indicator of capacity 
constraints of legal products, of lower poaching costs, or of product differentiation and the 
 
16 From a quote of Leonardo da Vinci who said: “He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who 
boards a ship without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may be cast.” 
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existence of segmented markets (or a combination of them), and therefore as a signal of supply 
variability conditions and entry barriers. Also, rhino horn traffickers may have the capacity to 
withstand the pressure of legal sources of supply (Nadal & Aguayo, 2014: 23). Thus, far from 
driving prices down and satiating the market a legal trade may in fact accelerate demand and 
increase  laundering of illegal rhino horn into the legal trade. 
 
Another point of contention for Nadal and Aguayo is not only the lack of knowledge on the 
supply side but also the demand side in Asia for rhino horn. Assuming that the proposed 
market-based policy does lead to price reductions, the response from the demand side would 
need to be rigorously evaluated. Nadal pointed out to the COI that: 
 
The lack of information on demand applies to potential responses to price changes 
with respect to different formats of the final product (complete horn, pieces or 
powder). Each one of these different uses probably has a different sensitivity to 
price changes, income effects, and market re-organization. None of these uses are 
substitutes and thus we may not observe them in the same individual at the same 
time. They may entail relationships underlying consumer behaviour that are more 
complex than those normally assumed by standard consumer theory (Department 
of Environmental Affairs in South Africa, 30th May 2015: 8). 
 
The assumptions concerning consumers and final demand used in simple economic models are 
based on highly restrictive conditions. Nadal maintains that in these models, consumers make 
fully informed, rational choices, with a schedule of preferences ordered according to decreasing 
marginal utility. “But once we relax the over-simplistic assumption that we are dealing with a 
single commodity, the downward sloping demand curves are logically inconsistent. This is one 
of the reasons why simplistic trade notions about the rhino horn market need to be abandoned 
and replaced by a more realistic and rigorous framework capable of analysing both, consumer 
behaviour and market-level demand dynamics” (Department of Environmental Affairs in 
South Africa, 30th May 2015: 8).  
 
Nadal believes that because the nature of firms and the structure of the existing illegal rhino 
horn market are not well understood, it is impossible therefore to rule out the case where some 
traders may seek to compensate revenue losses through the market expansion via lower prices 
or other avenues. He states that pro-active marketing campaigns are standard strategies in all 
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branches of economic activity, and they cannot be ruled out in the rhino horn market. If this 
takes place the market will actually grow and develop as prices are brought down (Department 
of Environmental Affairs in South Africa, 30th May 2015: 8). This last point is perhaps the 
most significant as an increase in the market will almost certainly create a demand that would 
outstrip the production capacities of a legal trade alone. This means, traders will again start 
targeting wild rhinos through poaching syndicates. 
 
Thus, for Nadal, who was the Chair of the Theme on the Environment, Macroeconomics, Trade 
and Investment (TEMTI) for the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social 
Policy (CEESP-IUCN) when he gave his presentation before the COI, the overall absence of 
more information on the nature of traders, the structure of markets, price-formation dynamics 
and the response of final consumer demand means that it is not possible to adequately evaluate 
a policy proposal to legalise the rhino horn market. Indeed, Nadal explicitly and correctly 
warned the COI that legalising a rhino horn market could instead “lead to a serious case of 
policy failure and the extinction of rhino populations could be the end result” (Department of 
Environmental Affairs in South Africa, 30th May 2015: 9). 
 
1.1.2. A practical economic critique of trading wildlife  
 
While the international trade in rhino horn is prohibited, with theorists on both sides of the 
debate only speculating on its outcomes in undermining wildlife trafficking, there are however 
around 5,000 endangered species of wild fauna where trade has been permitted under 
international regulations (CITES c.). In many cases – following Nadal and Aguayo’s 
theoretical injunction (2014) – the legal trade has resulted in strong anthropocentric over-
exploitation and, in some cases, with dire consequences to the future survival of the species 
concerned.  
 
Here I will show that the prevailing argument that a regulated legal trade will undercut and 
reduce the illegal trafficking of endangered wildlife has been disproven  for a number of high-
profile mammals – namely  all species of tigers for their bones (Mills, 2016), bears for their 
bile (Dutton et al., 2011) and, most significantly, African elephants for their ivory. These 
examples do not bode well for the plan to treat rhino similarly.  
 
• African elephants 
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In Chapter One I mentioned that a partial lifting of the ban by CITES of the international trade 
in elephant ivory occurred in 1997. This came a decade after all international commercial 
transactions of elephant ivory had been banned (CITES CoP17 Prop. XX, 2016) when it was 
agreed at the CITES Conference of the Parties (CoP) in Lausanne in 1989 that African 
elephants had met the biological criteria in terms of an overall decline in population size for an 
uplisting to Appendix I, meaning commercial trade was no longer permitted (CITES Conf. 
9,24).  
 
However, during the CITES CoP 10 in Harare in 1997, Parties recognised that some southern 
African elephant populations were not declining and well-managed. Accordingly, a vote to 
transfer the populations of elephants in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe to 
Appendix II was taken and the necessary two-thirds majority effected to enforce a downlisting 
of elephants for those four countries. The downlisting, however, came with a special annotation 
attached, which meant that rather than permit an unrestricted trade in ivory from these 
countries, the CITES Secretariat allowed three of the countries17 , to make a limited one-time 
sale of ivory to Japan totaling 50 tons (CITES Decision 10.1). The ivory was to be “derived 
from existing stocks gathered from elephants that have died as a result of natural causes or 
from problem-animal control” (CITES, 16th July 2008). 
 
Following much of the debate within CITES at the time whether the trade in ivory from legal 
government stocks would lead to decreased poaching levels (CITES, 12th November 2002), the 
one-time sale was permitted primarily on a kind of socio-economical experimental basis. The 
experiment was conducted in order to see whether a legal trade would indeed undermine the 
illegal one and slow down the rate of poaching (Reeve, 2002: 77). The experiment was subject 
to a series of conditions laid down in CITES Decision 10.1 which included a reinvestment of 
trade revenues into elephant conservation as well as the implementation of an international 
system for monitoring the effects a legal trade would have on the poaching of elephants and 
trafficking of their tusks (Reeve, 2002: 77). The CITES Secretariat, therefore, established two 
long-term monitoring systems – Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) and the 
Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) – to oversee and measure the experiment’s success 
rate (Reeve, 2002: 79 & 81). MIKE, a site-based system (initially from 45 sites in Africa and 
 
17 South Africa was excluded for the time being. 
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15 in Asia), sought to measure and identify trends in elephant poaching in both Africa and 
Asia. Its aim was to assess the factors driving elephant killings and to determine whether such 
killings are linked to CITES decisions. It was also designed to track the degree of law 
enforcement effort at these sites (Reeve, 2002: 83-4). ETIS operated under the auspices of 
TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network formed under the IUCN. ETIS’ goal was and 
is to collect global law enforcement data on elephant product seizures, corruption, domestic 
ivory markets, background economic variables and other factors (Reeve, 2002: 80-82).  
 
However, eight African elephant range states18 as well as India for the Asian elephant and a 
number of scientists and non-governmental organisations at the time raised serious concerns 
about MIKE’s process of implementation and its effectiveness (Reeve, 2002: 79). Criticisms 
included methodology for site selection, the system’s inability to demonstrate causality (that 
poaching was or was not caused by the reopening of the ivory trade), its considerable cost, and 
lack of involvement of range states in its development (CITES Inf. SC41.12, 1999). ETIS was 
dependent on prompt reporting of seizures but given the history of Party responses, it was likely 
any such reporting would be delayed (Reeve, 2002: 88). The objections were overridden by 
the Secretariat, most other Parties like Japan and the four southern African countries wanting 
to trade in ivory, and IUCN observers tasked with developing MIKE (Reeve, 2002: 79).  
 
For MIKE, the effectiveness of the CITES experiment in 1997 would have been best 
determined by comparing levels of poaching pre and post ban (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009: 455). 
This process was measured by the number of carcasses found without tusks. Unfortunately, 
such data was not available for many African countries. Researchers were forced to pursue a 
number of alternative evaluative strategies such as economic modelling and extrapolation of 
the 1989 ban’s likely effects compared to the post ban from 1997 onwards as well as analyses 
of ivory seizures, observational studies of ivory markets, detailed case studies of particular 
countries and longitudinal analyses of elephant population data (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009: 
455). 
 
As for ETIS, the effectiveness of the legal trade came from ivory seizure data collated to 
examine whether ivory markets have been reduced, but all the reports indicated that the 
international ivory market was still active after the one-time sale experiment and was even 
 
18 Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali and Zambia 
 67 
growing in certain countries (Dublin et al., 1995; CITES 2002; 2004 a; Williamson 2004; 
Milliken et al., 2007; Born Free Foundation 2007 in Lemieux & Clarke, 2009: 456). In another 
approach to studying ivory markets, researchers posed as buyers to collect data from markets 
on the number of outlets selling ivory, the number of carvers employed, the price of ivory and 
the number of pieces for sale. In brief, these surveys found that some ivory markets declined 
while others were growing (Stiles 2004 in Lemieux & Clarke, 2009: 456). Overall, Lemieux 
& Clarke found that attempts to assess the effectiveness of the CITES one-time sale “yielded 
few firm conclusions” (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009: 456). This, they concluded, was largely on 
the basis of theoretical arguments where some have concluded that the ban had been successful 
while others found that the ban was “detrimental to countries that depended on ivory sales to 
fund elephant conservation; that it had little effect on a poacher’s decision to hunt; and that it 
successfully reduced ivory markets in some places but not everywhere” (Lemieux & Clarke, 
2009: 456). 
 
Yet in spite of the MIKE/ETIS research being inconclusive, the CITES Standing Committee, 
which oversees the implementation of CITES regulations and recommendations, gave the go-
ahead in 2007 for another one-time sale (a term that had now become a misnomer). Botswana, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe with South Africa added, were authorised to sell a total of 108 tons of 
government-owned ivory, more than double the amount of ivory of the previous sale. Most 
significantly, the Standing Committee agreed to add China to Japan as an importing 
country (CITES, 16th July 2008). 
 
While the first one-time sale was inconclusive in undermining the trafficking of ivory, the 
second proved to be an unmitigated disaster for elephants. In the years following the second 
“one-time sale” in ivory, the poaching levels of African elephants for their tusks spiked 
dramatically. According to the final results of the Great Elephant Census announced at the 
IUCN’s World Congress in August 2016, Africa’s elephant population had declined by 30% 
in just the seven years since the second one-time sale (Chase et al., 2016). An in-depth 
economic evaluation of the consequences of the second one-time sale by Solomon Hsiang and 
Nitin Sekar of the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge Massachusetts (2016) 
found that this was no mere coincidence. The abrupt and singular nature of the 2008 legal sale 
allowed the evaluators to employ an event study design model (Kothari and Warner, 2006 in 
Hsiang & Sekar, 2016) to identify the causal effect on the global underground network of 
primary suppliers. This was the summary of their overall finding: 
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 …the legal ivory sale corresponds with an abrupt 66% increase in illegal ivory 
production across two continents, and a possible ten-fold increase in its trend. An 
estimated 71% increase in ivory smuggling out of Africa corroborates this finding, 
while corresponding patterns are absent from natural mortality and alternative 
explanatory variables. These data suggest the widely documented recent increase 
in elephant poaching likely originated with the legal sale. More generally, these 
results suggest that changes to producer costs and/or consumer demand induced by 
legal sales can have larger effects than displacement of illegal production in some 
global black markets, implying that partial legalization of banned goods does not 
necessarily reduce black market activity (Hsiang & Sekar, 2016: Abstract). 
 
Thus, far from improving the population status of African elephants, the impact of trading 
elephant products has in fact had the reverse effect. Hsiang and Sekar’s results are consistent 
with the theory posed by Nadal and Aguayo (2014) in that the legal sale of ivory indeed triggers 
an increase in black market ivory production by increasing consumer demand and reducing the 
cost of supplying black market ivory, and these effects dominated any competitive 
displacement that occurred (Hsiang & Sekar, 2016: 1). Hsiang and Sekar’s findings 
demonstrate that partial legalization of a banned goods can increase illegal production of the 
goods “because the existence of white markets may influence the nature of black markets” 
(Hsiang & Sekar, 2016: 30). What is more, their results “are likely to extend to markets 
structurally similar to ivory markets, such as those for products from other slow-growing, slow-
breeding, or low-population density species like rhinoceroses and tigers. These species are 
difficult or impossible to produce in large quantities at low cost limiting the ability of legal 
supplies to displace illegal supplies” (Hsiang & Sekar, 2016: 30). 
 
Under the Appendix II annotation of the African elephant populations in the four southern 
African countries, no further commercial ivory sales after 2008 were allowed to be proposed 
by the southern African countries until 2017 (CITES CoP14 Inf. 61). Any future proposal to 
allow commercial ivory sales has to be submitted to the Conference of the Parties (CoP) for 
approval. Without the approval of the CoP, commercial international trade in elephant ivory 
currently remains prohibited under CITES. If there is no consensus among the CITES Parties 
on any such proposal, the decision will be determined by a vote, with a two-thirds majority 
being required to accept any proposal (CITES, 21st July 2016).  
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1.2. Tyranny of the prized megafauna 
 
In her book, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and 
Compliance (2002), Rosalind Reeve wrote:  
 
Elephants are the Convention’s ‘flagship’ species19 and are undeniably ‘special’, 
but thousands of other listed species receive comparatively next to no attention – 
or funds. And spending such disproportionate sum on the verification and 
monitoring of two species (although the Asian elephant is yet to benefit), without 
even attempting to raise equivalent funds for preventative anti-poaching measures, 
detracts from other crucial cross-cutting issues, such as improving the capacity for 
enforcement of CITES at national level (Reeve, 2002: 88). 
 
Charismatic megafauna, certainly of the mammalian kind, dominate the agendas at all CITES 
meetings. Elephants and big cats make up the bulk of the proceedings, even though there is 
little effectiveness in spending an inordinate amount of time and funding in trying to protect 
them through a policy of trade. Little attention, as Reeve emphasises, is given to other species.  
 
1.2.1. The silent, unseen, unknown and unvalued majority 
 
This anthropocentric approach is evident in the species groupings under CITES ‘protection’. 
Of the 669 faunal species listed under Appendix I, mammals predominate with 318 species 
(almost half), while there are only 155 bird species, 87 reptile species, 24 amphibians and only 
16 species of fish. The Appendix II listing has a similar disparity – of the 4,952 species of fauna 
in the listing, amphibians and fish total only 137 and 107 species respectively (CITES c.). 
 
Fishes are the least represented group of animals under CITES but by far make up the bulk of 
wild vertebrate fauna on the planet with almost 34,000 species (Fishbase, June 2018), which is 
more than the combined number of species of mammals, reptiles and amphibians. After the 
first meeting of CITES in 1976, no new marine fish taxa were added to the CITES Appendices 
for another 26 years, when Parties agreed in 2002 to act to ensure sustainable and legal 
 
19 The elephant is represented in the official CITES logo. 
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international trade in seahorses and just two species of sharks. Since then progress has hardly 
continued and CITES remains largely indifferent (?) toward marine species (CITES c.). 
Furthermore, given that there are now a recorded 7,77-million species of all animals 
(invertebrates included) on Earth (Mora et al., 2011), CITES represents an inordinately small 
number of animals facing survival threats.  
 
It is not only CITES that ignores most of this planet’s animal life, but conservation in general.  
Lord Robert May, past-president of the UK's Royal Society stated in 2011:  
 
It is a remarkable testament to humanity's narcissism that we know the number of 
books in the US Library of Congress on 1 February 2011 was 22,194,656 but 
cannot tell you – to within an order-of-magnitude – how many distinct species of 
plants and animals we share our world with (Mora et al., 2011).  
 
In 1758, Swedish scientist Carl Linnaeus created and published the system still used to formally 
name and describe species. In the 260 years since, about 1.25 million species – roughly one-
million on land and 250,000 in the oceans – have been described and entered into central 
databases (roughly 700,000 more are thought to have been described but have yet to reach the 
central databases). And yet, Mora et al’s. census into marine and terrestrial life, published 
by PLoS Biology (2011), found that a staggering 86% of all species on land and 91% of those 
in the seas have yet to be described and catalogued (Mora et al., 2011). 
 
The reason for this lies with the failure of an economic slant of weak anthropocentrism in 
cataloguing and describing wild animals, let alone valuing and utilising them. Way back at the 
dawn of the Anthropocene, Aldo Leopold, warned that “one basic weakness in a conservation 
system based wholly on economic motives is that most members of the land community have 
no economic value” (Leopold, 1949: 246). Economic models of weak anthropocentric 
sustainable development tend to draw similar lines. Hundreds of thousands of little or unknown 
species of amphibians, birds, insects and reptiles are prone to total annihilation mainly because 
there is no recognized direct economic value in  them even though many species ‘invisibly’ 
benefit human life, such as for example pollination of food crops by insects.  
 
In South Africa, charismatic megafauna like lions, leopards, cheetah, giraffe, buffalo and 
elephants are major drawcards for game ranchers, trophy hunters, and wildlife-watching 
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tourists, but the little-known rabbits, toads, bats and beetles have almost zero value in the model 
of sustainable development. Consequently, they are all but disregarded by national and 
international policy-makers, uncared for and ignored, often with dire consequences to their 
survival. According to the 2016 Mammal Red List of South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland 
compiled by the Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT) and the South African National 
Biodiversity Institute (SANBI), about 20% of the country’s mammals are threatened (Child et 
al., 2016). Ten species are on the critically endangered list. These ten include: five species of 
golden mole, two species of bats, the riverine rabbit and the Ngoye red squirrel (Child et al., 
2016). As the Endangered Wildlife Trust description of the list points out: “The general public 
will not be familiar with many of our threatened species as they have restricted ranges and are 
rarely seen” (Endangered Wildlife Trust, 2016). The only critically endangered mammal that 
most humans will be familiar with, is the one that is anthropocentrically valued, namely the 
black rhinoceros.  
 
Reptiles in the region fare even worse. According to the SANBI Atlas and Red List of the 
Reptiles of South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland (2014), the region comprises of exceptional 
reptile diversity with high levels of endemism (Bates et al., 2014: 1). Of the 421 indigenous 
reptile taxa, 45% occur nowhere else in the world. Yet reptiles have “largely been ignored in 
conservation plans” (Atlas and Red List of the Reptiles of South Africa, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, 2014: 1). Tellingly, only 13% of known taxa were previously evaluated according 
to the IUCN Red List Categories and Criteria (Atlas and Red List of the Reptiles of South 
Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, 2014: 1). William R. Branch, the reptile ecologist writing in 
Chapter 3.3. (Conservation Assessment) of the Atlas and Red List of the Reptiles, poignantly 
gives his assessment: 
 
Reptile Conservation in South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, and globally, has 
lagged behind that of all other terrestrial vertebrates…reptiles are rarely of direct 
economic use and usually have limited appeal to ecotourism ventures. They cannot, 
therefore, play much of a part in tourist enterprises that stimulate employment to 
uplift disadvantaged communities. As a consequence, reptiles remain largely 
neglected in a fragile economic climate and a conservation paradigm that views 
wildlife not for its intrinsic value, but in terms of its use to people (Branch, 2014: 
22). 
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In all, Branch says over 17% of the reptile taxa in the region are of serious conservation concern 
(Branch, 2014: 35). Five species are listed ‘Critically Endangered’, ten as ‘Endangered’, 
twenty-one are ‘Vulnerable’ and thirty-seven species are classified as ‘Near Threatened’ 
(Branch, 2014: 29-30). This is mainly as a result of anthropogenic factors such as habitat loss, 
land degradation and fragmentation, pollution, human disturbance, harvesting, climate change 
and invasive aliens (Branch, 2014: 37-42). Branch, however, warns that conservation measures 
for reptiles, amphibians and butterflies are limited to little more than Red Lists. This is mainly 
due to the fact that conservation in the region, and indeed the world, is viewed exclusively “as 
a vehicle for sustainable development that targets the social upliftment of neighbouring 
communities” (Branch, 2014: 50). He asks: “What value is given small, cryptic and neglected 
lizards and snakes that have no direct value in terms of sustainable resources?” (Branch, 2014: 
50) The answer lies in the dire conservation status (as listed above) of these highly endemic 
yet instrumentally unvalued species.  
 
1.2.2. Insectageddon 
 
One of the least known and even less valued – both instrumentally and intrinsically – are one 
of the largest group of animals, namely insects. Acclaimed environmental writer, George 
Monbiot, sums up the problem of insects in this extract published in The Guardian in December 
2017: 
Two naturalists from Flanders, Bart van Camp and Rollin Verlinde, asked if they 
could come to our tiny urban garden and set up a light trap. The results were a 
revelation. I had come to see the garden – despite our best efforts – as almost dead: 
butterflies and beetles are rare sights here. But when Bart and Rollin showed us the 
moths they had caught, I realised that what we see does not equate to what there is 
(Monbiot, 19th December 2017). 
Monbiot writes that “our failure to apprehend the ecology of darkness limits our understanding 
of the living world.”20  When the naturalists opened the insect trap, Monbiot was astonished 
by the range of their catch. “There were pink and olive elephant hawkmoths; a pine hawkmoth, 
feathered and ashy; a buff arches, patterned and gilded like the back of a barn owl; flame moths 
 
20 Later on in this dissertation I will discuss the systematic anthropocentric invisibility of these species in 
greater philosophical detail when I introduce Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the visible and the invisible. 
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in polished brass; the yellow kites of swallow tail moths; common emeralds the colour of a 
northern sea, with streaks of foam; grey daggers; a pebble prominent; heart and darts; coronets; 
riband waves; willow beauties; an elder pearl; small magpie; double-striped pug; rosy tabby” 
(Monbiot, 19th December 2017).. For all these species,  almost nobody e living in the country 
has  ever even heard of their existence (Monbiot, 19th December 2017). Altogether, there were 
217 moths of fifty species in the net that night. But twenty-five years ago, there would have 
been far more.   
Just two months earlier Monbiot wrote an explosive article in The Guardian, where he writes 
as regular columnist. The article is poignantly entitled Insectageddon (20th October 2017). Here 
the environmental writer refers to a study published by amateur naturalists in the journal PLoS 
ONE (2017) which reveals that flying insects surveyed on nature reserves in Germany have 
declined by 76% in 27 years (Hallman et al., 2017). The cause of the dramatic collapse, of 
course, is the widespread use of pesticides on surrounding farmlands to boost crop production 
for human or human-based consumption like feeding livestock. Apart from a potential 
ecological ‘Armageddon’, the main problem is that this was brought to the world’s attention 
by amateur naturalists. Monbiot bemoans that “long-term surveys of this kind simply do not 
exist”, which reflects “distorted priorities in the funding of science…There is no end of grants 
for research on how to kill insects, but hardly any money for discovering what the impacts of 
this killing might be” (Monbiot, 20 October 2017). In other words, humans don’t really care 
enough about the invisible or near-invisible lives of insects which make up almost two-thirds 
of life on earth even though they have crucial ecological and instrumental functions such as 
pollinating plants, including crops. What we thus see, is that many of these creatures are of 
important instrumental value to humans, but are not recognised as such, and thus not protected, 
meaning that our instrumental approach fails on its own terms due to our lack of knowledge 
and interest. At best, they are seen as pests to eradicate at all costs in favour of mass food 
production for humans, which paradoxically relies on those insect populations for maximum 
output. 
 
Again, the problem points to the fact that most insects have almost zero known instrumental 
value, and because most insect species are not economically beneficial (at least not directly), 
their plight is at best ignored, at worst, they are eradicated completely.  Most of the world’s 
wild flowering plants (87.5%) are pollinated by insects and other animals (IPBES, 2016: 11). 
The preservation of wild plants is therefore an essential foundation for the conservation of wild 
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animals, and humans. Pollination is a fundamental ecosystem function that is essential to plant 
reproduction and the maintenance of terrestrial biodiversity. Around 40 per cent of all 
pollinators face extinction, according to a United Nations Intergovernmental Panel for 
Biodiversity Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Pollinator Assessment that spent two years 
evaluating information from more than 3,000 scientific papers, as well as indigenous and local 
knowledge from more than 60 locations around the world (IPBES, 2016: 11). 
 
In terms of sustainable development, humans could do well to provide protection for some 
insect species in terms of cultivating crops for human consumption, such as bees. However, 
even though bees are estimated to pollinate approximately a third of the world’s crops (Yang, 
25th October 2006), very little consideration (at least at a government policy level) is yet 
afforded them. This is possibly because the most stable crops such as wheat, corn and rice, 
which make up the bulk of human crop consumption, do not require any form of animal 
pollination (Yang, 25th October 2006). 
 
1.3. Plight of the prized megafauna 
 
The instrumental value placed on prized megafauna presents its own set of problems, as I have 
already demonstrated with the trade in elephant ivory and rhino horn. Thus, even those species 
we most value anthropocentrically are themselves harmed by the conservation practices 
underpinned by weak anthropocentrism. But these problems extend to other practices of 
sustainable development: 
 
1.3.1. Trophy hunting 
 
Trophy hunting, as shown in Chapter One, is lauded for its benefits to conservation mainly in 
bringing in revenue for ongoing conservation programs. Trophy hunting is defined as the 
practice of selectively hunting wildlife based on the size of an individual or its physical 
attributes, such as horn size. By definition, trophy hunting rewards the hunter primarily with a 
physical trophy or photographs, and the experience of the hunt. The practice is usually applied 
to large mammal species (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). Under the policy of weak 
anthropocentric sustainable development, trophy hunting ought to generate measurable 
positive benefits for the preservation of wildlife as well as make a tangible financial 
contribution to society, particularly amongst local communities in the vicinity of hunting areas. 
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However, according to its Position Statement on Trophy Hunting, the Endangered Wildlife 
Trust has found that it is quite apparent that many trophy hunting operations in South Africa 
do not do this (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015).  
 
Trophy hunting raises the following problems about the sustainability of the practice for which 
there are few credible answers:   
 
The first is the notion of ‘selective removal’. Trophy hunting by its very nature removes the 
larger, most impressive looking individuals, many of which may be prime breeders, or 
otherwise still play an active breeding role in the population. The fact the trophy hunters target 
male lions with luxuriant manes, means that they are reducing the effectiveness of the gene 
pool to produce dominant genes. These individuals would, naturally, be expected to make a 
disproportionately large contribution towards breeding and therefore are key to their species’ 
survival. Only older individuals of some species that are past their breeding prime present 
legitimate trophy hunting targets, but identifying these individuals is difficult without an 
intimate knowledge of their life histories, while others may in fact not be considered the best 
trophies and are avoided (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). Cases of mistaken identity 
are regular and common as highlighted by the frequency of such incidences in the media. For 
example, the globally publicized case of Cecil the lion in Zimbabwe (Cruise, 21st July 2015), 
and more recently of the lion called Skye in South Africa, (Cruise, 27th June 2018) are both 
examples of the main gene pool of a species taken out by supposed mistaken identities. 
 
Then, second, there is the problem of ‘population demography’. There is an absence of reliable 
data on which to base trophy hunting quotas for some species (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 
2015). This leads to very real concerns about the potential negative and unsustainable impact 
that trophy hunting can have on populations (e.g. leopards and wild lions). This is particularly 
relevant in areas where conflict between wildlife and people leads to increased removal of so-
called ‘problem animals’, for which the combined impacts of both trophy hunting and the 
removal of ‘problem animals’ are not taken into account when considering their impacts on a 
species or population (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
Third, trophy hunting can disrupt the wider, social population structure of a species, even 
impacting on protected areas where hunting may be forbidden. This ripple effect occurs when 
individuals either wander naturally into hunting areas or are lured unethically out of non-
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hunting areas by practices such as baiting and calling. The social instability this causes leads 
to unforeseen mortalities brought on, for instance, by territorial disputes as new territory 
holders and borders need to be established and infanticide as new territory holders kill the cubs 
of other males in order to breed themselves (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). This is 
particularly the case with lions as again evidenced by the killing of the lions Cecil  (Cruise, 21st 
July 2015) and Skye (Cruise, 27th June 2018). 
 
Breeding animals for trophy hunting can, fourth, cause overall ecological degradation. The 
high densities of wildlife on some wildlife ranches, coupled with an inability for them to roam 
beyond the ranches’ borders, can easily result in ecological degradation (Endangered Wildlife 
Trust, May 2015). This is similar to cattle ranching when high densities of animals are penned 
into small areas. This has the effect of destroying floral habitat that, in turn, affects the habitat 
of local fauna from insects and birds to reptiles and small mammals. 
 
Fifth, trophy hunting can also include the breeding of exotic species. Hunting of exotic can 
have serious negative impacts on biodiversity in that they displace the endemic fauna and flora 
or spread diseases, often with catastrophic consequences. The practice also negates any so-
called conservation advantages of hunting indigenous wildlife, if exotics have been imported 
into an area where they never naturally occurred (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
Conservation of African wildlife can hardly be considered ‘conservation’ of Asian tigers are 
bred and hunted in South Africa. 
 
Sixth, there is the problem of species persecution. The trophy hunting industry requires that 
wildlife meet hunters’ demands and can, for instance, exacerbate conflict with threatened 
carnivores. Carnivores are a financial threat to breeders and so many, especially leopards are 
persecuted and removed from an area of high-profile breeding stocks. So, for antelope such as 
roan and sable that have a high trophy value, predation is an obvious risk that can lead to the 
persecution of large, apex predators like cheetahs, leopards and African wild dogs which may 
prey on them (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
Seventh, to ensure that trophy animals are not lost from their property, ranchers often fence 
their wildlife in. Fencing prevents animals (including non-target species such as pangolins, 
small antelope and tortoises) from roaming over larger areas and mix with neighbouring 
populations. This is detrimental as it increases the local impact on vegetation, stops animals 
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from responding appropriately in drought situations when food is scarce and increases the 
chances of inbreeding (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
Finally, while trophy hunters invest money in conservation, this is almost exclusively limited 
to conserving the species that they want to hunt (e.g. limited, if any, funding is made available 
for the conservation of frogs, snakes etc.), meaning that any further conservation gains are by 
default rather than design (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
Thus, far from being a useful conservation tool, trophy hunting is in fact detrimental to the 
species they target to conserve as well as being detrimental to non-trophy species and the 
overall biodiversity. Furthermore, trophy hunting, much like the livestock industry, encourages 
intensive breeding of wild animals in order to produce better and bigger trophies as I shall now 
discuss: 
 
1.3.2. Intensive breeding  
 
Prized game species are penalised on having enough space to roam freely. They are most often 
maintained in small fenced areas and are therefore not exposed to natural ecological 
fluctuations, and lose their natural engagement with their habitat, the meaning of which will 
become clear. The Taylor et al. study (2015) highlights the complications of intensive breeding 
as a direct result of applying a weak anthropocentric sustainable development model to 
conservation. 
 
Intensive breeding generally involves high-value species and comprises of: 
 
…the confinement of wild species in small to medium sized camps or enclosures, 
where they are fenced in, protected from predators and provided with most of, or 
all their food, water and veterinary requirements. They are often held in isolation 
or with few other species, and most behavioural and ecological characteristics (e.g. 
breeding and home range areas) are unnatural and controlled by the rancher (Taylor 
et al., 2015: xii).  
 
Far from being wild, animals in intensively-bred enclosures are not self-sustaining – they 
would quickly die without human intervention, and because they are not exposed to the 
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processes of natural selection, animals born in captivity may have a relatively low chance of 
survival if released back into the wild. This is something I discuss in depth in the closing two 
chapters of this dissertation when I discuss the importance of being wild. But that is not the 
purpose of breeding them. The real purpose is strictly economic. Intensification is designed to 
produce ‘superior animals’ to maximize profits for live game sales or trophy hunting but minus 
their wild abilities. Breeding is manipulated to select animals for desirable traits. For example, 
long horns in kudu and buffalo; large body size in lions and buffalo; or multiplication of a 
colour variants such as black impala, golden wildebeest or white lions. These artificially 
manipulated species can fetch staggering prices on the open market. For example, in February, 
2016 a buffalo with oversized horns was sold for a record R176-million (Crowley, 15 February 
2016) and in September the same year another was sold for R168-million (Sishuba, 26 
September 2016). 
 
The Taylor et al. survey found that thirty-eight percent of private wildlife ranches in South 
Africa bred high-value wildlife, comprising a total of fourteen different species. Twenty three 
percent of properties bred colour variants in camps, with a total of fifteen varieties (Taylor et 
al., 2015: 2). Colour variants have become considerably more common on private land over 
the last decade, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of animals sold live on auction or 
privately; a cursory scan of any hunting or wildlife ranching magazines highlights this (Cloete, 
2014 in Taylor et al., 2015: 82). In Chapter One it was pointed out that population numbers of 
wildlife in South Africa had increased ten-fold, but as evident here, it is done at a cost of 
manipulating wild species to the point that they are more ranched, or farmed, than wild. 
 
Taylor et al. suggest that the reasons for this increased prevalence are purely financial: 
economic pressures have  led some wildlife ranchers to transition from normal game farming 
practices and focus more on breeding prized species or colour variants. They found that during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s economic pressures on the hunting industry caused by factors 
such as harsh exchange rates, increasing marketing costs, increasing competition and the global 
economic slowdown, resulted in stagnation of live auction prices of ‘normal’ game species 
(Taylor et al., 2015: 82). Wildlife ranchers whose main incomes were generated by the use of 
plains game experienced decreased profits because their costs were increasing but their income 
was not. To remain financially sustainable, some of the ranchers shifted their focus to intensive 
breeding. This increased the demand for so-called high-value species (Taylor et al., 2015: 82). 
These days, game breeders are placing wild animals in intensive breeding camps for selective 
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breeding and protecting them from predation and disease. This leads to further domestication 
and a loss of wildness in species. 
 
The resulting increase in prevalence of intensively bred animals has raised a number of 
problems surrounding biodiversity conservation (Chardonnet & Mallon, 2015; PHASA, 2015 
in Taylor et al., 2015: 83).  
 
Taylor et al state that the biggest danger at the moment of the ongoing selective breeding is not 
the variants themselves, but rather the inbreeding factor to try and get more and more of the 
same colour, bigger or longer horns etc. (C. Harper, pers. comm. in Taylor et al, 2015: 84). If 
breeders are not being careful in their selection, and they are inbreeding, this will bring out a 
lot of the deleterious genes as well. The easiest and quickest way for ranchers to get more 
colours is to breed fathers and daughters. In the first generation, they will probably not have 
any problems, but that also depends on the quality of the initial stock. If the initial stock come 
from outbred stock, and if they are good quality animals, things will likely be fine to start with. 
But if a breeder buys poor quality animals (and this could happen because these animals are 
very expensive, so the breeder may not be able to afford the best quality, or that many), such 
as small animals, low fertility, skew horns, or immune problems, inbred traits might become 
fixed more quickly (Taylor et al., 2015: 84). 
 
Taylor et al. conclude: “With the increasing intensification of wildlife ranching, more and more 
so-called wild animals are being moved in the direction of domestication. Arguably, the more 
intensively managed animals are, the less conservation value they have” (Taylor et al., 2015: 
130). 
 
Conservation based on weak anthropocentric approaches such as these, shows there is no 
regard for the fact that wildlife is an integral and interconnected combination of vital aspects 
in a broader ecological system. As is the case in South Africa, the successful preservation of 
numbers, especially in private game spaces, is achieved at the expense of the natural 
environment in that wild animals are bred and stocked on ranches that are more akin to 
domestic livestock farms where animals are manipulated and inbred to achieve financial gains 
for humans and, as such, have zero overall conservation value. This loss, unacknowledged 
within the currently dominant paradigms of wildlife “conservation”, lies at the heart of my 
concern in this study. Anthropocentrism, strong or weak, thus does not serve as a legitimate 
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conservation approach to wildlife, ultimately because the wild is taken away from the life, as I 
will explain during the rest of this dissertation.  
 
2. Philosophical flaws with weak anthropocentrism in wildlife conservation 
 
2.1. The cataclysm of dualism 
 
Anthropocentrism thus becomes the problem, rather than the indirect solution to wildlife 
conservation, as some suggest. However, before any alternative paradigms to anthropocentrism 
are to be discussed, it is important to first deconstruct the philosophical and historical notion 
of anthropocentrism. This is because it is necessary to understand the root cause behind the 
global predilection for wildlife conservation practices based on anthropocentrism and how it 
permeates throughout human thinking when it comes to wild animals. Once broken down and 
understood, only then can a thorough and rigorous construction of an alternative concept be 
undertaken. In the sub-sections that follow, I first explain Descartes’ dualism between mind 
and body human and animal (Section 2.1.1. Descartes’ mind over body), then (in Section 2.1.2. 
The violent epoch) I look at the consequences Cartesian dualism held for the Western world’s 
treatment of animals. Thereafter (Section 2.1.3. Anthropocentrism toward other humans), I 
show that the supposedly insuperable line between human and animal has always been 
permeable in the sense that some groups of people have historically been (and still sometimes 
are) treated like (other) animals. 
 
2.1.1. Descartes’ mind over body 
 
Until the 1970s, Western philosophy and science, tended to follow an anthropocentric approach 
to (other) animals. This preponderate anthropocentrism culminated in René Descartes’ 
influential writings in the seventeenth century on the dualistic separation of mind over body. 
By eliminating all that is not indubitable, the philosopher basically embarked on a reductive 
ontology that ultimately separated the supposedly disembodied mind from the bodily and 
material sphere. In doing so, Descartes opened up a virtually unbridgeable gap, an abyss, 
between the human mind and the body. This reductive substantiation is evident in Descartes’ 
classic passage in Meditations:  
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What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say ‘a 
rational animal’? No; for then I would have to inquire what an animal is, what 
rationality is, and in this way one question would lead me down the slope of other 
harder ones, and I wouldn’t like to waste the little time and leisure that remains to 
me by using it to disentangle subtleties of this kind (Descartes, 1884: 17). 
 
Thus, in order to save “the little time” remaining to him and avoiding the slippery slope that 
leads to too many difficult questions, Descartes rejects the enquiry into a thorough animal 
ontology. This includes a rejection of the living, breathing human body, which, of course, is 
also animal. Instead, he investigates what it means to be ‘rational’, which he equates with 
having an immaterial mind or soul. He reaches his conclusion through a thought experiment 
set out in his Meditations on First Philosophy. The philosopher sets about rejecting everything 
that he does not consider indubitable, which includes the actual existence of everything as 
perceived through our fallible bodily senses, until he arrives at the epicenter – dubito, ergo 
cogito, ergo sum – the existence of the mental act of the doubting doubter cannot logically be 
in doubt. This is the full presence of the rational mind, the lone, reduced, doubting entity that 
has been detached from the world of objects and stripped of the ebullience of corporeal life. 
The disembodied, autonomous mind of the Subject, a miraculous (divinely ordained) exception 
in substance to everything else existing materially, is the core of Descartes’ reductionist thesis 
and has since become the kernel of modern philosophical and scientific methodology. 
 
However, deconstructionist philosopher, Jacques Derrida, states that while Descartes tried to 
ignore (or erase) the significance of the animal part of being human, the entire ontology of 
separating the human cogito from all corporeity is still “essentially a thesis regarding the 
animal” (Derrida, 2008: 27). From this viewpoint, try as he may, Descartes could never recuse 
his cogito from the “animal bit” (the body). Descartes covertly  admitted as much  by 
maintaining a link between the two radically incompatible, incommensurable entities of soul 
and body, through the pineal gland at the base of the human brain. Besides, says Derrida, the 
foundational ontological question in philosophy posed by almost all the principal thinkers from 
Aristotle to Descartes, has always been the nature of being: “Who am I?” This is an egocentric 
question, which transmutes into an anthropocentric one since “who am I?” can essentially be 
transcribed as “what is it to-be-human?” However, as exclusive to humans as this question 
insists on being, it must always rely on a direct comparison with everything that is not human. 
This means the foundational ontological question always comes with a rider attached, namely: 
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“What makes humans separate and different from (other) animals?” Put differently: even 
though humans have always regarded themselves as an exception to, and superior to, the 
‘animal’ world, they have always had to define their way of being through contrasting it 
somehow with animal existence.  
 
This exclusively animal-related question, as Derrida argued, is both the overriding and binding 
thread in Western ontology, one that has been answered consistently and variously through the 
ages by almost every principal philosopher. And thus, one might say, precisely through its 
evocation then repression and exclusion from human consideration, the animal has ironically 
always played a central role in “Western man’s” self-understanding. The supposedly unique 
mental properties of humans have been thoroughly analysed throughout history with such 
conclusions as: a doubting ego, possessing consciousness, the ability to speak, to reason, to 
respond, to mourn and bury the dead, invent television sets, fly airplanes etcetera ad nauseum. 
The bottom line is that Western metaphysics is wholly preoccupied with; firstly, neatly dividing 
all living beings into just two distinct and opposing camps: the human Subject into one and all 
(other) animals into the other; and secondly, by erecting an ‘insuperable line’ (Bentham, 1823. 
XV11.122) to keep them separate. With the line clearly demarcated and entrenched, philosophy 
has then spent an entire epoch trying to widen and deepen it, so much so that, as Martin 
Heidegger pointed out, an unsurpassable abyss now ostensibly separates the human from all 
the other life forms (Heidegger, 2004: 17).  
 
And yet, despite this artificially enforced abyss, an ontology of the human subject remains 
inseparable from the animal. This is what Derrida called being ‘blind to the supplement’ 
(Derrida, 1976: 141) – a thing added to something else in order to complete or enhance it 
(Oxford English Dictionary). For Derrida, the addition of a ‘thing’ as supplement to another 
implies both are incomplete without each other. A supplement is an addition, so it is not 
intrinsic to the thing it adds to but, paradoxically, the thing being added to is incomplete without 
the addition. The logic of supplementation is extremely important in that it troubles the nature 
of opposites (binaries) in their traditional ‘face-off’ as fully separated, mutually independent, 
competing antagonists. Supplementation, while still recognising differences, attaches the 
opposing terms to one another, showing that every side of the binary is incomplete without the 
other. Thus, the logic of supplementation attacks and tears down the Cartesian concept of stand-
alone sovereign subject-hood presiding over objects. In other words, the cogito as a thinking 
being is inextricably tied to the body, the human inextricably tied to the animal. The one cannot 
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be defined without the other as we see with all binaries like: big and small, old and young, 
black and white, male and female. These Derridean notions will take on new and fuller meaning 
in my discussion of Merleau-Ponty. 
 
The problem with binaries in Western thinking, is they become hierarchical. While they may 
rely on each other for their definitions, one side always becomes inferior to the other. The 
‘supplement’, by definition, is inferior to the ‘thing-being-supplemented’, the ‘body’ is inferior 
to the ‘cogito’, the ‘object’ is inferior to the ‘Subject’, the ‘small letter’ is inferior to the ‘Capital 
letter’, ‘black’ is inferior to ‘white’, ‘women’ are inferior to ‘men’, ‘(other) animals’ inferior 
to ‘humans’. 
 
Descartes argued that humans were the opposite of and superior to (other) animals because of 
the latter’s perceived absence of speech (‘absence’ is inferior to ‘presence’). The absence of 
speech, according to Descartes, was an indication that all (other) animals lacked mental 
capacity, rational immaterial minds, or soul. In other words, they were unable to doubt and 
therefore had no consciousness of themselves, but were at the mercy of determining forces 
exerting pressure on them. Descartes appears to come to the conclusion that since all modes of 
rationalisation and consciousness depend upon the existence of thought, (other) animals are 
nothing but mindless machines or automata (Descartes, 1999: 19). This Cartesian perspective 
of non-human animals as ‘mindless’ is closely comparable to the modern international and 
national conservation policies that treat such animals as instrumental objects. Weak 
anthropocentrism favours treating wild animals as commercial resources – objective ‘things’ 
to be traded in order to satisfy the continuous availability of a ready-at-hand resource rather 
than to regard wild animals as sentient and valuable in their own right (intrinsically). In spite 
of decades of radical philosophical critiques against Descartes’ foundational building blocks, 
they still wield enormous power in how Western institutions approach the world, the natural 
world in particular.  
 
However, Descartes’ insistence on the total separation of humans from (other) animals, 
according to Derrida, is bad philosophy: “To put all living things that aren’t human into one 
category is, first of all a stupid gesture – theoretically ridiculous – and partakes in the very real 
violence that humans exercise toward animals” (Derrida, 2008: YouTube). It makes no logical 
sense to separate humans from all other animals just because one can cite various mental 
capacities that are seemingly unique to human animals. Obviously, we can admit there are 
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properties unique to humans, but to attach exclusivity to a specific set of human properties and 
to place them in opposition to the properties of the entire animal kingdom makes no sense. As 
American philosopher, David Abram (who we will be seeing more of later on in this 
dissertation), expostulates, we humans are mightily special. Abram highlights our opposable 
thumbs, our ability to balance and ambulate on our hind legs, our capacity for reflection, and 
our slyness with tools and ever-more-complex technologies. But then he points out that the 
hawk is able to fly without any of the contrivances that we depend upon, and the apple tree is 
able to squeeze apples directly out of its limbs, some whales can dive to a depth of six thousand 
feet, holding their breath for over ninety minutes, and   monarch butterflies undertake a massive 
migration. There are  many more  attributes of (other) animals that are astonishing, ‘mightily 
special’, too. Abram asks: “Are we humans unique? Sure we are. But so is everyone else around 
here” (Abram, On Being Human in a More-Than-Human-World). Derrida concurs, and adds 
that putting humans into a single category and all other animals into a separate single category 
leads to a very violent relationship between the two groups: 
 
There are considerable differences between different types of animals. There is no 
reason one should group into one and the same category monkeys, bees, snakes, 
dogs, horses, anthropods and microbes. These are radically different organisms of 
life, and to say ‘animal’ and put them all into one category – both the monkey and 
the ant – is a very violent gesture (Derrida, 2008: YouTube). 
 
The violence comes as a result of the complete separation of humans in one category and 
all (other) animals in another, in accordance with the notion that only humans are 
regarded as  having  moral standing. Given that (other) animals are not afforded any 
moral value opens the door to untold violence toward them, a violence that was 
legitimized by Descartes. 
 
2.1.2. The violent epoch 
 
Directly following Descartes, an epoch of violent (strong) anthropocentrism prevailed 
(Derrida, 2008: 25). This separation between the human and the (other) animal coincided with 
Western modernity . From here the epoch progressed rapidly and exponentially with the rise 
of industrialisation and human population growth during the industrial age in the mid-
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nineteenth century when wild animals were wantonly decimated by rapidly expanding and 
colonizing Western populations of humans without much thought given to their future survival.  
 
A case in point was the East African ivory trade that took place at the exact point 
industrialisation came of age, which is between 1840 and 1890 (Spinage, 1973). Even though 
the trade in ivory in Africa was an ancient one in that it figures prominently in the earliest 
reference to trading activities on the East African Coast (Beachey, 1967: 269-290), in the 
nineteenth century an increased demand for the commodity in America and Europe, which 
coincided with the “opening up” of East Africa by Arab traders and European explorers, led to 
a sudden collapse of the ivory supply from over‐exploitation by the turn of the century. During 
the nineteenth century ivory exceeded all other commodities in trade value — even slaves 
(Spinage, 1973). The uses of ivory were wide and novel, from piano keys and knife handles to 
chopsticks and hairpins. Essentially, ivory played the same versatile role in the nineteenth 
century as plastics do in the twenty-first – although ivory was a far more expensive material.  
 
After the rampant over-exploitation of the colonial era, and certainly from the dawn of the 
Anthropocene era after 1945, human conservation policies, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, adopted a weaker anthropocentric slant. Rather than just unlimited exploitation of 
wild animals and (other) raw materials, humans began to develop ways of recycling wildlife 
for long-term efficiency and output. The violence against non-human animals perpetrated 
during the modern era, however, did not abate in the post-modern one. If anything, it got worse, 
more intense and more sophisticated: 
 
This has occurred by means of farming and regimentalisation at a demographic 
level unknown in the past, by means of genetic experimentation, the 
industrialisation of what can be called the production for consumption of animal 
meat, artificial insemination on a massive scale, more and more audacious 
manipulations of the genome, the reduction of the animal not only to production 
and overactive reproduction (hormones, genetic crossbreeding, cloning etc.) of 
meat for consumption, but also all sorts of other end products, and all that in the 
service of a certain being and the putative well-being of man (Derrida, 2008: 25). 
 
To emphasise his point, Derrida compares the culminating violence on animals with the worst 
forms of inter-human violence, with specific mention of the Nazi Holocaust (Derrida, 2008: 
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26). Derrida is by no means the first and only philosopher to make this comparison. Heidegger, 
himself a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party, once alluded to a comparison of the meat 
industry with the Holocaust (Heidegger, 1994: 52). It is no coincidence that philosophers make 
these comparisons, and it is an important one. Assistant-Professor of Philosophy at California 
State University, Matthew Calarco states in his book Zoographies: The Question of the Animal 
from Heidegger to Derrida (2008) that the comparison with the Nazi Holocaust obliges us “to 
consider precisely the anthropocentric value hierarchy that places human life always and 
everywhere in a higher rank over animal life” (Calarco, 2008: 110).  
 
Acclaimed novelists such as J.M. Coetzee are likewise not shy to bring in the comparison of 
the Nazis and the Holocaust with our current treatment of animals, stating at first that it was 
the Chicago stockyards that showed the way for the mass slaughter of (other) animals. This 
was also where the Nazis took note later applying the same process in the Jewish death camps 
(Coetzee, 2003: 110). Derrida too makes the comparison:  
 
As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let’s 
say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overpopulation and 
overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial 
insemination so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined 
in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that for the imposition of genetic 
experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs (Derrida, 
2008: 26). 
 
It is an uncomfortably apt comparison in that it drives home how Cartesian anthropocentrism 
has manifested itself so violently in our modern society. In the Anthropocene, humans are 
committing genocide against wild animals as evidenced by the fact we have lost 60% of the 
world’s vertebrate population between 1970 and 2014 (WWF, 2018: 7). Yet, genocide is an act 
that traditionally seeks to extinguish a race or group for good, but under the rubric of weak 
anthropocentrism, wildlife ranchers are deliberately increasing the numbers of wild animals so 
that we may commit to wholesale slaughter continuously, and in ways fast becoming similar 
to the factory-farming of domestic livestock. This is not about extermination of some selected 
species, but rotational and continual propagation of an animal Holocaust.  
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The association with the Nazi Holocaust brings home with clarity that the vast bulk of the < 7-
billion global human population eat (other) animals without any remorse while human hunters, 
as one example of hundreds of thousands, use the by-products (in the form of heads, horns and 
pelts) to decorate the walls and floors of their houses.  J.M. Coetzee conjures a macabre twist 
with such a comparison in Elizabeth Costello: 
 
It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark about the lamp in 
their living room, and they were to say “Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it? Polish-Jewish skin 
it’s made of, we find that’s best, the skins of young Polish-Jewish virgins.” And 
then I go to the bathroom and the soap wrapper says, ‘Treblinka - 100% human 
sterate’ (Coetzee, 2003: 115). 
 
Coetzee’s powerful statement here is that humans don’t flinch for a second knowing that the 
lampshade is made from the skin of a piglet, or that the rug in the lounge is the skin of a zebra, 
yet if we exchange the decoration of (other) animal skins with humans we experience a 
revulsion at the horror, and that’s just at the thought of it. This then is the central pillar of 
anthropocentrism – weak or strong. Anthropocentrism lacks a moral reaction to the violence 
toward (other) animals.  
 
It is clear, then, that Descartes’ entrenched hierarchical dualism, which is overtly prevalent in 
Western thought, remains the theoretical bedrock of anthropocentrism that, in turn, reflects in 
the indiscriminate and unlimited violence meted out towards all (other) animals. Worse, under 
the concept of weak anthropocentrism this violence is perpetuated under the notion of 
maintaining or increasing wild animal numbers to be slaughtered, traded or exploited ad 
infinitum.  
 
2.1.3. Anthropocentrism toward other humans 
 
Anthropocentric concerns for wild spaces, game parks and game farms are often regarded as 
elitist. The singling out of sustainable development as a solution to human inequality becomes 
a problem when the impoverished lives of some humans are left the same or are made worse 
through a policy of weak anthropocentrism. One common ground between those concerned 
with social inequality and the rights of non-human species can be the “critique of 
instrumentalism and relation between the domination of humans over animals ― as an integral 
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part of the domination of nature in general ― and the domination of humans over one another” 
(Kopnina, 2015: 7).  
 
The concept of anthropocentrism has never placed all humans on an equal footing, but 
“typically it functions to include only a select subset of human beings in the sphere of humanity 
proper’’ (Calarco in Crist & Kopnina, 2014: 393), while relegating the rest to the sphere of ‘the 
animal’ where moral consideration does not arise. The privileging of ‘the human’ has not only 
tracked along species-inclusive lines (Calarco in Crist & Kopnina, 2014: 393). In South Africa, 
conquests, colonialism, Apartheid and, as we saw earlier, modern displacements of agricultural 
communities by private wildlife ranchers are a straightforward extension of this 
anthropocentric logic – categories of ‘subhuman’, ‘savage’, ‘primitive’, ‘black’, ‘Hottentot’, 
‘coloured’ and even ‘labourers’ have historically functioned to excise certain groups from full 
humanity and lump them into the sphere of (animal) otherness toward which violence and 
domination can be exercised (Crist & Kopnina, 2014: 393). In a similar way, the terms 
‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ so prominent in sustainable development terminology “may 
be seen to imply that the poor, vulnerable, marginal people – and in fact entire nations – need 
to emulate the higher stages of development exemplified by the superior sectors of the 
population and entire nations” (Kopnina, 2015: 7). One could argue that anthropocentrism, is 
the enemy of both human and wildlife interests. Anthropocentrism, therefore, destroys social 
and cultural diversity as well as biological diversity (Kopnina, 2015: 7), and hierarchises 
different ways of living among humans. 
 
As I have started to discuss, although (the cost of) wildlife conservation has consistently been 
justified by the South African government post-apartheid with reference to poverty reduction 
and the “development of opportunities for economic and social benefit” (Morewa), in practice 
the current paradigm seldom yields the promises made in this regard. For example, the 
Endangered Wildlife Trust Position Statement on Trophy Hunting states that trophy hunting is 
often not as economically beneficial to human society as it claims to be. (Endangered Wildlife 
Trust, May 2015) While some jobs are created within the trophy hunting industry, employment 
opportunities remain limited and the contribution of trophy hunting to job creation is often 
overstated – especially by government as shown in Chapter One. These are also often not 
skilled jobs, are not regulated and do not offer career paths or skills development (Endangered 
Wildlife Trust, May 2015).  
 
 89 
In South Africa, not many local communities can claim to benefit from trophy hunting on 
private ranches, as little of the profits generated from hunts are fed back into these 
communities. Besides, issues around community benefits and land ownership targets are not 
being adequately addressed through the current system. Key issues include inadequate 
legislation to enforce community involvement as well as limited business knowledge within 
communities to negotiate terms with private operators and run hunting operations (Endangered 
Wildlife Trust, May 2015). Finally, not all trophy hunting operations provide their workers 
with even the basic working conditions as required under South African law (Endangered 
Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
• Private game farms in the Karoo 
 
A study by Brandt and Spierenburg entitled Game Fences in the Karoo: Reconfiguring Spatial 
and Social Relations (2014) found that in the Eastern Cape, more than 90% of mainly white-
owned commercial farmers and private landowners had converted from traditional livestock 
farming to game hunting farms. However, Brandt and Spierenburg found that converting 
livestock farms to hunting operations in the Karoo results in spatial rearrangements in the 
countryside as well as negative relationships between white landowners and black and coloured 
workers (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 222). To create the image of wilderness, internal fencing 
is removed, and high, almost impenetrable fences are erected on the outside perimeters. This 
process results in a substantial increase in the price of land per hectare, which in turn, hampers 
land reform (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 222). While game farmers and government claim 
that the conversions benefit rural populations through job creation and skills development 
opportunities, in reality, according to Brandt and Spierenburg, the process “obscures the issue 
of labour relations on farms as well as tenure security for farm dwellers” (Brandt & 
Spierenburg, 2014: 222). Their research on hunting farms shows that conversions to hunting 
farms in fact reduces the demand for labour and thus reinforces asymmetric power relations on 
the farms that were evident since the frontier wars of the nineteenth century and reached a peak 
during the Apartheid era (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 222).  
 
The Brandt and Spierenburg study found that hunting operations take place within a network 
that consists of landowners, hunting outfitters and professional hunters each supporting the 
others’ business (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 227). These networks “further entrench 
continued processes of displacement of farm dwellers off farms into informal settlements and 
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townships” (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 227). On the Karoo hunting farms, only a small core 
of permanent, mostly male workers live on the farm to do general farm work as well as hunting-
related work like tracking, skinning and preparing the hunted animal for taxidermy. The rest 
have been displaced (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 231). These labour arrangements contribute 
to changing labour relations and the disconnection of work and home on the farm. According 
to the study, the farm is no longer a home to families of permanent farm workers and “the 
boundaries of private property have effectively been solidified” Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 
231). 
 
Also, Brandt and Spierenburg discovered that “hunting tips from foreigners, presented by 
farmers as one of the ‘benefits’ of trophy hunting, are often arbitrarily distributed by farmers 
only as periodical rewards” rather than “structural earnings” (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014: 
231). Thus, Brandt and Spierenburg’s study concluded:  
 
Contrary to farmers’ claims, the hunting farms in the Karoo require less labour. 
The spatial reorganisation of the farms, reducing what little access farm workers 
and dwellers had to land on farms for land-based livelihood strategies, the 
increased outsourcing of tasks and the employment of immigrant labours have 
changed labour relations and interdependencies on the farms (Brandt & 
Spierenburg, 2014: 234). 
 
Furthermore, in spite of some positive economic benefits of trophy hunting as described in 
Chapter One, there are a number of other concerns related to the distribution of profits. In many 
instances, revenue stays overseas where the transaction takes place, usually with agents, expo 
marketers or hunting outfitters. The revenue more often does not feed through to the country 
in which an animal is trophy-hunted (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). Ultimately, the 
majority of income goes to the professional hunter, with relatively little trickle-down to the 
community and conservation (Endangered Wildlife Trust, May 2015). 
 
Thus, far from providing meaningful benefits for both the conservation of wildlife and human 
livelihoods, the exclusively instrumental valuation of wildlife can in fact accelerate the demise 
of wild animals as well as exacerbating poverty levels amongst  the majority of so-called human 
benefactors . These problems, centred primarily on an anthropocentric construct, are well-
recognised, especially by those critics who  champion a non-instrumental-valued ideal. The 
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dominant voice of such an ideal are animal rights activists who propose moral consideration of 
other animals as a viable alternative to anthropocentrism.  
 
2.2. Exclusionary logic in moral consideration and animal rights practices 
 
In this section, I briefly turn to  the common alternative notion against anthropocentrism, 
namely moral consideration and the rights of (other) animals. Due to a lack of space, I will 
focus only on Peter Singer’s alternative position. I will show that there are a number of 
problems associated with this alternative approach, the first (The Consideranda Club) being 
that it still draws an insuperable line between those also morally and those merely 
instrumentally considered, only this time the line is drawn between higher-order more 
‘sentient’ mammals and the rest of life.  At face value, it would seem that the obvious counter-
argument facing the dominant paradigm toward (other) animals, as discussed above, are the 
theories posited by animal rights philosophers. Renowned animal and environmental ethicists 
like Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Clare Palmer, J. Baird Callicott, Arne Naess, Richard Sylvan 
(Routley), Val Plumwood (Routley), Holmes Rolston III, James E. Lovelock and many others 
have, since the emergence of formal animal and environmental philosophical enquiry in the 
early 1970s, begun to question the pervading anthropocentric dominance in Western traditional 
thought (Bryan Norton being the notable exception)21, specifically “its elevation of humanity 
high above the rest of nature, and its celebration of human reason” (Callicott & Palmer, 2005: 
Vol 1, xxxv). Editors J. Baird Callicott and Clare Palmer have claimed in the general 
introduction to their voluminous five-volume work entitled Environmental Philosophy: 
Critical Concepts (2005) that “in the finest tradition of Western Philosophy” most 
environmental philosophers have taken “a non-anthropocentric turn” (Callicott & Palmer, 
2005: Vol 1, xxxvi). This statement is ostensibly true. True in that the intention of these 
philosophers is non-anthropocentric but in the main they remain inextricably tied to the 
anthropocentric discourse they attempt to confront.  
 
In the remaining two sub-sections (Zoocentrism and Animal rights versus human rights) I 
explore how one version of this alternative serves to alienate many human animals too. I will 
demonstrate that often animal rights approaches are accused of zoo-centrism and alienate some 
 
21 Recall in Chapter One that Norton favours a weak anthropocentric approach to the conservation and 
protection of (other) animals. 
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human groups for the benefit of protecting animals. In short, many animal rights theories serve 
to exclude humans and most animals from their ethic. 
 
2.2.1. The Consideranda Club 
 
Broadly, animal rights theorists insist that all (sentient) animals ought to enjoy similar moral 
value as humans. In the 1970s Peter Singer called for a liberation movement that demands an 
expansion of moral horizons and claims that unless “we wish to avoid being numbered amongst 
the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think our most fundamental attitudes” (Singer, 2005: 
75). That re-thinking means a mental switch to consider the point of view of the disadvantaged 
belonging to a “very large group of beings, members of a species other than our own – or, as 
we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals” (Singer, 2005: 75-76). Singer wanted to 
find something that circumvents such reductionist hierarchical distinctions. His intended 
deferment from the dominant anthropocentric paradigm comes in the form of his basic 
principle of equality. 
 
Equality is not about beings of different species enjoying the same rights, like the right to vote, 
but whether all living beings enjoy equal moral consideration (Singer, 2005: 77). Singer 
wanted to challenge the dominant anthropocentric attitude of society, not by ignoring actual 
differences between races, sexes, individuals and (other) animals, but by accepting an equal 
consideration for all living beings. Equality, says Singer, “is a moral ideal, not a simple 
assertion of fact” (Singer, 2005: 79). We humans tend to eschew the claim that equality among 
our own species is based on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters 
of fact, otherwise why does a plumber have the same moral consideration as a philosophy 
professor? Thus, the principle of equality is not an (f)actual equality but a prescription of how 
we ought to treat others (Singer, 2005: 79). By using this sort of principle, we can see how easy 
it is to make a switch to morally consider (other) animals as well as humans of an ‘other’ nature.  
 
Singer is a utilitarian who broadly follows Jeremy Bentham’s straightforward approach to the 
sort of criteria that must be met to qualify for ‘subjectivity’. In light of all that has been 
discussed so far in this chapter, Bentham’s oft quoted line, benefits being presented here in its 
unabridged version:  
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The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The 
French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a 
human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It 
may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the villosity [sic] of 
the skin, or the termination of the ossacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for 
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the 
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? 
But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a 
more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, a week or even a month, old. But 
suppose they are otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1823. XV11.122).  
 
Bentham was the first to insist that uniquely human traits were not the correct criteria for equal 
moral consideration. For him, the only criterion that bridges the ‘insuperable line’ between 
humanity and (other) animals are “those sovereign masters of pleasure and pain” (Bentham, 
1823). As long as a being can suffer and (by default) also can experience pleasure, ethical 
consideration must be afforded it. This effectively means that any being, as long as it has 
feelings, is to be considered equally to human beings with respect to their experiences (of 
pleasure and pain). A being such as a plant that is not governed by sentience cannot be 
considered, neither perhaps coral polyps, mussels and amoebas but an animal like a cow or a 
buffalo that has a central nervous system can. Singer follows Bentham’s ideal that the utility 
principle must include non-human animals too – or at least all those that are deemed sentient 
(Singer, 2005: 80).  
 
Yet, the fundamental problem is that by asking whether animals can suffer, the whole enquiry 
tends to fall into a similar dualist/reductionist trap where philosophers are simply shifting the 
insuperable line to include some animals (elephants, dolphins, lions, cows, chickens, pigs) but 
not most animals (sharks, crocodiles, frogs, insects and all invertebrates). The difficulty with 
asking whether animals can suffer, is still arbitrarily marking the boundary, this time at 
wherever the level of sentience is determined. This sends philosophers toward a ceaseless 
debate as to the nature, extent, and moral weight of what precisely suffering entails. As Calarco 
emphasises, this has “led to an entire field of inquiry focused on determining whether animals 
can suffer and to what extent this can be confirmed empirically [do elephants suffer more than 
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rats?], and what the normative and legal implications of these empirical findings are” (Calarco, 
2008: 119). Theories on sentience simply lure animal-rights theorists to redraw the same 
insuperable line, only now it is between those included and those excluded from what is 
morally considered with a small number of elect animal species falling on the right side of 
moral consideration.  
 
Moral consideration, conceived of in this way, is anthropocentric in that it is governed entirely 
by human sentiment at the apex of the moral echelon. Humans in this framework enjoy the 
highest form of moral consideration, since we think we have the greatest capacity for suffering, 
while the rest of animal life is ranked below humans and toward ever decreasing levels of moral 
value. This is determined entirely by the perceived degree of sentience dictated solely by 
humans at the top. Charismatic megafauna, or ‘higher-order’ mammals, like elephants, lions, 
whales, chimpanzees, tigers, dolphins and panda bears are awarded more ethical consideration 
than ‘lower-order’ sharks, rats, snakes, spiders and bats. It is little wonder that the World 
Wildlife Fund has a panda as its logo. The organization wouldn’t generate much human 
empathy, let alone funding, if they had a mosquito or snake as their logo. These reasons remain 
heavily anthropocentric, since panda bears are closer to our own sense of sentience than 
mosquitoes and snakes.  
 
This is perhaps the biggest pitfall of all with the Benthamite question. The capability to suffer, 
and the degree of human-like suffering, now becomes the means to construct another version 
of the anthropocentric hierarchy. Thomas H. Birch who compiled a thought-provoking essay 
entitled Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration (1993), states that the problem 
with this line of enquiry is that it is forever seeking to draw the line between those ‘inside’ and 
those ‘outside’ the scope of moral concern (Birch, 1993: 315). Therefore, non-members, those 
whose suffering cannot be considered empirically or ontologically, suffer the atrocities meted 
out by those within the ‘Club of Consideranda’ (Birch, 1993). It just so happens that, because 
of our anthropomorphic view of sentience and physicality, the vast majority of animal life finds 
themselves forever entrapped on the outside of the club.  
 
2.2.2. Zoocentrism 
 
The animal rights movement has come under fire from environmental philosophers who regard 
right theorists, like Singer, as ‘zoocentric’ (Callicott & Palmer, 2005: Vol 1, ii). The main 
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accusation against zoocentrism from many principal environmental philosophers such as Baird 
Calicott, Holmes Rolston III and others (Callicott & Palmer, 2005) as well as philosophical 
‘movements’ such as Deep Ecology, Bio- and Eco-centrism is that zoocentrism is a refusal to 
look beyond the reduced parameters of an individual’s suffering instead of at the effects of the 
natural environment or biosphere as a whole.  
 
This can be clearly illustrated with the South African example of wildlife ranching.  The same 
problem as with instrumental valuations manifests itself with intrinsic valuations in that both 
remain firmly  anthropocentric. An analysis in 2001 by Castley et al. of a number of private 
wildlife operations in the arid and semi-arid regions of South Africa “revealed an alarming 
degree of undesirable large mammal introductions” (Castley et al., 2001: 344). The extent of 
non-native species in private wildlife operations ranged between 10 and 57%, with two-thirds 
of all operations surveyed having 25% or more non-native species present. These species range 
from fallow deer to Asian tigers. Such introductions intended to improve the economic viability 
of these operations, instead showed that the comprehensive and long-term ecological costs 
outweighed the immediate economic benefits (Castley et al., 2001: 344). Castley et al. recorded 
that the loss of sensitive species, such as cryptic antelope species like oribi and duiker, as a 
result of competitive exclusion and associated effects ultimately diminished the biodiversity of 
the landscape.  
 
This is a clear case of some human valued animals (introduced species) destroying the lives of 
many of the native species. Concerned environmentalists, in this situation, would not hesitate 
to call for the removal, which often means culling, of introduced or invasive animals in order 
to protect the overall biodiversity of the area. Zoocentric animal rightists, however, feel very 
differently as the following example of Table Mountain tahr controversy highlights: 
 
• Table Mountain’s (ex) tahrs 
 
A few years ago, a decision was made to cull the Himalayan tahrs that had been living wild on 
the slopes of Table Mountain since the 1930s when a few escaped from the zoo at the 
University of Cape Town.22 The decision was made by environmentalists primarily because, 
 
22 I flagged this example in my Masters thesis.  
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as alien ungulates, they were displacing the indigenous wild antelope (klipspringers) through 
the overgrazing of fynbos, an endemic biome that also supported a list of smaller, endemic 
wild animals like the extremely rare and localised Table Mountain ghost frog. The sound 
decision to sacrifice a few tahrs for the greater ecological good, however, caused a furore 
among the animal rights activists in Cape Town. The animal rights activists believed that 
shooting tahrs and selling off their carcasses for human consumption was cruel and that the 
individual right to life of the tahrs had to be respected above all else. In the end the tahrs were 
killed because the lives of endemic animals were correctly deemed more vital to the health of 
the entire natural biodiversity of Table Mountain than the moral consideration of a few tahrs 
(Cruise, 2015: 116-117).  
 
The problem of invasive species and the integrity of the indigenous environment is not the only 
problem with an animal rights approach. The movement often comes into conflict with human 
rights concerns. 
 
2.2.3. Animal rights versus human rights 
 
Another major problem with the movement for animal rights, is that the movement competes 
with other political identities, especially human-related ones, like the rights of the 
underprivileged, women and minority groups. Particularly within the social fabric of a country 
like South Africa, animal rights issues are expected to invariably take a back seat to these other 
‘more pressing’ political identities.  
 
Paradoxically, it is among socially and politically progressive thinkers that it is the greatest 
challenge for the animal rights movement to gain a centre stage (Cruise, 2015: 134). Many 
progressive thinkers and legislators, regard animal rights as an elitist luxury, or simply an 
inconsequential fringe group, while the country’s high human unemployment, rampant poverty 
and human suffering are seen as  far more urgent and important issues. The problem is animal 
rights theory does not include any human benefits in their manifestoes and because of this they 
are ranked extremely low in the listings of other political movements and policies. This is 
indicated in the predicted budget expenditures of the South African National Treasury for the 
period 2018-2019: Social Development, Economic and Community Development, Learning 
and Culture, and Health are to receive R259,4-billion, R200,1-billion, R196,3-billion, R351,1-
billion, and R205,4-billion respectively while the Environment gets a paltry R7,1-billion 
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(National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2018). The latter is one of the smallest 
beneficiaries of the national expenditure budget. In fact, the South African National Parks 
(SANParks) receives a miniscule annual grant from government to carry out its mandate. This 
is not nearly sufficient to cover the management costs. The organisation is forced to utilise its 
own revenue derived from commercial activities, such as conservation fees and 
accommodation to subsidise the shortfall (SANParks, 2018: 198). 
 
Animal rights ideas have also permeated somewhat into national conservation management 
policies. This was especially the case during Apartheid but is still widely evident today. This 
is the notion of ‘fortress conservation’ (Büscher, 2015: 1, Jones, 2016). The central theme of 
fortress conservation thinking is that humans do not have a place in nature, that they threaten 
ecosystems and species, and hence that conservation areas must be ‘defended’ against humans 
(read: ‘local communities’), if necessary, by force and coercion (Büscher, 2015: 2; Jones, 
2016). In South Africa, it was clearly apparent prior to 1994 that many “people and communities 
in and around protected areas are marginalised or excluded from nature”23 (Kaminsky, 2010). 
 
The idea and practice of fortress conservation seems to have lost little of its appeal in current 
times. It is now viewed as ‘class’ or ‘economic’ instead of ‘race’ based. Critical researchers 
find that fortress thinking persists in the governance of protected areas in South Africa (Harris 
2014; Kepe 2014 in Büscher, 2015: 2). The Kruger National Park in South Africa is a case in 
point because it is one of the most iconic parks globally, long regarded as a classic conservation 
fortress (Carruthers 1995 in Büscher, 2015: 2). This was especially apparent during Apartheid 
years when people were moved from the land to make way for the National Park. In 1998, 
almost forty land claims were lodged on land within the Kruger National Park (Wray & 
Strauss) but the decision was taken by government not to restore the land rights of the claimants 
(Government Communication and Information System of the Republic of South Africa, 2009). 
Despite this, there have been some attempts by government to break through the fortress, but 
much of the limited progress has recently come undone by the massive ‘green militarization’ 
triggered in response to  rampant rhino poaching in the Kruger National Park (Lunstrum 2014 
in Büscher, 2015: 2). The result is a return of ‘Fortress Kruger’, a term actually used by those 
involved in protecting KNP from poaching incursions (interview, Kruger National Park staff 
officer, 6 February 2014, Skukuza, South Africa in Büscher, 2015: 2). 
 
23 ‘Nature’ here implies the natural environment. 
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To make matters worse, the elitist cliques in promoting animal rights and conservation 
practices before human needs has led some activists to adopt regressive, and occasionally, 
militaristic strategies and actions that, firstly, are contrary to social reform and, secondly, are 
unlikely to win the intended empathy from the general human population. Organizations like 
Sea Shepherd, for example, have been saddled with militaristic and violent innuendo, labelled 
as ‘eco-terrorists’ or ‘eco-fascists’ because of the violence meted out toward those hunting 
whales and dolphins. This kind of war-like action and rhetoric is easily associated with 
militaristic or nationalistic policies of vicious inter-human acts of violence. War and terrorism 
are common associations one makes with this kind of rhetoric. As a result, people tend to 
associate such attitudes with actual war and often take a dim view of the perpetrators as their 
behaviour compares to violent oppression. After the hunting of Cecil the Lion, the hunter, 
Walter Palmer, was hounded by animal rights activists who verbally abused, not just the hunter 
himself but his family and even clients who still attended his dental practice after the case went 
viral in the media and social media (BBC News, 29th July 2015). Militaristic metaphors by 
animal rights activists have connotations of acts of war, violence and, at worst, genocide. 
Consequently, it may be construed, by those on the outside, that conservationists and the animal 
rights movement are violent and racist and are subliminally regarded with a suspicion that can 
manifest in open derision (Cruise, 2015: 134-137). I will demonstrate in the final chapters how 
an eco-phenomenological approach will potentially assist animal rights movements in their use 
of language and counter the tension between human and animal rights. This will be achieved 
by shifting the focus away from a zoocentric approach to something broader, namely something 
that considers the interdependence of all life forms as an interconnected web rather than 
binaries that constantly face off and vie with each other for dominance.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates that what lies at the heart of our current crises regarding the Sixth 
Extinction of wild animals is predominantly the predisposition toward anthropocentrism. 
 
This prevailing anthropocentrism is demonstrated theoretically both in deep-rooted human 
ontological and ethical pursuits. This highlights the widespread contagion of Cartesian 
dualism, either in terms of the human rational mind versus the corporeal body, or the exclusion 
of most animals over the minority who display anthropomorphic moral agency or physicality 
 99 
with the Club of Consideranda. This tendency or bias in Western thought, as criticized in this 
chapter, is the bedrock of a manifestation of global and national anthropocentric policies in 
attempting, and failing, to preserve the planet’s species from complete annihilation. At the 
same time, it also forms the bedrock of the colonial period’s ruthless exploitation of nature. 
The fact that anthropocentrism underlies both unlimited exploitation of nature and our 
dominant paradigm for trying to limit that exploitation, points to a pertinent contradiction. 
Furthermore, anthropocentrism is not just a pretext for our violence and extirpation of (other) 
animals but serves as a means for human exclusion and dominance too. It is obvious then, that 
the key to preventing further decline of wild species, and to prevent further human-on-human 
subjugation is to fully dismantle anthropocentrism, no matter strong or weak, in our pervading 
attitudes. A fully non-anthropocentric paradigm that can be applied is therefore required if we 
are to have any hope of saving wild species and marginalised human communities.  
 
In the next chapter, I will introduce the conceptual basis for the possibility of such a paradigm 
– phenomenology.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PROSPECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A NON-
ANTHROPOCENTRIC PARADIGM 
 
Back to the things themselves! 
(Husserl, 2001: 168) 
 
Phenomenology is rooted in experience of the world. It is a study in the involvement of an 
experiencer with his or her surroundings, an involvement which profoundly shapes the 
experience and perception. From this basic premise, phenomenology makes an immediate 
departure from the notion of a Cartesian dualism of an egocentric ‘Subject’ separated and 
distant from the corporeal world. It is this insistence upon an unavoidable ‘involvement’ with 
the world that makes phenomenology a promising prospect in providing a non-anthropocentric 
paradigm. 
 
The study of phenomenology looks at the structure of various types of immediate, bodily 
experience in terms of meaningful phenomena, appearances or perceptions. Phenomena are the 
appearances of things, or things as they appear to us, or the ways we experience things. It is 
not only about perceiving things around us, but phenomenology includes also actions that 
demonstrate a connectivity with the world. The fundamental acts of breathing, eating, talking 
and walking show a direct connectivity with our surrounding environment that cannot be 
avoided. Studying the structure of experience includes different kinds of experiences like 
relatively passive experiences of seeing, smelling or hearing, and active experiences like 
touching and tasting, which in turn develop into more complex actions such as walking, 
swimming, rolling in the mud, howling at the moon or hammering a nail. Phenomenology 
analyses these experience-structures that develop into other types of experience like thought, 
memory, imagination, emotion and desire (Smith, 2018). 
 
In section one of this chapter (The Non-Anthropocentric Prospect of Phenomenology), I will 
show how in these embodied experiences within the world, phenomenology can be clearly 
differentiated from Cartesian dualism (and the resultant manifestation of anthropocentrism). 
This is because the latter as discussed, takes everything in the world as non-subjective or 
objectively given entities acting and reacting to and with one another. As a non-anthropocentric 
prospect, phenomenology could be the new paradigm in wildlife conservation since its focus 
deals with the way an experiencer – be it an elephant or a human; a bat or a gnat – bodily and 
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perceptually experiences and interacts with its surroundings. Phenomenology therefore 
considers living beings, not as objective entities, but as organisms within a broader natural 
sphere. It is the focus on the natural sphere that makes phenomenology an exciting new 
prospect in wildlife conservation.  
 
In traditional phenomenology, as I will lay out in section 1.2 of this chapter (Potential non-
anthropocentric foundations in traditional phenomenology) there are five principal 
philosophers that developed the discipline as we know it24 – Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-
1995) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). With these thinkers, phenomenology 
developed into a full philosophical enquiry as distinct from epistemology, ontology, ethics and 
logic – although it contains foundational elements of all these disciplines (Smith, 2018). 
According to David Woodruff Smith’s tour d’horizon of phenomenology in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “with these philosophers, the discipline of phenomenology was 
prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy” (Smith, 2018: online) in that it is essentially 
anti-reductionistic, anti-Cartesian and finally also a solid alternative to anthropocentrism.  
 
Aside from Merleau-Ponty, whose work will be analysed in the chapters following this, I will 
in this section briefly provide an overview of the other four principal phenomenologists’ 
arguments, primarily to show how the foundation of the discipline evolved, and to highlight 
the core principles of phenomenology. I do not want to labour too much in the detailed and 
often complex ideas in the broader aspects of traditional phenomenology and its 
methodologies, since it detracts somewhat from the core of this dissertation, namely Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology as the truly non-anthropocentric approach to wildlife conservation. 
 
Importantly, in section two of this chapter (Anthropocentric pitfalls in traditional 
phenomenology), I will reveal that while the overriding concern was to dismantle the dominant 
Cartesian paradigm, the various versions of traditional phenomenology as laid out by Husserl, 
Heidegger, Sartre and Levinas were unable to untangle completely from the anthropocentric 
web they tried so hard to unravel. While these philosophers came close in their overall projects, 
the all maintained feint elements of anthropocentric bias that ultimately still favours human 
 
24 There are other phenomenological thinkers  before (Brentano, Hegel), during (Scheler, de Beauvoir, Arendt) 
and after (Derrida, Abram), but arguably the credit goes to Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty 
for the foundational development of traditional phenomenology as a discipline. 
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over (other) animal, at least from an ethical perspective. It was only Merleau-Ponty who was 
successful in making a complete break from anthropocentrism. It must be said however that 
without the foundation laid by these thinkers, especially that of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
would not have been able to progress in his own endeavor.  
 
1. The non-anthropocentric prospect of phenomenology 
 
Overall, phenomenology is primarily concerned with the structure of consciousness and, in its 
most basic form, with attempts to create conditions for the ‘objective’ study of topics 
considered ‘subjective’, such as judgements, perceptions and emotions. However, 
phenomenology does not attempt to study consciousness from the objectifying perspective of 
normal scientific-empirical analysis that say clinical psychology or neurology does. Instead, it 
seeks through systematic reflection of the surrounding world to determine the essential 
properties and structures of direct, immediate and subjective experience (Menon et al., 2014: 
172).  
 
Historically, phenomenology is the philosophical tradition that began in earnest during the first 
half of the 20th century with Edmund Husserl, whose adoption of the term propelled it into 
becoming the designation of a philosophical discipline. Phenomenology came into its own with 
Husserl, as epistemology came into its own with Descartes, and ontology or metaphysics came 
into its own with Aristotle and Plato (Smith, 2018: online).  
 
1.1. A return to the things themselves 
 
“Back to the things themselves!” exclaimed Husserl (Husserl 2001: 168) in Logical 
Investigations, Husserl’s magnum opus published in 1900. He was specifically referencing 
phenomenology’s charge against the dominant Cartesian paradigm in philosophy. It was 
Cartesian dualism, as well as the descendent empirical realism that, for Husserl, had tended to 
forget its own roots in real-time experience. Basically, from Husserl onwards, 
phenomenology’s concern was with overcoming the dualistic heritage of Cartesian Western 
thought that traces our alienation from nature to the conceptual severance of mind from body, 
human from animal. The process of Cartesian reduction ignores the lived, subjective 
experience one has of living beings and inanimate entities in the natural world. It instead tends 
to reduce the description of these ‘things’ to the listing  of their externally related parts.  
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For example, the typical scientific (Linnaen) description of a wildebeest is not one of how we 
would experience a living dynamic being grazing the tall yellow grass on an open savanna, but 
separated from its surroundings and in its constituting parts. This is much in the same way one 
would describe the interlocking parts of a machine, as Descartes would have done when he 
described (other) animals as automatons: 
 
Genus: Connochaetes under,  
Kingdom: Animalia,  
Phylum: Chordata,  
Class: Mammalia,  
Order: Artodactyla,  
Family: Bovidae,  
Sub-family: Alcelaphinae,  
Species: gnou.  
 
We describe machines in this way. Take a look at how the car I drive is described by the motor 
industry: 
 
Manufacturer: Toyota,  
Make: Land Cruiser,  
Series, J100, 
Transmission: VX 5 speed-automatic,  
Engine: 4.2 L 1HD-TI6 Turbo Diesel;  
Model: 2002 
 
Yet, even with ecology’s Cartesian attempt to ignore world-experience, we find that the genus 
word for the wildebeest, Connochaetes, derives from a perceptual experience of it – the Greek 
words, kónnos, meaning ‘beard’; and, khaítē, meaning ‘flowing hair’ or mane (Benirschke, 
2002). These hidden meanings in the Greek description point to the fact that science is unable 
to describe the wildebeest without first experiencing it. A beard is something the human 
experiencer recognises in his own subjective self and is thus able to make a comparison, a link, 
to the wildebeest that he is experiencing, 
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Furthermore, the common name ‘wildebeest’ was also given from what was experienced when 
Dutch settlers, on their way to the interior of South Africa, first saw them in around 1700. Due 
to their resemblance to wild cattle, the settlers called them ‘wild ox’ or ‘wildebeest’ (Talbot & 
Talbot, 1963: 20-31). In this  sense, direct sense experience is the core and basis of any 
description or ontological investigation, the basis finally, of every knowledge claim. The 
following experience is essentially what phenomenology is about: 
 
• Kalahari wander 
 
During my many expeditions into the Kalahari Desert, I would often get lost, or stuck, 
sometimes for days before I could extract myself from the wilderness. Yet, while it was a 
challenge, being trapped in a land of little water and plenty of wild beasts actually wasn’t so 
bad, especially the longer I remained immersed in it. For me, the mornings were always cool 
(to the touch) and the air bracing, if not slightly dusty. The smell of coffee and its bitter taste 
as I bit into a dunked rusk somehow complemented the sound of the roar of a distant lion. 
Often, I had close encounters with lions and hyenas who would wander into camp more out of 
curiosity than anything else. At first, I had a deep carnal fear about their presence, especially 
at night, but over time I got used to them, as they did with me. Often, I would get the sensation 
of being watched. I would turn around and be faced with a pair of amber eyes watching me 
with an intent that signaled one of enquiry rather than attack. I continuously had to (rather 
gently) clear the camping area of cobras and scorpions, for fear I would accidently stand on 
one. They politely acquiesced when they discovered I was no threat to their survival. I also 
endured legions of flies and bees that would cling to my sweat-drenched body to satiate their 
thirsts as temperatures exceeded 40˚C. Initially, the insects crawling over me (touch) caused 
no end of discomfort with endless swatting and swishing on my behalf, but again after a time 
I got used them. If I thought logically about the insects, they created a mild tickle, nothing 
more. It was hardly something to fret over. The desert thunderstorms in summer were the most 
challenging of all these experiences, indicating that our sense perceptions of our environment 
are always value-laden, correlating with our species needs, desires and vulnerabilities and 
capacities. Great purple thunderheads spewing shards of lightning would roll in during the 
afternoon and cause complete mayhem. Tent poles snapped and canvas ripped, or the entire 
tent would blow away bouncing over the dunes like a tumbleweed. Drenched and cold, I sought 
solace in  my hip-flask of brandy, the soothing liquid warming the mood once again as a bright 
double rainbow arcs (vision) across a spruce of camelthorn trees against an indigo sky. The 
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Kalahari can be a special place. The most familiar pattern on every one of my Kalahari travels 
was to sip a glass of wine (taste) around a crackling fire at dusk (sound and sight). Almost 
always, spurfowl would cluck around the tent like domestic chickens, and the ambient sound 
of a hundred toktokkie beetles tapping their armoured abdomens on the ground – tok-tok-tok 
– would add to the orchestra of crickets. A jackal would usually yip-yip in the distance, and a 
nightjar would follow his lead with a quavering call (sound). The desert was pure bliss. This 
pattern would repeat itself night after night, expedition after expedition.  
 
The point about this little excerpt, is that this is not about an aloof subject listing off the features 
of an outside, objectively knowable, world of determinate objects. Instead, it is all about my 
deeply interactive experience through all my perceiving senses with an ambiguous and 
uncertain wilderness. They were about me being sensorily and bodily immersed in a breathing, 
heaving realm that responds to my emotions and physical tribulations as I do with it in return. 
At no point did I feel above or beyond this unique world but fully a part of it, even as I tried to 
‘read’ or ‘interpret’ the environment, discern between mere irritation and actual threat to my 
existence, for example. The discipline of phenomenology, then, is about the study of these 
complex accounts of temporal and spatial interactions. It is about distinguishing focal and 
marginal awareness. This includes an awareness of one’s own experience and awareness-of-
oneself in different roles, such as thinking, seeing, sweating and swatting. It also includes 
kinesthetic awareness of one’s movement, of purpose or intention in action; and of awareness 
of other living beings in empathy, fear, inter-subjectivity and collectivity, of linguistic activity 
involving meaning, communication, attempting to understand the tok-toks, clucks, yips, grunts 
and roars of others, and social interaction with one’s own and other species.  In short, whatever 
I perceive is entwined with my own embodied subjectivity exposed to the surrounding world, 
and thus the meaning that I make of my lived experience, is a function of the relation between 
me and the surrounding world.  
 
At this point I will introduce the four thinkers and their phenomenology as they pertain 
specifically to a non-dualistic way of thinking about knower and known. The point is to provide 
the broad overview before exposing their specific problems with detaching themselves from 
anthropocentrism. 
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1.2. Potential non-anthropocentric foundations in traditional phenomenology 
 
1.2.1. Husserl 
 
Husserl’s hope was that phenomenology would break down the Cartesian paradigm and return 
us to the things as we directly experience them in phenomena. For Husserl, our knowledge of 
‘things’ is not about listing fixed and finished ‘objects’; instead, phenomenology requires a 
return to that world which precedes knowledge, “of which knowledge always speaks, and in 
relation to which every scientific schematisation is an abstract and derivative of sign language, 
as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, 
a prairie or a river is” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: viii-ix). This world of phenomena precedes all 
knowledge claims and grounds them in sensory experience. All knowledge, inclusive of 
scientific knowledge and representation of the natural world (as we find in a map or textbook), 
is finally, as Merleau-Ponty states here, an abstraction and a derivative of the immediate 
embodied experience, e.g. of the ‘countryside’.  
 
Husserl maintained that a phenomenological study different forms of experience just as we 
experience them from the perspective of the subject living through or performing them, as I 
did with my experiences in the Kalahari Desert. Thus, I characterise and describe experiences 
of seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking, feeling, wishing, desiring, willing, and, of walking, 
talking, driving a car, etc. Husserl asserted that in order to study the structure of consciousness, 
one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which 
it is directed (Husserl, 1962).  
 
For Husserl, the leading property of all experiences is their intentionality or ‘aboutness’ – the 
directedness of experience toward things in the world. The property of consciousness is always 
a consciousness of or about something (Smith, 2013: online). According to classical Husserlian 
phenomenology, our experience is directed toward things only through particular concepts, 
thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience. 
Consciousness is always consciousness about something, an intentional object, which we 
perceive directly ‘as’ something, i.e. as meaningful. For example, a vertically placed 
rectangular wooden plank in a doorframe is not experienced by us as simply a material object 
of a certain shape and texture, but we immediately (pre-theoretically) perceive it as a door 
which allows us to pass through to another room. David Woodruff Smith states:  
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Conscious experiences have a unique feature: we experience them, we live through 
them or perform them…This experiential or first-person feature — that of being 
experienced—is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious experience: 
as we say, ‘I see / think / desire / do.’ This feature is both a phenomenological and 
an ontological feature of each experience: it is part of what it is for the experience 
to be experienced (phenomenological) and part of what it is for the experience to 
be (ontological) (Smith, 2013: online).  
 
Therefore, Husserl contended that consciousness is not ‘in’ the mind, as Descartes would have 
it, but rather consciousness is always of something other than and outside of the mind itself, 
namely of the intentional object (Menon et al., 2014: 172), such as a door. For Husserl, human 
consciousness is a lived, intentional, directedness upon the phenomena in the world. 
 
Husserl’s thinking is that there is a distinction between the act of consciousness, what he called 
noesis, and the phenomena at which it is directed (he called this noemata), or its content. 
Husserl argued that what we observe is not the object as it is in-itself, but how and in as much 
it is given in the intentional acts of the perceiver. Knowledge of objects would only be possible 
by ‘bracketing’ all assumptions about the existence of an external, “natural” world and the 
inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure 
Husserl called epoché – suspension of judgement of the things as they appear to us, and an 
attempt to return to the raw perception (Husserl, 1963: 238).  
 
Epoché is about perceptual experience, which can be construed from descriptions from a first-
person point of view. According to Husserl, this is done “to ensure that the respective item is 
described exactly as it is experienced” even if there is a “perceptual error” (Husserl, 1963, 249) 
Therefore, it is always possible that one is subject to an illusion or even a hallucination, so that 
one's perceptual experience is not truthful or factual. If one is hallucinating or under an illusion, 
there is really no object of perception. However, with Husserl’s phenomenology the experience 
one undergoes is exactly the same as if one were successfully or accurately perceiving an 
external object. Therefore, for Husserl, the phenomenological description of a perceptual 
experience should be independent of whether for the experience under investigation there is an 
object it represents or not. Either way, there will at least be a perceptual content, even if in 
error. It is this content that Husserl calls the perceptual noema. Thanks to its noema, even a 
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hallucination or an illusion is an intentional act, an experience “as of” an object. 
Phenomenological description is concerned with those aspects of the noema that remain the 
same irrespective of whether the experience in question is verifiable or not. Thus, a 
phenomenologist must “bracket” her belief in the existence of the perceptual object, and then 
return to verifying the experience at a later point in time (Smith, 2018: online). 
 
Husserl stressed that representations such as objectiveless hallucinations can in a sense be 
characterised as “representing an intentional object”, provided that this characterisation is 
understood to be made “under an existential assumption”, as follows: “If the act of 
hallucination or illusion were verifiable, it would successfully represent such-and-such an 
object (under such-and-such aspects)” (Smith, 2018: online). 
 
With this ‘phenomenological reduction’, one is able, he thought, to suspend judgment 
regarding the general belief in the existence of the external world (Husserl, 1962: 238). In 
short, we direct attention, in reflection, to the structure of our own conscious experience. 
 
An example of this could be construed when one day in the Kalahari I saw what I thought (in 
the instant I saw it) was a kangaroo. My experience was real but the immediate interpretation 
of it was incorrect. Post-experience analysis told me kangaroos obviously do not exist in the 
Kalahari – what I had seen was in fact a spring-hare (a large rodent that bounds around on its 
hind-legs like a kangaroo). Husserl would argue we concern ourselves with how the animal is 
meant or intended (I ‘see’ a kangaroo, not a spring-hare). Thus, bracketing the animal off, we 
turn our attention to my experience of the animal, and specifically to the content or meaning in 
my experience. This animal-as-perceived or the appearance or phenomenon of a kangaroo, 
Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the experience (Smith, 2018: online). 
 
It doesn’t matter whether the ‘object’ is a substance or a figment of the imagination. In short, 
phenomenological method relies on the description of phenomena as they are given to 
consciousness in their immediacy (Menon et al., 2014: 172). This structure of intentional 
consciousness comes to light in the course of what Husserl calls the “phenomenological 
reduction” (Husserliana, vol. XIII, pp. 432 ff), which uses the method of epoché in order to 
make coherent sense, in terms of the essential horizon-structure of consciousness, of the 
transcendence of objective reality.  
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1.2.2. Heidegger 
 
While Heidegger owed a debt to Husserl for introducing him to phenomenology, he takes 
Husserl’s version somewhat further. Like Husserl, Heidegger rejected the idea of a human 
knower or ‘subject’ as a transcendent, distanced ‘spectator’ of the objective world. However, 
Heidegger rejected the Husserlian centrality of the human as first-person experiencer since, for 
Heidegger, Husserl still treated the human experiencer too much as a transcendent 
consciousness, or a distanced spectator, which stands as an exception to what it perceives.  
 
Heidegger stated that phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as 
the method of Husserlian epoché would suggest. In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger argued 
instead that we and our consciousness are always ‘in the world’, not transcendent of it 
(Heidegger, 1962: 84). We do not study our activities by bracketing the world, rather we 
interpret our activities and the meaning things have for us by looking to our contextual relations 
to things in our surroundings (Smith, 2013: online). Heidegger, therefore, resisted Husserl’s 
neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, including how perception presents 
things around us to our consciousness. Instead, Heidegger, held that more fundamental ways 
of relating to things are to be found in practical activities like hanging a painting or hammering 
a nail where a phenomenological study reveals our situation in a context of equipment and in 
being-with-others and being-in-the-world.  
 
Heidegger uses the example of a hammer as an ontological extension of ourselves. It is what 
he calls ‘ready-to-hand’ (Heidegger, 1962: 123). Here our situation is in the context of our 
equipment and being with things, not only of being conscious of them. As with the hammer, it 
is ready-to-hand in that we use it without theorising about the hammer itself as an object. This 
is similar to walking through a doorway without first conceiving of the door as a unique 
material object. For Heidegger, merely being conscious of or observing something is seeing an 
entity as, what he called, ‘present-at-hand’, as opposed to the more primary relationship we 
have with things, which is ready-to-hand. The transcendent Cartesian subject as a passive and 
distanced knower is concerned only with the bare facts of a thing or a concept, but forgets the 
real purpose of its being or being with things and being inextricably interconnected with them 
(Heidegger, 1962: 126). For Heidegger, our understanding of beings and their being is best 
revealed through phenomenology. Here, with Heidegger, the connection with classical issues 
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of ontology is more apparent than with Husserl, because of a real, lived, concreate and practical 
(action-oriented) connect with the objective world.  
 
Heidegger, therefore, transformed Husserl's transcendental consciousness into an inherently 
social and thoroughly worldly being who always already operates with a pre-theoretical grasp 
of the a priori structures that make possible particular modes of Being (Wheeler, 2017). When 
we start to ask the question “who is this being?”, the human being, also called Dasein by 
Heidegger, we always come in a sense too late, or after the fact of having already lived a human 
life with a certain pre-theoretical grasp upon the world. He also transforms Husserlian 
intentionality into the concept of ‘being-in-the-world’, which is a non-intentional, or perhaps 
pre-intentional, openness to a world (Wheeler, 2017). Let us go back to my experience of the 
spring-hare in the Kalahari. The confusion and wonder felt toward this animal that looked like 
a kangaroo as it bounded across the grassy dunes at sunset was my real-time experience. In this 
sense, I am in-the-world participating with the natural phenomena around me. I am not a 
transcendental subject analysing experiential data from afar. Sure, I was mistaken with the 
taxonomy of the animal, but the experience of awe remained authentic. 
 
Heidegger’s philosophy that acknowledges human existence as ‘being-in-the-world,’ can also 
be understood as embeddedness and inseparability from the world (Heidegger, 1962: 103). 
Heidegger’s phenomenology challenges the concept of dualism far more than Husserl in that 
his challenge is especially evident in rejecting the notion of the human subject as a spectator 
of objects/phenomena espousing that both subject and object are inseparable (Heidegger, 1962: 
124). In presenting human being as inseparable from its worldly surroundings, Heidegger 
introduced the concept of Dasein (Heidegger, 1962)  I will explore this in more detail later on 
in this chapter when I present Heidegger’s own difficulty in over-coming anthropocentrism, 
but for now the basic definition Dasein – literally ‘being there’ – is one that explores the notion 
of a living being through the activity of ‘being-in-the-world’. The very use of the word ‘there’ 
in being breaks down the ontological priority of subjectivity, the epicenter of the first-person 
experiencer, of being ‘here’. It places the old Cartesian ‘subject’, the semi-divine, distanced 
and abstract knower of things, in a specific, concrete place and location and makes her 
interested in the (‘her’) surrounding concrete world in a practical, engaged way25. Heidegger’s 
 
25 At risk of getting ahead of myself, one may start to think of Heidegger’s ‘worlding’ of the human self as 
similar to the way we speak about other animals’ ‘habitat’.  
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being-in-the-world is unitary and “must be seen as a whole” (Heidegger, 1962: 79). In 
presenting the ‘worldhood of the world,’ Heidegger criticised Husserl’s attempt to explore 
consciousness separate from or prior to the world in which the person (as first-person) is 
situated. Instead, Heidegger put forth the argument that understanding is achieved through 
worldly activity. Heidegger argued that Dasein’s understanding of their being and the being of 
other entities encountered through everyday interactions is what serves as the point of departure 
for all knowledge (Heidegger, 1962: 81).  
 
For Heidegger, we and our activities are always ‘in the world’, our being is being-in-the-world, 
so we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for us by looking to our unfolding 
contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves 
into what he called ‘fundamental ontology’. We must distinguish beings from their being, and 
we begin our investigation of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own 
existence in the activity of Dasein.  
 
1.2.3. Sartre 
 
Jean Paul Sartre’s version of phenomenology in his seminal work Being and 
Nothingness became the philosophical foundation for his notion of existentialism. In Sartre’s 
model according to Smith: 
 
the central player in consciousness is a phenomenon, and the occurrence of a 
phenomenon just is a consciousness-of-an-object. The chestnut tree I see is, for 
Sartre, such a phenomenon in my consciousness. Indeed, all things in the world, as 
we normally experience them, are phenomena, beneath or behind which lies their 
‘being-in-itself’. Consciousness, by contrast, has ‘being-for-itself’, since each 
consciousness is not only a consciousness-of-its-object but also a pre-reflective 
consciousness-of-itself (conscience de soi). Yet, for Sartre, unlike Husserl, the ‘I’ 
or self is nothing but a sequence of acts of consciousness, notably including 
radically free choices (Smith, 2018). 
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Sartre maintained that one can only experience one’s own subjectivity in the presence of the 
Other:26 
 
The look which the eyes manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are, is a pure 
reference to me. What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling 
behind me is not that there is someone there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have 
a body which can be hurt … in short, I am seen (Sartre, 1986: 259). 
 
Through vivid description of the ‘look’ of the Other, Sartre laid the groundwork for the 
contemporary political significance of the concept of the Other as in other groups or ethnicities, 
(Smith, 2013) and potentially other animals. Sartre’s existential project is rooted in a more 
fundamental phenomenology. In a nutshell, the power of Sartre’s being-for-the-other has great 
potential. The experience of placing one’s trust in the usual world order (the preformed 
reductionistic categorizations or conceptualizations like ‘subject’, ‘self’, ‘other’, ‘animal’ and 
so on) is disrupted by the presence and gaze of the Other. Feeling irrationally ashamed in front 
of the Other causes the subject later to reflect whether at that very moment he knows who he 
is or what the Other is asking with that gaze. Jacques Derrida wrote about the uncomfortable 
feeling he had when his cat walked into the bathroom one day and saw him naked (Derrida, 
2008). The gaze, wrote Derrida, was uncanny and he had a hard time overcoming it: 
 
I often ask myself, just to see, who I am – and who I am (following) at the moment 
when caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example, the eyes of 
a cat. I have trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my embarrassment (Derrida, 
2008: 3-4).  
 
The gaze is not the property of the subject but of the Other, yet the gaze reflects the subject’s 
potential thoughts like a mirror back at the subject. When the subject (Derrida) gazes at the 
Other (his cat), he realises that the Other is gazing back, but from a point outside the field of 
 
26 Sartre writes the word ‘other’ with a capital ‘O’ to designate the usage of a constitutive other that ‘supplements’ 
the Self. It demonstrates an intersubjectivity so as to describe how the Self is altered by the appearance of the 
Other, of how the world then appears to be oriented to the Other person, and not to the Self. This usage became 
common with other phenomenologists post-Sartre. Levinas used the term with his thesis of the face-of-the-Other, 
as we will see shortly. 
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the subject’s perception, and thus there is something finally ungraspable and unknowable in 
the gaze of the Other.  
 
This disruption of the subject, then, is an important development in phenomenology in that it 
opens up the possibility for the human experience of (other) animals to be thoroughly 
decentered or non-anthropocentric, just as the experience of another person’s gaze disrupts and 
de-centres the self and the subject from the centre of its world. The return of the gaze, therefore, 
de-centres the subject and breaks down the hierarchy with the Other. Even if not always 
acknowledged, this is a key moment in the development of the phenomenological thrust 
towards non-anthropocentrism, as will become clear.  
 
1.2.4. Levinas 
 
Emmanuel Levinas was a Jewish Lithuanian-born French philosopher who was a contemporary 
of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Sartre. While he may not have been as influential as the 
aforementioned philosophers in the development of phenomenology as a discipline, his 
contribution to phenomenology, nonetheless, has been significant, and is pertinent to the thread 
of this dissertation.  
 
Levinas, typical of his fellow scholars of phenomenology, criticised traditional philosophy for 
being  rooted in a damaging, deeply unethical, Cartesian dualism. In some ways, Levinas’ 
phenomenology is similar to Sartre’s Being-for-the-Other as he analyses how the Other 
disrupts the egoism of the Self, but he is different in that he centres exclusively on the face-of-
the-Other, whose perceived recognition of sentimental attributes suspends the selfish egoism 
and creates, following Sartre, a ‘being-for-the-Other’ (Levinas, 1969: 64-70). It is the 
perception of the living face that causes a disruption with the perceiving Subject, since the face, 
above all, reveals recognisable emotions, like vulnerability and suffering. This in turn, causes 
a disruption in the usual hierarchical subject-object dichotomy. For Sartre the face of the Other 
almost always presents as a threatening, menacing gaze, an active external disruption of the 
comforting world of the Self in which the Self otherwise rests in tranquil sovereignty. In 
contrast, for Levinas, the face of the other first and foremost disrupts the Self’s with an ethical 
demand issuing forth from the vulnerability and irreplaceability of that living, animated face.    
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The interesting part for any purposes of Levinas’ phenomenological approach to the face-of-
the-Other is that it seems perfectly suited to include (other) animals, although he did not work 
this out in any detail. That he nevertheless had a sense of how important the gaze of the Other 
animal might be for human dignity, becomes  evident in this essay published  late in his life , 
called The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights (1975).  
 
The Name of a Dog is a story about Bobby, a stray dog that befriended Levinas and his fellow 
Jewish prisoners of war during their internment in a camp near Hanover in Nazi Germany. 
What is interesting about this actual phenomenological encounter is that Levinas succeeds in 
blurring the line between canine animal and human animal. Levinas and his fellow Jewish 
prisoners have been reduced to nonhumans by their captors: “… stripped of our human skin. 
We were sub-human” (Levinas, 2004: 48). However, in the eyes of the stray dog, which they 
named ‘Bobby’, “there was no doubt that we were men” (Levinas, 2004: 48) It means that, 
unlike the injustice meted out by the human guards, the dog showed no discrimination towards 
them. To Bobby, Levinas and his fellow P.O.W.s were men in every normal sense. They were 
not the sub-human embodiment of evil that had to be eradicated from the planet according the 
warped Nazi ideology. Bobby would bark and wag his tail every time the prisoners returned 
from their daily routine of backbreaking labour. Levinas and his fellow prisoners naturally 
appreciated the dog’s moral ascendency over their guards – “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany” 
(Levinas, 2004: 49) – primarily because Bobby’s attitude reflected back onto them that they 
were still very much human. This story points to the fact that Levinas does, to some degree 
value non-humans, especially dogs, as phenomenologically equal, at least as morally agentive. 
 
*   *   * 
 
As we can see from the four principal philosophers highlighted above, the development of 
phenomenology gradually breaks down Descartes’ separation of mind over body and the 
distant observance of the world based on an unequal hierarchy. The fundamental tenet 
throughout all of their works, that which defines the basis of phenomenology itself, is that the 
human being is not a detached mind, aloof, alone and separate from a corporeal world, but 
instead an extension of a corporeal body immersed in the things that surround it. Although they 
emphasise the worldliness and embeddedness of the human mind, none of them, arguably, take 
the corporeity of the perceiver seriously enough. That only happens with Merleau-Ponty. While 
none of the philosophers (apart from Levinas to a limited degree) considered (other) animals 
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directly in their phenomenological developments, the foundations that they laid in their works  
led to the gradual erosion of the cornerstone of anthropocentrism, Cartesian dualism. 
 
Nonetheless, none of these philosophers was personally able to break completely  with the 
Cartesian paradigm. In all of them structural elements of Descartes’ fundamental concept 
remained, an indication of the tenacious hold this thinker’s main ideas has had on the Western 
tradition. This impeded any further progress in shaking off anthropocentrism, as I shall 
demonstrate now for each thinker in turn … 
 
2. Anthropocentric pitfalls in traditional phenomenology 
 
2.1. Husserl’s Transcendental (re)Turn 
 
As mentioned, Husserl’s phenomenology is based on the study of consciousness as experienced 
from the first-person point of view. While the focus is on the object (noemata) rather than the 
subject, the very act of intentional directed upon the object (noesis) is, however, subjective in 
that it originates from a first-person perspective. This immediately raises the spectre of dualism 
by reintroducing a Cartesian-type binary between the first-person consciousness and 
everything else, which is the content of that consciousness. As mentioned, this is a problem 
Heidegger flagged in Being and Time. 
 
Like Descartes, Husserl’s ‘phenomenological reduction’ is transcendental (Husserl, 1913: 194) 
in that he still considers the consciousness of the subject as central and an apriori preceding 
experience. Granted, Husserl finds the experience of the Subject more important than the 
Subject itself, but it’s still the Subject as the experiencer that remains central while that which 
is experienced is marginal and, as such, objective. In this respect, he is not very far removed 
from Descartes’ focus on the doubting doubter. For Husserl, consciousness of any given thing 
calls for discerning its meaning as an ‘intentional object’. Such an object does not simply strike 
the senses, to be interpreted or misinterpreted by mental reason; it has already been selected 
and perceived beforehand. (Husserl, 1913: 105-109). The problem with this approach is that  
Husserl is left, just as Descartes was, with a transcendental ego that experiences the world as 
‘other’ or ‘over there’. In this way, I (the Subject) am reducing my experience to an object with 
a set of separate parts. Using the aforementioned example, a mammal with long legs and short 
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forearms in a desert in southern Africa. This is undeniably dualistic in that Husserl’s creation 
of an aloof ‘first-person’ judge will inevitably circle back to the pitfalls of anthropocentrism. 
  
2.2. Heidegger’s ‘being-poor-in-the-world’  
 
As we have seen, Heidegger argued against Husserl’s transcendental solipsism of the supreme 
first-person experiencer analysing that which is experienced.  
However, Heidegger, while providing a far better alternative to Husserl’s solipsism and latent 
Cartesian dualism with the concept of Dasein, which is a very different, much more worldly 
creature than Descartes’ ‘Subject’, also could not finally avoid the trap of anthropocentrism. 
Even though Heidegger’s approach is less Cartesian in that he avoided the transcendental 
relapse of the experiencer, it is of great wonder that he did not follow through what seems like 
an obvious line of analysis, namely, to include (other) animals in his notion of being-in-the-
world.  
One would be forgiven for thinking that this phenomenological sort of ‘being’ includes all 
beings, since, as author J.M. Coetzee has Elizabeth Costello remark in his novel by the same 
name, “the overriding sameness of all living beings comes from ‘being-alive-in-the-world.’” 
(Coetzee, 2003: 78). However, Heidegger insisted that Dasein only applies to humans 
(Heidegger, 2004: 17).  During his lecture courses of 1929-30, which have been compiled as 
the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1938), Heidegger penned an excerpt posthumously 
entitled The Animal is Poor in World.27 In his notes, Heidegger asks the familiar philosophical 
question: “Does the animal too have world … in the same way as man, or in some other way?” 
(Heidegger, 2004: 17) By ‘world’ Heidegger means accessibility to other beings and the 
environment. It seems as if Heidegger is about to include (other) living beings into his project, 
yet Heidegger falls right back into dogged anthropocentrism in his final analysis. Heidegger 
resolutely reinforces the otherness of non-human animals by making a clear distinction 
between the human-relation-to-the-world and the non-human-relation-to-the-world.  
In The Animal is Poor in World Heidegger presents three entities: the stone (material object), 
which is ‘world-less’; the animal, who is ‘poor-in-the-world’; and humans who are ‘world-
forming’ (Heidegger, 2004: 17). With the notion of ‘being-poor-in-the-world’ Heidegger 
 
27 The title was added to the original text by Atterton and Calarco when they included it in their book Animal 
Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought (2004). 
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insists he is not making a hierarchical value judgement compared with humans’ ‘world-
forming’ relationship. To explain his thesis Heidegger goes on to ask if one could put oneself 
into the mind of a lizard basking on a stone in the sun. The inanimate stone, it is obvious, has 
no concept of the world because it has no consciousness, but the lizard, a living thing, has a 
conscious world-relation. The lizard has ‘access’ to the world around it, like a warm stone to 
seek out and lie on (Heidegger, 2004:17). This responsiveness to the environment by the lizard, 
and its accessibility to various objects and other beings means, in Heideggerian terminology, 
it ‘has-world’. But the fundamental question for Heidegger, echoing that ontological question 
by all philosophers throughout the ages, is: does the lizard ‘have-world’ in the same way a 
human does?  
There should be, according to Heidegger’s broad development of phenomenology, no reason 
why not to include other animals. Yet Heidegger turns away and falls right back into a dualist 
dogma and redraws Bentham’s insuperable line in the process. The lizard, he maintains, is 
incapable of making a relational connection between the warm stone and the sun that warms 
it. When a human lies out in the sun on a rock, the sun is accessible to her as the sun, and the 
rock is accessible to her as the rock. Lizards cannot understand these entities as such. (Other) 
animals respond to sets of relationships, but they are specific to survival or instinctual 
relationships like food, predators or mating partners. They cannot respond to or understand 
entities as entities. In other words, lizards cannot grasp the ontological differences between 
entities. The lizard, says Heidegger, is poor-in-the-world because she can have access to other 
beings but not to other beings as such (Heidegger, 2004: 17-18). One has to wonder where 
Heidegger’s insight into lizard experience comes from. 
 
Therefore, Heidegger, like Husserl and Descartes et al., remains steadfast in insisting on 
making a clear and qualitative distinction between world-forming humans and world-
impoverished non-human animals. To continue to separate humans from all other animals by 
insisting on unique human properties remains an area of much criticism, especially when it 
comes from a philosopher who, in all other aspects of his work, steadfastly attacked the notion 
of Cartesian dualism. 
 
However, it is perhaps Heidegger’s personal discrimination of (other) animals that may have 
affected his thinking in this instance. One perhaps could forgive Heidegger for living during a 
time long before any notions of animal rights and environmental thinking began. Certainly, the 
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overall basis of his project was non-anthropocentric, one that, despite his personal bias could 
point toward the inclusion of (other) animals, a baton that Merleau-Ponty would eagerly pick 
up and carry to its logical conclusion.  
 
This is not to say that Heidegger did not understand his weakness. In fact, after Being and Time 
he became acutely aware that he had not quite broken the anthropocentric shackles. In what he 
himself called his ‘turn’, the later Heidegger began to understand that his concept of Dasein 
still bore the faint hallmarks of subjectivity that ultimately blocked the path from a complete 
break away from the Cartesian construct (Wheeler, Winter 2018).  
 
2.3. Sartre’s being-in-itself 
 
Sartre’s concept of the gaze of the Other, as I have discussed, seems to break the hierarchical 
nature of subjectivity lording it over its world. Yet, one cannot help thinking that the focus still 
remains on the subject – the Subject is still the focal point of the encounter, not the ‘Other’ – 
and therefore the anthropocentric bias will somehow remain. In Sartre's 
opinion, consciousness arises from an awareness of other things. As we found with Husserl, 
consciousness is always and essentially consciousness of something, whether a thing, a person, 
an animal, or a figment of the imagination. By appearing to itself, Sartre argues that 
consciousness is fully discerned. But consciousness is, in Sartre’s sense, self-consciousness – 
a Husserlian-like relapse into the self as the primary subject of experience. 
 
This problem of the primacy of the Self to itself is shown most clearly by the fact that Sartre 
did not explicitly include other animals in his version of phenomenology. His enquiry presumes 
the human being is distinct from plants and animals in that plants and animals merely exist 
(being-in-itself) – or simply as objects in the external world – while human beings alone are 
conscious of their own existence (being-for-itself). Sartre was hardly an expert in animal 
behavior and probably, like Nagel, could not fathom what it was like to be a bat (Nagel, 1974). 
Even modern animal behavior experts have a hard time determining whether non-human 
animals have consciousness, certainly in Sartre’s being-for-itself sense. It is a classic Problem-
of-Other-Minds scenario as “the topic of consciousness per se in animals has remained 
controversial, even taboo, among many scientists” (Allen & Trestman, 2017). Despite the 
Cambridge Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2012) stating that many scientists agree 
that “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological 
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substrates that generate consciousness”, other scientists, including Marian Stamp Dawkins, 
who has been prominent in the science of animal welfare (Dawkins, 2012), are not ready to 
endorse the claim, writing: “The mystery of consciousness remains. The explanatory gap is as 
wide as ever and all the wanting in the world will not take us across it” (Dawkins, 2012: 171–
172). As Colin Allen and Michael Trestman point out in their essay entitled Animal 
Consciousness:  
 
Many philosophers and scientists have either argued or assumed that consciousness 
is inherently private, and hence that one's own experience is unknowable to others. 
While language may allow humans to cross this supposed gap by communicating 
their experience to others, this is allegedly not possible for other animals (Allen & 
Trestman, 2017). 
 
In this vein, Sartre did not really give the human-animal relation any attention. As with Husserl, 
Heidegger, Descartes, and almost all other philosophers before and after him (at least those 
writing before the 1970s), Sartre’s lack of consideration regarding (other) animal 
consciousness remains a result of the pervading anthropocentrism in philosophy.  
 
Even if more attention were given to (other) animals, the notion of consciousness, like that of 
sentience, sends philosophers down the endless road of trying to determine the nature and 
extent of consciousness in various animals from gorillas to mosquitoes. The usual way humans 
think about consciousness is anthropocentric – as primarily an innate endowment of ourselves, 
which other animals may or may not share in virtue of being sufficiently like us.   
 
It is consistent with an evolutionary perspective that humans are the only conscious 
animals. This would imply that consciousness was acquired through a recent 
evolutionary event that occurred since the split of our ancestral lineage from that 
of our closest non-human relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos. But such a view 
requires support; though perhaps intuitive to some, its choice as a default position 
is arbitrary (Allen & Trestman, 2017). 
 
From this viewpoint, the question: ‘Are (other) animals conscious?’ is theoretically ridiculous 
(as Derrida would argue) because it implicitly groups bats and gnats together with lions and 
lemurs, and always in contrast and opposition to humans. In reality, lions are more closely 
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related to humans than they are to bats, genetically at least, “so framing the question this way 
embeds a false presupposition” (Allen & Trestman, 2017).  
 
2.4. Levinas’ face-of-some-others 
 
While Levinas’s face-of-the-Other appears to go the furthest in dismantling the anthropocentric 
paradigm, he lapses back into anthropocentrism by also drawing the insuperable line between 
humans and (other) animals. Non-human faces, thinks Levinas, do not disrupt the Subject in 
the same way human faces do (Levinas, 1969: 64-70), although he could never rigorously 
explain why.  This was highlighted toward the end of his life in a 1986 interview when students 
from the Universities of Essex and Warwick pressed Levinas to clarify why a human face 
carried more value than a non-human one. Levinas answered, somewhat unassuredly, that:  
 
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one 
understands for example a dog. Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but 
in the human face. We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in accordance 
with Dasein. The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form in the dog. In the 
dog, in the animal, there are other phenomena. For example, the force of nature is 
pure vitality. It is more this that characterizes the dog. But it also has a face” 
(Levinas, 1988: 169). 
 
This last point highlights a potential contradiction in classical phenomenology. While moving 
experience away from the Cartesian cogito toward the things in the world, the traditional 
version of the discipline still relies on a first-person perspective to analyse those worldly 
phenomena that are experienced. In this sense, phenomenology seems inextricably tied to an 
anthropocentric outlook.  
 
However, when asked in a follow-up question by the students in 1986 whether his concept of 
the face-of-the-Other should be extended to all non-human animals, Levinas admitted that 
while it could be extended to (other) animals his enquiry is “a prototype to human ethics” that 
“arises out of a transference to animals of the idea of suffering” (Levinas, 1988: 171). To his 
credit, Levinas recognised the same problem with the Benthamite question. The ageing 
philosopher saw the face, first and foremost, as a human condition that is extended onto certain 
(other) animals but only as a comparison to their own faces. Dogs, like Bobby, he admitted, 
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can invite moral obligation because the face is recognisable and familiar to us, but said Levinas 
during the same interview, “I don’t know if a snake has a face. I can’t answer that question. A 
more specific analysis is needed” (Levinas, 1988: 171). Levinas, it is clear, understood the 
limitations of his own thesis and that he was aware that he never gave enough consideration to 
non-human animals, especially snakes, in his phenomenological disquisition.  
 
Yet, like Heidegger, Levinasian phenomenology does remain open enough for further analysis. 
There are a limitless number of ways in which the face of a specific (Other) animal can interrupt 
and disrupt one’s selfish pursuits.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
While the works of these prominent thinkers of phenomenology open up the prospect toward 
a non-anthropocentric paradigm, the world of phenomena as described by them, remains 
experienced from the first-person human perspective – be it a transcendental Subject (Husserl), 
or a human subject that has-world (Heidegger), or a human being with consciousness (Sartre), 
or a recognizable face as compared to humans (Levinas). The human animal remains the 
primary ‘experiencer’ of a world that is experienced. It is therefore not surprising that for 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Levinas, (other) animals remained part of that experienced 
world while humans remain at the epicentre as experiencers of the world. 
 
Heidegger and Levinas became aware of their own failures to break completely away from the 
Cartesian paradigm but never quite fully achieved that break-through. It is only with Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty that we find a complete albeit gradual break from the anthropocentric contagion 
of Western thought and practice. In the next chapter, I will explore how Merleau-Ponty was 
able to tunnel phenomenology out of the anthropocentric mire. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MERLEAU-PONTY’S NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC BREAK-
THROUGH 
 
We do not begin ab homine as Descartes… 
We do not take Nature in the sense of the Scholastics… 
…is not Nature in itself, a philosophy of Nature,  
but a description of the man-animality intertwining… 
Nature as the other side of man (as flesh…)28 
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 274) 
 
 
This chapter is the central pillar of this dissertation as it introduces the phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here, I will demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s final conception of 
phenomenology reveals no sharp distinction between humans and (other) animals in that it 
avoids comparisons of (degrees or types of) consciousness (and sentience for that matter) and 
comprehensively fills in the supposed abyss that separates human ‘subjects’ from non-human 
‘objects’. With the later Merleau-Ponty, we see phenomenology finally shrugging off the 
vestiges of anthropocentrism that plagued his predecessors and thereby laying the foundation 
for the development (by others) of a full-fledged, non-anthropocentric, eco-phenomenology.  
 
While heavily influenced by Husserl, Heidegger and his good friend and fellow French 
compatriot, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, toward the end of his career, became increasingly critical 
of the fundamental underlying theoretical tendencies of their, and his own earlier, 
phenomenological methods. This was, however, as Ted Toadvine suggests in his account of 
Merleau-Ponty for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, done with the intention of 
reforming rather than abandoning phenomenology (Toadvine, 2018). It is primarily in his 
posthumous writings collected in The Visible and the Invisible (1968) that he works out a 
phenomenology that finally soars free from the grip of anthropocentrism and the reign of the 
Cartesian ‘Subject’. This occurs with Merleau-Ponty’s innovation of the concepts of ‘flesh’ 
and ‘chiasm’, which many consider to be his most fruitful philosophical contributions 
(Toadvine, 2018: online). These two concepts are central to Merleau-Ponty’s project and will 
be discussed in detail throughout this chapter. 
 
28 From Merleau-Ponty’s last working note (March 1961) before his death in May 1961. 
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Merleau-Ponty greatly inspired  many philosophers who applied his notions specifically  to 
non-human animals. It is important to showcase these examples in order to illustrate the 
immense fruitfulness of his ideas for ecological theories, since Merleau-Ponty never worked 
out these details himself. At the same time, the theoretical advances he made are crucial to 
grasp in order to appreciate their radical nature and implications. These Merleau-Pontian 
applications will be discussed in the second section (The More-Than-Human-World) of this 
chapter in order to show clearly how Merleau-Ponty’s concepts link to how (other) animals 
participate in a world that is neither  Cartesian nor anthropocentric. Most prominent among 
these phenomenological thinkers was Jacques Derrida, whose excellent deconstruction of 
Cartesian dualism, is a bold testament to the groundwork laid by Merleau-Ponty. Derrida shows 
how a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology is effortlessly applied to include (other) animals, both 
in breaking down the hierarchical Cartesian barrier and in pointing toward a new paradigm in 
the human attitude to (other) animals. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari also feature for their 
analogy of rhizomes and arborescents and their notion of becoming-animal. Another 
philosopher that was influenced directly by Merleau-Ponty, is David Abram, an American 
advocate of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Unlike Derrida, who concentrates entirely on 
the Cartesian human-animal dichotomy, Abram extends Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy to 
include the full biodiversity of the natural world, including trees, soils and mountains. And 
indeed, the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology take us beyond the human-animal 
ethical relation and go way beyond the scope of this dissertation with its focus on the 
conservation of wildlife and wildness, in that it proposes a brand-new way of understanding 
the place and nature of the human species in among the other natural phenomena. 
 
Finally, threaded throughout this chapter, since phenomenology is all about experience in the 
corporeal world, I will provide (as I have in all previous chapters) actual life-world experiences 
to demonstrate in more concrete terms each stage of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
endeavour.  
 
In section one of this chapter (Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological development) I will show 
how Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical progression finally takes phenomenology out of the 
anthropocentric pitfalls that plagued his predecessors. In a variety of sub-sections, I show how 
his development moves from the notion of a “body-subject”, which still harbors  vestiges of 
anthropocentrism to the “chiasmic” nature of “flesh” in his last work as a radically new 
paradigm-shift in the human-animal (non)dichotomy. Section two of the chapter (The more-
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than-human world) demonstrates how his phenomenology  points to  a world beyond 
anthropocentrism, what Abram called the ‘more-than-human-world.’ (Abram, 1996) Here we 
see how Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological development includes all animals (including 
human ones) on an interrelated level. 
 
1. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological development 
 
The key to Merleau-Ponty’s break-through as evident in his earlier work Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945) was the unequivocal and unprecedented focus on the primacy of the body, 
rather than the consciousness of the mind. In brief, as Merleau-Ponty’s original analysis shows, 
the corporeal, living, breathing, tactile body of the ‘subject’ is in fact the solution toward 
dismantling the anthropocentric problem. It is the body alone that enables one to enter into 
relations with other beings, both animate and inanimate, for without the body’s eyes, voice, 
hands, or skin a human would be unable to see, to hear, and touch things; or be seen, heard and 
touched by them. In other words, without the body, the part that Descartes dismissed, and the 
earlier phenomenologists slowly started to acknowledge, there would be no possibility of 
experience or perception and therefore nothing for the rational mind to function upon, no 
‘noemata’ in Husserl’s terminology. For Merleau-Ponty, it is the emphasis on the living and 
perceiving body (what Merleau-Ponty at first described as the ‘body-subject’29) instead of the 
supposedly  transcendental mind that begins to break down the bedrock of anthropocentrism. 
In fact, in his thinking, it is not the mind that is transcendental or primary, but the body, and 
the mind is reconceptualised as a function of embodied life in the world. 
 
For most of his career, as with the other phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty focused on 
clarifying the relation between the mind and the body, the objective world and the experienced 
world, and especially the  expression of the world in language and art, history, politics, and 
nature. According to Toadvine’s entry on Merleau-Ponty in the online Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring, 2018):  
 
 
29 This was a term he later rejected for its continued reference to ‘subject’ and replaced by another term, ‘the 
flesh’, as we shall see further on in this chapter. The underlying concept of the body, however, as central to his 
ontology remained intact.  
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The characteristic approach of Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical work is his effort to 
identify an alternative to intellectualism or idealism, on the one hand, and 
empiricism or realism, on the other, by critiquing their common presupposition of 
a ready-made world and failure to account for the historical and embodied character 
of experience (Toadvine, 2018: online).  
 
In his most well-known work, Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, 
argues that the basic level of perceptual experience is a “living communication with the world 
that makes it present to us as the familiar place of our life” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 79). In this 
earlier development of his phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty also rejects Husserl’s focus on a 
conscious subject set apart from the surrounding world – a transcendental observer. Instead, 
the early Merleau-Ponty, following Heidegger, attempts to show that consciousness is 
intricately shaped in and by the world through perceptual experience of it: human 
consciousness is an embodied, worldly consciousness. Consciousness, the world, and the 
human body are intricately intertwined and mutually engaged. This is what philosophers and 
scientists over the ages have tried to ignore, and yet as Toadvine suggests in his explanation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking: 
 
Perception orients itself toward the truth, placing its faith in the eventual 
convergence of perspectives and progressive determination of what was previously 
indeterminate. But it thereby naturally projects a completed and invariant ‘truth in 
itself’ as its goal. Science extends and amplifies this natural tendency through 
increasingly precise measurements of the invariants in perception, leading 
eventually to the theoretical construction of an objective world of determinate 
things. Once this determinism of the ‘in-itself’ is extended universally and applied 
even to the body and the perceptual relation itself, then its ongoing dependence on 
the ‘originary faith’ of perception is obscured; perception is reduced to ‘confused 
appearances’ that require methodical reinterpretation, and the eventual result is 
dualism, solipsism, and skepticism (Toadvine, 2018: online). 
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that this scientific, empiricist reduction of experience to fit ‘the 
theoretical construction of an objective world of determinate things’ is a distortion, because it 
does not base knowledge on any immediate experience or sensation, but on widely held 
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prejudice (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 4-5). Merleau-Ponty understood this empirically-centred 
prejudice had to be an ex post facto abstraction in that causal and physiological accounts of 
perception explain perception in terms that are only arrived at after abstracting from the 
phenomenon itself. Merleau-Ponty criticised philosophy and other disciplines for treating 
phenomena like elements of ‘an objective world of determinate things’. We saw how a 
wildebeest is described (or listed) in common ecological lexicon in the previous chapter. It is 
this kind of objective description that Merleau-Ponty objected to. The central theme in 
Phenomenology of Perception is Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on the ‘primacy of perception’. 
Merleau-Ponty recognised that one's own body is not just an objective ‘thing’ but is rather a 
permanent condition of experience. The primacy of perception signifies a primacy of 
experience. Merleau-Ponty writes that: 
 
We started off from a world in itself which acted upon our eyes so as to cause us 
to see it, and now we have consciousness of, or thought about the world, but the 
nature of the world remains unchanged; it is still defined by the absolute mutual 
exteriority of its parts, and is merely duplicated throughout its extent by a thought 
which sustains it (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 39). 
 
Merleau-Ponty is explicitly against the notion that our experience of the world is reduced to 
defining it in its separate parts, rather than as we experience it in the original sense  perception. 
The Cartesian assumption that involves passively perceiving something and then interpreting 
that perception is, for Merleau-Ponty, a false one. The usual presumption is still that a being 
exists either as a thing, or as a consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 198), but for Merleau-
Ponty the perceiving body-subject conforms to neither of these positions; its mode of existence 
is manifestly more complicated and ambiguous. Our perception of things as we experience 
them is never about listing the parts of the object we see before us – like the parts of a broken 
wine bottle. Instead, the broken bottle generates so much more of experience of wine bottles, 
or wine, or bottles in general, or broken bottles and what they all represent from other 
experiences. Glass can cut if handled incorrectly, the liquid of the wine provides a pleasant 
sensation when drunk, and there’s a feeling of loss when it is spilt (for me anyway).  
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Merleau-Ponty, therefore, argues for an intersubjective or relational conception of 
consciousness, where the body of the subject is always already purposefully engaged with its 
surroundings, rather than a transcendental, incorporeal Subject analysing the surroundings 
from a distance. The corporeal body (le corps propre) is therefore central to Merleau-Ponty's 
account of perception. It is the body’s tangible involvement with the things that surround it that 
renders the connection between consciousness and the world that we spontaneously experience.  
Playing on Husserl’s famous exclamation, Merleau-Ponty said the “fundamental philosophical 
act” would be to ignore the determinism of the ‘in-itself’ and “return to the lived-world” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 83). In other words, back to being among and with the things 
themselves. This is very unlike Husserl whom we saw lapse into a transcendental solipsism 
reminiscent of Descartes. Rather than a transcendental ego, Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, 
wrote that consciousness always has a situated perspective of the world as a consequence of 
being bodily located within the field of which it is conscious of (Toadvine, 2018). 
 
1.1. The body-(non)subject 
 
As I have mentioned, Merleau-Ponty insists the body is not the self-contained object as 
described by Descartes or in anatomical journals and school textbooks that reduces it to listed 
parts like the circulatory, digestive and respiratory parts of the body. For Merleau-Ponty the 
body is an entity that breathes, sleeps, hears a lion roar in the distance, explores the Kalahari 
on foot and experiences constant waves of phenomena from the desert dust blocking the nose 
of the adventurer, to the hot breeze wafting across the dunes causing him to sweat, and then 
cool. This is a body that draws its sustenance from the air, soils, and plants, and that finds the 
shade of trees to cool from the heat, so that it is very difficult to discern at any moment precisely 
where the living body begins and where it ends. In short, “the body is my very means of 
entering into relation with all things” (Abram, 1996: 46-7). 
 
Merleau-Ponty creates a phenomenology that strives, not to explain the world from a distance, 
but from our experienced situation within it, while at the same time “recalling us to our 
participation in the here-and-now, rejuvenating our sense of wonder at the fathomless things, 
events and powers that surround us on every hand” (Abram, 1996: 47). The Cartesian 
transcendence of a mind separate from and above the surrounding world is overcome by 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of immediate sensory experience, for it is the senses 
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transmuted through my body that disclose the proliferation of entities and elements in the 
Kalahari Desert in which I am thoroughly immersed. In short, we humans find ourselves 
originally in the midst of, rather than separated from the world. 
 
Nor does the body solely belong in the mechanical-physical realm. My body is not just an 
objective automaton standing in the desert and computing the activities of nature. Rather, my 
body is me engaged in action with all the things and animals I perceive. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology expands upon Husserl’s notion of intentional directedness when he addresses 
the role of attention in the phenomenal field. The field is the experience of the body (feeling 
the heat and dust), the spatiality of the body (within a dune landscape), the versatility of the 
body in movement and in speech (pitching and breaking camp), with other selves, (engaging 
in my fellow travelers, clearing the area of snakes and scorpions), temporality (expecting the 
approach of a thunderstorm) , and the notion of freedom (open-ended series of choices such as 
where best to pitch the tent). Merleau-Ponty expertly sums up his embodied form of 
phenomenology, writing: 
 
Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up with that 
of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as subjectivity [= 
consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence 
of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is 
inseparable from this body and this world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 408). 
 
For Merleau-Ponty:  
 
[The] body unites us with the things through its own ontogenesis, by welding to 
one another the two outlines of which it is made, its two laps: the sensible mass it 
is and the mass of the sensible wherein it is born by segregation and upon which, 
as ‘seer’, it remains open and because it is a two-dimensional being the body and 
it alone brings us to the things themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but 
beings in depth, inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above, open 
to him alone that, if it be possible, would coexist with them in the same world 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 136).  
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This is the fundamental basis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The human body subject as 
material coexists with the surrounding world – with the air, the dust and the (other) animals 
that the ‘body’ may encounter. As Merleau-Ponty says: ‘… because it is a two-dimensional 
being the body and it alone brings us to the things themselves’. It is a concrete, sensible 
coexistence that is not segregated but one that is intertwined in many ways with ‘the mass of 
the sensible’ beyond mere consciousness of things, yet it is ‘separate enough’ that it can 
perceive and observe the world. Segregation is not construed here in the Cartesian sense – of a 
qualitatively different, separated and insular being – but one where there is a two-dimensional 
nature of the body, separate and distinguishable, yet interconnected. This is a body that partakes 
actively, passively and unavoidably in the world.  
 
As an illuminating way of describing Merleau-Ponty’s embodied concept, philosophers Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in the essay Becoming Animal (1987) describe the concept as 
follows: The pair, both heavily influenced by Merleau-Ponty (Toadvine, 2018: online) 
differentiate between two ways of conceptualizing phenomena: the arborescent (a tree) versus 
the rhizome (a rootstalk or tuber). The arborescent concept is hierarchical, has a centre (the 
subject) and peripheries with a strong spinal axis of organization. The rhizome, on the other 
hand, is anti-hierarchical and grows in a lateral manner with no centre, no beginning or end 
and no privileged viewpoint. The Cartesian ego is an arborescent concept while the actual 
living, sensible body is a rhizome, enveloped in air and dust, and partaking laterally with its 
surrounding world. Becoming animal (human or not) is not a classificatory, genealogical tree 
but a rhizome that sends out roots and shoots horizontally (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007: 39). 
Becoming animal is a process that is neither regressive nor progressive because these would 
imply that some forms are higher or better than others. The term ‘becoming’ rejects the notion 
of the hierarchical or lineal especially the assumption that humans are of a ‘higher’ order since 
a human is, in terms of his or her body, animal. This is a thorough departure from 
anthropocentrism since it throws the human off ‘his’ pedestal as a superior being above all 
other life forms. Instead, by insisting that human consciousness is governed through the 
rhizome of the body it places humans in among and immersed in the living world surrounding 
it. This concept, however, is somewhat simplistic in an ethical sense as it points towards moral 
egalitarianism, which is not something eco-phenomenology insists upon. One simply has to 
ask about the moral status of a mosquito compared with a human to see how, in an ethical 
sense, this becomes problematic. I will address this ethical aspect in the final chapter of this 
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dissertation. Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari make a compelling argument against 
anthropocentrism overall. 
 
The ‘becoming animal’ concept is precisely the experience I had with my forays into the desert. 
I had stepped away from the world of surveying nature from television sets or windscreens of 
motor vehicles and stepped out into and surrounded myself with nature. No longer did I feel 
like a subject privileged and removed from the objective world surveying it from afar but fully 
immersed in it. I coexisted, blended, bonded and rooted my body into the dust and heat of the 
desert much like a rhizome does with the soil. My Kalahari immersions were, for me, the true 
fullness of animal becoming. The interaction, interconnection with nature provided a carnal 
awareness of my body as a wild, natural entity, exposed to the natural environment and at the 
same time drawing sustenance from it. 
 
1.2. The Animal that Therefore I Am (following)  
 
Deleuze and Guattari were not the only philosophers to be influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. Here I use Derrida’s linguistic play on the famous Cartesian statement to 
illustrate some of the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s own thinking. 
 
Derrida’s nuances of language as a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology are evident in the title of 
Derrida’s book The Animal that Therefore I Am (2008). Typical of all phenomenologists, 
Derrida takes issue with Descartes and his deeply entrenched anthropocentric dualism. With 
his own title, Derrida deconstructs that infamous Cartesian ‘I think therefore I am’ phrase, a 
phrase that has more than any other in philosophy cemented the hierarchical dichotomy 
between the human self and the animal other, as discussed. The deconstruction works 
brilliantly in French, the language Derrida wrote in, but I will attempt to provide an adequate 
translation and analysis in English.  
 
In French, Descartes’ famous declaration ‘I think therefore I am’ is written in French as: Je 
pense donc je suis, but Derrida in his own title takes the ontological je suis (I am) and 
juxtaposes it with  the verb which also happens to be je suis30 (I follow). This is a technique 
 
30 In French, while ‘I am’ and ‘I follow’ are written the same: ‘je suis’, they conjugate from different root 
words: ‘etre’ – to be; and ‘suivre’ – to follow.  
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that is central to any deconstruction. In a similar vein to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming 
animal’, the technique replaces the enclosed static egoistic ‘I am’ with a dynamic, temporal 
non-egoistic or indeed relational ‘I am following’. This takes away the stand-alone ‘I am’ and 
places it in the world by providing the cogito with a bodily function, an active, dynamic 
orientation and a constitutive relationship (following). Derrida’s book title, l’Animal que Donc 
Je Suis, could both mean: ‘the animal that therefore I am’ as well as ‘the animal that therefore 
I am following’, which moreover directs our attention to the ontological decentering of the 
human subject. 
 
The English translator of Derrida’s text informs the reader in his Notes, that Derrida’s title 
could also variously mean ‘the animal that therefore I am (more to follow)’; or ‘the animal that 
therefore I become (by following)’; or ‘the animal that therefore I follow’ (Derrida, 2008: 162). 
The linguistic play here is clearly working against the Cartesian prioritization of the self-
contained, static consciousness of the doubting Subject over and against everything else 
because it involves a real-time fluid experience – following. Just by playing with the order of 
words and the slight differences in language structure, this title produces limitless 
phenomenological connotations. Does the title say: ‘I am an animal’, or ‘I am being-animal?’ 
Perhaps, following Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 232), ‘I am becoming an animal’ or ‘I am after 
the animal?’ (Just the word ‘after’ again opens up a spectrum of further phenomenological 
interpretations like ‘in pursuit’, ‘hunt’, ‘behind’, ‘in the wake of’, ‘in search of’, ‘in honour 
of’), which signifies movement, interplay and crossing of borders.  
 
Also, since I no longer just ‘am’ – the lone ego emerging from nowhere – Derrida, talking of 
his title, states: 
 
 … everything in what I am about to say will lead back to the question of what ‘to 
follow’ or ‘to pursue’ means, as well as ‘to be after’, back to the question of what 
I do when ‘I am’ or ‘I follow’, when I say ‘Je suis’ if I am (following) this suite 
then [je suis cette suite], I move from the ‘ends of man’, that is the confines of man, 
to ‘crossing the borders’ between man and animal. Passing across borders or the 
ends of man I come to surrender to the animal, to the animal in itself, to the animal 
in me and the animal at unease with itself (Derrida, 2008: 3).  
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This is a linguistic employment in deconstructing Descartes’ most rigid and reductionist 
concepts because just by introducing the slightest change in the meaning of the egoistic je suis 
the whole Cartesian ontological structure is disrupted. Here we find how Derrida and Merleau-
Ponty begin to problematise and smudge the human-animal divide, by drawing attention to the 
inescapable connections and relations between these categories. 
 
Derrida’s account is a linguistic version of Merleau-Ponty’s central tenet in Phenomenology of 
Perception. The transcendental ego (I am) is replaced by a bodily embodiment within the 
world, a participatory entity that moves within its surroundings (I am following). However, 
Merleau-Ponty was not entirely satisfied with his own earlier conceptualization of the 
embodiment of the body in the world. It still had connotations of ‘subject-hood’ (hence his 
rejection of his own term ‘body-subject’). Merleau-Ponty recognized that the human 
consciousness, even as body-subject, remains at the epicenter of the world and therefore 
remains anthropocentric. He needed to figure out a way in which he could deny the human 
body centre-stage.  
 
1.3. The cross-reversibility of the flesh 
 
In the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible (1968), written just before his death in 1961, 
Merleau-Ponty introduces a whole new set of terms, a new vocabulary, in order to overcome 
the anthropocentric foundations of phenomenology and do justice to the radical insights that 
flow from his positioning of the living and perceiving body as starting-point for understanding 
consciousness, experience and knowledge. .  
 
Merleau-Ponty now develops a new way of speaking about embodiment. He begins to write of 
an altogether new term – ‘the flesh’:  
 
What we are calling flesh…has no name in any philosophy. As the formative 
medium of the object and the subject, it is not the atom of being, the hard in itself 
that resides in a unique place and moment: one can indeed say of my body that it 
is not elsewhere, but one cannot say that it is here or now in the sense that objects 
are; and yet my vision does not soar over them, it is not the being that is wholly 
knowing, for it has its own inertia, its ties (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 147). 
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Merleau-Ponty here stresses that ‘the flesh’ is the element in which the body and the 
surrounding world connect and which denotes the primordial relationship or kinship between 
subject and object. He describes the flesh as an ‘elemental power’: 
 
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should 
need an old term, ‘element’, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the 
spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a 
style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an 
‘element’ of Being. Not a fact or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to the here and 
now (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139-40). 
 
What Merleau-Ponty is attempting to explain here is that the flesh is an element31 in that it is 
not seen but is understood. The flesh is a space in between the divergence of the mind and body 
of perceiver and the perceived, between the subject and the object. Instead of a simple dualism, 
and this is the key to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, this divergence between perceiving and the 
thing-being-perceived (between the sentient and the sensible), also allows for the possibility of 
overlapping and encroachment between these two apparently divergent and hierarchical terms, 
or dehiscense. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that this is not anthropocentric projection. Instead: 
 
carnal being, as a being of depths, of several leaves or several faces, a being in 
latency, and a presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype of Being, of which 
our body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant, but whose constitutive 
paradox already lies in every visible (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 136). 
 
Merleau-Ponty is stating here that the element of flesh is not a reduced thing but something far 
more complex, open and limitless, and the living body consists in a ‘constitutive paradox’. It 
exists as a connection and a relationship between beings, even as it has enough distance on 
things that is necessary for perception. Like Sartre’s ‘being-for-the-Other’, the flesh constitutes 
a concrete and mutually constitutive relationship we have with other beings. For example, a 
 
31 ‘Element’ is used by Merleau-Ponty here in the ancient Greek philosophical sense i.e. the basic concept that 
explained nature in terms of earth, water, fire, air and space. But one could also interpret a sixth element in 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh, similar to that of René Magritte’s surreal painting “The six elements”  
(1928), which hints at the multiple, interwoven interconnection of the human body with these older Greek 
elements. 
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stranger standing before me speaks to me, forcing me to acknowledge she is a sentient subject 
like myself while at the same time I am a sensible object in her gaze. We are each therefore 
simultaneously both subject and object, an irreducible paradox and ambiguity that characterises 
all existence at the same time. We can extend this relationship beyond seeing and hearing. The 
stranger extends her hand and I accept it. The connection of hands blurs the subject-object 
relationship even further as both hands entwine. In this handshake who then is the subject, and 
who the object? Each is actively touching (and feeling) the other’s body even as their own body 
is being touched by another. In the former mode we exist as subject, in the latter as object in 
the world. This dilemma highlights Merleau-Ponty’s famous example of one person’s right 
hand touching the left. The two simultaneously touch and are touched: 
 
I can identify the hand touched in the same one which will in a moment be 
touching... In this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents to 
my left, I can anticipate for an instant the incarnation of that other right hand, alive 
and mobile, which I thrust towards things in order to explore them. The body tries... 
to touch itself while being touched and initiates a kind of reversible reflection 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 93).  
 
Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, the human ‘experiencer’ is no longer the transcendental ego 
but a sensuous body that intertwines with and embraces his environment:  
 
there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the 
touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted in it, as, 
conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without visual 
existence. Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the 
same world…There is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible 
and of the tangible in the visible…he who looks must not himself be foreign to the 
world he looks at (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 134). 
 
We therefore cannot see or touch ourselves, or even somebody else, without awareness of our 
own tangibility and capacity to be seen and touched by others. Any absolute distinction 
between being-in-the-world as seeing and touching and being-in-the-world as seen and 
touched, is impossible. Our embodied subjectivity is never located purely in either our 
 135 
tangibility or in our seeing and touching, but in the intertwining of these two aspects, where 
the two lines intersect with one another. As Merleau-Ponty says, ‘he who looks must not 
himself be foreign to the world he looks at’, but must in fact himself be the kind of thing that 
can be looked at and be seen. It is this similarity of being, between perceiver and perceived, 
this intangible ‘thing’ or ‘stuff’ that we share with the universe and that makes our existence 
here possible, that Merleau-Ponty calls ‘flesh’.  
 
In the stand-alone final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, “The Intertwining — The 
Chiasm” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 130-162), which forms the crux of his argument, Merleau-
Ponty describes this phenomenon in depth:  
 
1.3.1. The intertwining aspect of the flesh 
 
‘Intertwining’ translates from Husserl’s Verflechtung – entanglement or interweaving – like 
the mesh of a fabric (Toadvine, 2018). In the classical dualist conceptualization, there is usually 
a gap between me as a seeing or touching subject and as an object that is seen or touched; in 
fact, in Descartes this is an almost unbridgeable abyss. As a result, there is a divergence 
between the sentient and sensible aspects of our existence, in which these two moments or 
modes of being get stabilized and frozen and definitely divorced from one another. However, 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that seeing and touching and being seen and being touched cannot 
be dichotomous orders of being in the world, because they are reversible. The concept of my 
one hand touching the other does more than merely represent the body's capacity to be both 
perceiving object and subject of perception. The left hand is not merely another 'object', but 
the same fleshy substance that is capable of reversing the situation back to the right hand. We 
cannot touch ourselves, or somebody else, without recognition of our own tangibility and 
capacity to be touched by others.  
 
Importantly, it is not only about the touching of bodily flesh on flesh in the literal sense. Flesh 
as we have discussed is not a ‘thing’ but an element. The generality of Merleau-Ponty’s term 
‘flesh’ embraces the seer and the seen in the same ontological order. Indeed, this is true of all 
the senses – hearing, tasting and smelling. But the flesh goes beyond this. Importantly, there is 
also an ‘intercorporeity’ of the flesh (Toadvine, 2018: online). The title of Merleau-Ponty’s 
last work is The Visible and the Invisible. Both concepts are equally original to his concept of 
perception. Merleau-Ponty’s sensible flesh — what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘visible’ — is not 
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all there is to flesh, since flesh also transmutes itself into an ‘invisible’ dimension too, the flesh 
of ideas. This, however, is not an Husserlian-like relapse into a transcendental ego. These are 
notions that cannot be ‘seen’ but, insists Merleau-Ponty, in these cases the ideas “cannot be 
detached from the sensible appearance and be erected into a second positivity” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968: 149). He is implicitly here rejecting the Platonic (and Cartesian) notion that ideas exist 
in a separate, second order of being, radically separated from ‘the sensible appearance’. The 
invisible passions, concepts and ideas of love and distrust, destitution and suffering, in fact all 
of our ideas, however abstract, all originate and are grounded in and intermingle with what we, 
our bodies, have originally experienced sensibly in the world. Ideas are thus not alien to this 
material world, are not imposed onto an inherently meaningless material mass, but instead they 
emerge out of the dynamic interactions among fleshy things.   
 
Language is formed in a similarly embodied corporeal-incorporeal fashion. What we treat as 
‘pure ideas’ are nothing more than a certain divergence and ongoing process of differentiation, 
now occurring also within language, rather than just in sensible things (Toadvine, 2018: 
online). Ultimately, we find a similar relation of reversibility within language  that has been 
located within visible/invisible sensibility. Just as, in order to see or touch, my body must be 
part of the visible and capable of being seen, so, by speaking, I make myself one who can be 
spoken to (allocutary) and one who can be spoken about (delocutary) (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 
154). While all of the possibilities of language are already outlined or promised within the 
sensible world, reciprocally the sensible world itself is unavoidably inscribed with language 
(Toadvine, 2018: online). I will pick up on Merleau-Ponty’s theme of language in Chapter Five 
when we apply his concept to the natural world. 
1.3.2. Chiasmic aspect of the flesh 
Chiasm, referred to in the title of his last chapter, is a Greek word meaning ‘cross-shaped’. 
This has two senses – the same in French and English – and both are relevant to Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. There is a physiological sense that refers to a cross-shaped structure 
formed at the point below the brain where the two optic nerves cross each other as well as a 
point where paired chromosomes remain in contact and exchange genetic material; and a 
literary one that refers to figures of speech that repeat structures or concepts in reverse order.  
The chiasm of the flesh, then, is described as “a crisscrossing or a bi-directional becoming or 
exchange between the body and things that justifies speaking of a ‘flesh’ of things, a kinship 
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between the sensing body and sensed things that makes their communication possible” 
(Toadvine, 2018). It is more than simple reciprocity or reversibility but a cross-dimensional 
aspect that bolsters the idea of intertwining. Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic ontology ensures that in 
some sense the ‘other’ is always already intertwined within the ‘subject’ or rather the ‘self’ in 
a far more complex reciprocity than just two-halves exchanging with one another, and he 
explicitly suggests that self and non-self are always, at the same time, the obverse and reverse 
of each other. He therefore affirms an interdependence of self and other(s) that involves these 
categories crisscrossing and intertwining with one another, shaping and framing each other, 
but without ever being reducible to each other.  
The chiasm then, is simply an image to describe how this overlapping and encroachment can 
in time take place between a pair that nevertheless retains a divergence, in that touching and 
being touched are obviously never exactly the same thing. The generality of ‘flesh’ embraces 
an intercorporeity, an anonymous sensibility shared out among distinct bodies: just as our two 
hands communicate across the lateral synergy of our bodies, I can touch the sensibility of 
another (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 142). As Merleau-Ponty writes in a working note from 
November 1960: 
the idea of chiasm, that is: every relation with being is simultaneously a taking and a 
being held, the hold is held, it is inscribed and inscribed in the same being that it takes 
hold of. Starting from there, elaborate an idea of philosophy: it cannot be a total and 
active grasp, intellectual possession, since what there is to be grasped is a dispossession 
– It is not above life, overhanging. It is beneath. It is the simultaneous experience of the 
holding and the held in all orders. What it says, its significations, are not absolutely 
visible: it shows by words. Like all literature. It does not install itself in the reverse of 
the visible: it is on both sides (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 266). 
 
This is a revealing excerpt in that Merleau-Ponty is showing that there are no binaries and 
therefore no hierarchy in the concept of chiasm since ‘subjecthood’ and ‘objecthood’ 
simultaneously combine and cross-exchange with one another to the point that the one cannot 
be dominant and the other subjugated.  
 
Chiasm of the flesh, therefore, is a promising figure for rethinking the mutually constituting 
relationship of the traditional binaries between perceiving ‘subject’ and the perceived ‘object’ 
world. As Merleau-Ponty has shown, we humans experience these intertwining mediations 
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corporeally in our sensible exchanges with the perceived world, as well as ‘invisibly’ through 
words and music and the passions. Such exchanges happen through an ‘encroachment’ that 
blurs the boundaries between what are joined together. 
 
Such an ontology completely rejects any notion of the sovereign Subject, which has always 
elevated a rational, autonomous individual, capable of imposing their interpretation or 
understanding upon a situation that is entirely and always external to them. In Sartre’s case, 
specifically with regards to the dichotomy of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, Merleau-
Ponty would argue that such notions overlap in such a way as to undermine any absolute 
difference between them (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 137); they constitute a foundational, necessary 
paradox which we share with all living beings, rather than two detachable types of being. As a 
consequence, Sartre's conception of an absolute freedom “is also rendered untenable by the 
recognition of the ways in which Self and world are chiasmically intertwined” (Reynolds: no 
date online). Merleau-Ponty is showing that there cannot be any complete disconnection from 
the surrounding world. The experiencer is always experienced and therefore immersed, 
involved, embodied and intertwined with his or her surroundings. Recall the quote above where 
he said that the human (knowing) body ‘does not soar over [objects], it is not the being that is 
wholly knowing, for it has its own inertia, its [own] ties’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 147).  
 
Merleau-Ponty, therefore, expertly finds in this ontology a new departure for describing the 
relationship between the body and the world, Self and Other, facts and ideas, sensibility and 
language. He insists that every living body is the seat of consciousness and that the embodied 
flesh of the body is always already in and of the world, never set apart from it. 
Anthropocentrism, therefore, becomes a false construct under such an ontology.  
 
2. The more-than-human world 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, therefore, is without doubt non-anthropocentric. He transforms the 
insuperable line or hard dichotomy between Descartes’ Subject and object, between  
Heidegger’s in-the-world and poor-in-the-world, and between Sartre’s in-itself and for-itself, 
into a constitutive paradox characteristic of all living bodies. His concept of the chiasm of the 
flesh ultimately paves the way for a completely different relationship between human and 
(other) animals, since it is one that is not constructed on hierarchical sovereignty or binary 
opposites that, in turn, justifies the instrumental exploitation and violent mistreatment of (other) 
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animals. Instead, by showing that perceiving subject and perceivable object are two sides to 
the same coin of every living body, he reveals a fundamental continuity between human and 
all other life forms. Even though Merleau-Ponty never addressed the animal question directly, 
his phenomenological formulation of the notions of chiasm, dehiscence and intertwining, and 
of flesh, drawn up at the beginning of the Anthropocene, can be effortlessly applied  to 
developing a meaningful interrelationship between human bodies, and wild animals and their 
wild places.  
 
That’s not to say, however, that Merleau-Ponty did not consider (other) animals. There are 
traces of Merleau-Ponty’s direction toward including (other) animals in his doctrine, especially 
in the last months of his life. Merleau-Ponty himself did write, in the working notes of his 
unfinished tome The Visible and The Invisible, that the primacy of being was a “brute”, “wild 
being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 168 & 200), that the body is “the living bond with nature” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 27). Furthermore  in the last paragraph of his final completed chapter 
“The Intertwining — The Chiasm” he writes that language “is the voice of the things, the waves 
and forests” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 155); while stating in his final working note before he died, 
“Nature as the other side of man (as flesh)” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 274). According to David 
Abram this carnal life-world that Merleau-Ponty speaks of is in fact the biosphere, which in a 
phenomenological sense is: 
 
the matrix of earthly life in which we ourselves are embedded. Yet this is not the 
biosphere of objectifying science, not that complex assemblage of planetary 
mechanisms presumably being mapped and measured by our remote sensing 
satellites; it is, rather, the biosphere as it is experienced and lived from within by 
the intelligent body – by the attentive human animal who is entirely part of the 
world that he, or she, experiences (Abram, 1996: 65). 
 
In many of the notes of his three lectures courses on the very concept of Nature conducted at 
the prestigious Collège de France in Paris between 1956 and 1957, Merleau-Ponty spoke 
consistently about nature and pointed out that we humans have forgotten our own source and 
Being within it because we have objectified nature. Modern humans have pretended to be 
disengaged observers, á la Descartes. (Merleau-Ponty, 1970: 63-69; 83; 97-99). 
 
As Abram highlights:  
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Such hierarchies are wrecked by any phenomenology that takes seriously our 
immediate sensory experience. For our senses disclose to us a wild-flowering 
proliferation of entities and elements, in which humans are thoroughly immersed. 
While this diversity of sensuous forms certainly displays some sort of reckless 
order, we find ourselves in the midst of, rather than on top of this order. We may 
cast our gaze downward to watch the field mice and the insects that creep along the 
bending grasses, or to glimpse the snakes that slither into the hollows deep 
underfoot, yet, at the same moment, hawks soaring on great winds gaze down upon 
our endeavours … Does the human intellect, or ‘reason’, really spring us free from 
our inherence in the depths of this wild proliferation of forms? Or on the contrary, 
is the human intellect rooted in, and secretly borne by, our forgotten contact with 
the multiple non-human shapes that surround us? (Abram, 1996: 48-49) 
 
Of course, these days most humans no longer participate in the last remaining vestiges of 
natural surroundings. Almost all our relationships are either with other humans or human-
constructed technologies. Our most common contact with (other) animals is when dead parts 
of them lie in front of us on the dinner plate, or we wear and adorn our furniture with their 
skins, have bits of them in our toothpaste, shampoo, cleaning products and even car tyres. Yet, 
the point that Merleau-Ponty  may be drawn upon to make is we humans need to humbly accept 
our involvement as members of the living natural world since without the oxygenating force 
of vegetation, the pull of gravity, the insects, birds, plants and mammals that are vital for global 
food production, clean water and carbon sequestration, we humans simply will cease to be. 
These insights are not only corroborated by objective sciences, but in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, we become aware of how they are given in the fabric of each and every 
sensory experience and perception. 
 
2.1. The primacy-of-being 
 
The acknowledgment of the body as central to my conscious relationship with the world is not 
to reduce me to a set of mechanisms, a corporeal Cartesian sack of matter (skin, flesh and 
bones). Instead, this is a breathing, sensing, intelligent animate lived body that draws its 
sustenance from nature even as it makes sense of its surroundings – the soils, plants and air - 
while at the same time contributing in return to these same elements.  
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As Abram suggests: to accept the body as the means of being-in-the-world, “is to acknowledge 
our existence as one of the earth’s animals” (Abram, 1996: 47). This ongoing interchange 
between my body and outside entities is a continuous ‘dialogue’ that unfolds largely 
independent of my conscious awareness, and it is seldom thematised. Yet, for Abram, the 
interchange between one’s living body and its material surroundings is “an experience of 
reciprocal encounters of tension, communication, and commingling” (Abram, 1996: 56), and I 
will add to that: “of our very survival”. This evokes the sense of the flesh as an ‘element’ (as 
mentioned earlier) of an open, limitless, reciprocal chiasmic nature of a living being moving, 
bonding, feeling, receiving and giving in a world that moves, bonds, receives and gives in 
return. Human being and (other) animals all partake in this elemental power of being. 
 
In short, everything we experience is underpinned by a chiasmic encounter with nature whether 
we are aware of it or not. The examples are endless and infinitely variable like the swarm of 
thirsty bees seeking the moisture of my body in the heat of the midday sun in the Kalahari 
Desert. My acceptance of the bees occurs at the point where my flesh ends, and theirs begins. 
This process is instantly reversed too. As I feel ticklish, the bees experience moist sweat and 
the touch of my skin and hair follicles. And, it is not just the sense of touching and being 
touched, but an intertwining of other senses too. The sound of their humming, the cool touch 
of my skin, the ticklishness of their thousand little legs. Should I move too rapidly in adjusting 
my position in the hammock in which I lie beneath the camelthorn tree, I risk the chance of 
getting stung as the bees will react to a sudden change in my body language and instantly adjust 
their own reaction accordingly. I am constantly exposed to the materiality of the world, just as 
the other creatures are exposed to my materiality. As Abram articulates: 
 
The sensing body is not a programmed machine but an active and open form, 
continually improvising its relation to things and the world. The body’s actions and 
engagements are never wholly determinate, since they must ceaselessly adjust 
themselves to a world and terrain that is itself continuously shifting (Abram, 1996: 
49). 
 
Such reversibility and encroachment of chiasmic structures between us informs Merleau-
Ponty's ontology of ‘flesh’ in that a continuity or kinship links us supposedly disparate beings 
– human and insect. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is not a staid, listed description 
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of a bee but of how bees dynamically and intentionally interact with us and their surroundings. 
Nor is it humans described as bipedal homo sapiens with four limbs and opposable thumbs but 
of infinitely complex scenarios of how we go about dynamically and intentionally reacting and 
participating in the same surroundings as the bees. 
 
Thus, to define another being, or even our bodies, as an inert or passive object is to deny the 
reality of constantly engaging with our surrounding world. If the bodies of self and other  were 
indeed a set of closed mechanisms as Descartes, anthropocentrism and instrumentally-centred 
conservation would have us think, “it could never come into genuine contact with anything 
outside itself, could never perceive anything new, could never be genuinely startled or 
surprised” (Abram, 1996: 49). By defining the natural world as a determinate set of objects, 
we therefore cut ourselves off from the reality of the natural world surrounding us, which is 
really a denial of being.  
 
Let me return to Derrida who continues to interpret his own title’s disruption with a Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology. Here, while he weaves in and around the ontological question of ‘who 
I am (following)’, Derrida discovers from the verb ‘to follow’ the necessitation of two further 
notions: “I am inasmuch as I am after [après] the animal” or “I am inasmuch as I am alongside 
[auprés] the animal” (Derrida, 2008: 10). The similarity between the diacritics (the accents that 
alter pronunciation and/or meaning) once again sounds better in French – aprés and auprés. 
Both similar-sounding words connote via the diacritic of being-near (prés) the animal, which 
leads to being with, being-huddled-together or being-pressed (cf. the root word pressu for 
English press as well as French prés), which could also mean ‘compressed’, ‘impressed’, 
‘repressed’ or ‘pressed-against’. The diacritics scatter Descartes’ reduction, and dilute any 
attempts at strict conceptualization or mechanization of our relationship. They effectively 
destroy the illusion of a fixed abyss between ‘cogito’ and ‘animals’. No more is there the 
ontological, singular ‘I am’, but a more plural, and intricately involved ‘I am animal’, ‘with 
animals’, ‘… alongside animals’, ‘… following animals’, ‘… among animals.’ There is, as one 
can clearly see, no rank categorisation. Also, since I am following the animal it is ‘being-there-
before-me’ it can allow itself to be looked at, regarded, analysed, compared, and the animal 
can also look back at me.  
 
2.2. The animal gazes back 
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Following Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intertwining and reversibility, Derrida continually 
reverses the human/animal opposition back and forth. The ‘I’ may regard the animal as other, 
but equally the animal may regard the ‘I’ as other. The animal too has a point of view, a point 
of view, like us, and of us, similar to  Sartre’s and Levinas’ Other. The result, as can be seen 
on countless occasions throughout Derrida’s oeuvre, is a complication of the traditional notions 
of definition and reference within the language structure, which ultimately serves to break 
down the hierarchical binary prevalent in language – the egotistical ‘I am’ (je suis) could be 
the more inclusive, fluid and flowing ‘I follow’ (je suis). Thus, ‘I am’ is no longer an 
autonomous static entity or concept of ‘self’, looking out across a great chasm at the other. The 
differential ‘I follow’ throws the ‘Subject’ in among the rest, scrambles it, multiplies it, mingles 
and as a result the supposedly clear distinction between humans and ‘other animals’ becomes 
blurred. Derrida’s title therefore throws the Cartesian human self in among the pigeons, along 
with all the other animals. 
 
With the Merleau-Pontian notion of intertwining, as we regard each other, the human and an 
(other) animal become intricately entwined – the obverse and reverse of each other at the same 
time but without being reduced to the other. This reveals a kind of phenomenological disruption 
that both affects and challenges us prior to any rational reflection or empirical debates we may 
have on the being of (other) animals. Levinas’ phenomenon of the face, or specifically, the 
gaze of the Other, is what disrupts our dualistic high-ground by committing us to respond to 
the gaze32 in some way. Our relation to the Other comes from a response to its gaze and in 
these instances one’s trust in the usual world order, including the preformed reductionistic 
categorisations or conceptualisations (like ‘subject’, ‘self’, ‘other’, ‘animal’ and so on), is 
disrupted. When Derrida noticed his cat staring at him when he was naked in the bathroom one 
day, he made this comment: 
 
If I say “it is a real cat” that sees me naked, this is in order to mark its 
unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name (whatever “respond” 
means, and that will be our question), it doesn’t do so as the exemplar of a species 
called “cat”, even less so of an “animal genus” or kingdom. It is true that I identify 
it as a male or female cat. But even before that identification, it comes to me as this 
irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space, into this place where it can 
 
32 The word ‘gaze’ is not simply a visual perception but includes the other’s perceptions of what it sees.  
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encounter me, see me, even see me naked. Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty 
that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized [rebelle à 
tout concept] (Derrida, 2008: 9). 
 
Derrida’s point here is this is not about cats as a species nor about what attributes make cats, 
say, different from bats. Nor is it about reducing all (other) animals to a homogenous and single 
Linnaen class, or whether it’s a kangaroo or spring hare. This was a once-off, unique encounter 
with “an other in a face-to-face duel”, and with “an unsubstitutable singularity” (Derrida, 2008: 
9) that cannot be bracketed by a reductionist referencing term like ‘animal’ or ‘cat’ or even 
‘little’ or ‘female cat’. By deferring from the reductionist description of cats as a species, 
Derrida, following Heidegger and certainly Merleau-Ponty, is contesting the possibility of 
reducing the animal, and himself, to a basic object of knowledge. He instead acknowledges the 
singular creature as a subject of knowledge. Derrida, therefore, veers from the simplistic 
anthropocentric treatment of his cat as a species of animal by insisting on the idiosyncratic 
nature of a singular event. He also avoids the empirical question of what another animal could 
be thinking or feeling, since, following Levinas’ line of enquiry, the gaze of the cat is reflecting 
such enquiry back toward him, the simultaneously seeing and seen subject. Thus, and most 
importantly in an anti-Cartesian vein, ‘Derrida’ is no longer really a subject in the classical 
sense of the term, but rather a (Merleau-Pontian) subject-now-object – an other to the Other. 
The gaze is not the property of the subject but of the Other, yet the gaze reflects the subject’s 
potential thoughts like a mirror back at the subject. When the subject (Derrida) gazes at the 
Other (his cat), he realises that the Other is gazing back, but from a point outside the field of 
the subject’s perception. This is precisely the chiasmic nature that Merleau-Ponty is speaking 
about. The order is reversed and cross-reversed continuously. A similar insight is reflected in 
Aldo Leopold’s comment:  “To look into the eyes of a wolf is to see your own soul” (Wolf 
Conservation Centre: website). Leopold means that there is often some deep connection in the 
face-to-face encounter with another animal, which leaves the selfdisrupted. It is something not 
fully explained except the fact it emphasizes Merleau-Ponty’s point that we are chiasmically 
entwined with each other. Our being includes the being of the other, and vice versa.  
 
I have experienced something similar to this myself. Here is another encounter of many I have 
had with the lions in the Kalahari:  
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I had driven one morning to a large waterless pan to see if it was a suitable place to set up 
camp. I came across a pride of lionesses lazing under the only tree on the edge of the pan. 
While observing them from a short distance, I noticed a movement to the immediate rear of 
my vehicle. I stuck my head out the window to get a better look. It was a large male lion with 
a luxuriant black mane. He lifted his gaze, and those fiery amber eyes looked directly into 
mine. It was a strange sensation. I was completely transfixed by the gaze, like a rabbit caught 
in the headlights of a car at night. The lion just held me with his stare. I couldn’t move let alone 
bring myself to take a photograph. I was so completely spellbound.  
 
I have had many such encounters of witnessing animals-that-witness, of being held in an animal 
gazed, being sized up, or puzzled over. The timeless gaze of a curious humpback whale I 
encountered while diving made me feel how puny and vulnerable I am. This is a feeling I often 
get when faced with elephants who notice my presence – their gaze impacts on my 
understanding of myself. Such unexpected encounters brought home that I am not just a 
sentient subject but also a sensible object, or even a crushable object, in the eyes and trunk of 
the other. Abram points out that “once we acknowledge that our own sentience, or subjectivity, 
does not preclude our visible, tactile, objective existence for others, we find ourselves forced 
to acknowledge that any visible, tangible form that meets our gaze may also be an experiencing 
subject, sensitive and responsive to the beings around it, as well as to us” (Abram, 1996: 67). 
 
2.3. Co-participatory perception 
 
There is a potential anthropocentric barrier to overcome here, which I touched upon in Chapter 
Three when I discussed Levinas’ difficulty with overcoming anthropocentrism. The gaze of a 
cat, or a lion, or even a whale is easily recognisable to our anthropomorphic minds. But, 
following Levinas coming unstuck with the line of questioning from the students of the 
Universities of Essex and Warwick in 1986, what of the gaze of a snake? Or, better yet, a shark, 
or mosquito or a fly? These are hardly the eyes that can elicit a similar response; it is harder to 
attribute a sense of the world to creatures like that. However, as Merleau-Ponty has informed 
us, perception does not always refer to the visual or tactile part, it could be any of the other 
senses (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 147). Derrida himself prefers to use the word ‘regard’ or 
‘address’ in these instances (Derrida, 2008). ‘Regard’ means ‘to consider’ or ‘to think of’ not 
necessarily ‘to look at’, implying that any form of consideration – visible or invisible – from 
the Other constitutes a ‘gaze’, ‘the flesh’ or perception as such. The mosquito keeping me 
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awake at night, smells me as a source of fresh blood. The bacteria working in our stomachs is 
such a form of invisible chiasm of the flesh – so-called ‘bad bacteria’ (viewed from our 
perspective) give us a stomach-ache, ‘good bacteria’ in the form of probiotics help us digest 
food.  
 
French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), emulating Descartes, 
stated that (other) animals merely obey a fixed coded program by reacting to external stimuli, 
as the fly and the crab do against my movement toward them. Lacan argues humans are 
different in that they respond to each other with a complex spoken language (Derrida, 2008: 
123). Lacan, however, is incorrect in assuming that just because (other) animals do not respond 
to each other or to their situation in the anthropomorphic sense it means they do not respond at 
all. Merleau-Ponty had often argued that the key to a response is participation or engagement 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Any form of perception – visible or invisible – is inherently 
participatory. It’s an experience of an active interplay, or coupling, between the perceiving 
body and that which it perceives. The feeling of a fly crawling on my arm causes me to 
experience a mild annoyance. For the fly, as I raise my hand to swat her, it is perhaps fear, or, 
at the very least, a desire to preserve her own life.  
 
• Clever Hans, the mathematical horse 
 
A great illustration of participatory nature of perception is a story I have related many times 
because it completely wrecks Lacan’s blatantly Cartesian notion that (other) animals only obey 
fixed coded programs. What’s more, it reaffirms Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the horizontal 
chiasmic nature between engaging entities that are not exclusively human. This is the story of 
Clever Hans, the Mathematical Horse (Pfungst, 2010). Clever Hans was an Orlov Trotter horse 
that performed in front of large human crowds in Germany around the beginning of the 
twentieth-century. The horse’s attraction was his ability to add, subtract, multiply, divide, work 
with fractions, tell time, keep track of the calendar, differentiate musical tones, and read, spell, 
and understand German. For example, his owner, Wilhelm von Osten, would ask Hans: “If the 
eighth day of the month comes on a Tuesday, what is the date of the following Friday?” Hans 
would answer by tapping his hoof eighteen times. For any question asked, whether from Von 
Osten or any member of the crowd, Hans would come up with the correct answer, almost every 
time. Von Osten exhibited Clever Hans throughout Germany drawing large, enthralled crowds, 
a spectacle that was even reported in the New York Times (1904).  
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As a result of the large amount of public interest in Clever Hans, the German Board of 
Education appointed a commission to investigate the phenomenon. Philosopher, and early 
phenomenologist who studied with Franz Brentano, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) formed a panel 
of thirteen people, known as the Hans Commission. This commission concluded in September 
1904 that no tricks were involved in Hans's performance (New York Times, 1904). The 
commission then passed off the evaluation to biologist and psychologist working for Stumpf, 
Oskar Pfungst (1874-1933), who further tested the basis for these claimed abilities. Using a 
substantial number of trials, Pfungst found that Clever Hans could get the correct answer even 
if Von Osten himself did not ask the questions. This ruled out any possibility of fraud. 
However, the horse only got the right answer if two conditions were in place: 1.) when the 
questioner knew what the answer was; and 2.) the horse could see the questioner. Pfungst then 
proceeded to examine the behaviour of the questioner in detail. What he found was something 
quite unexpected. Pfungst discovered that as the horse's taps approached the right answer, the 
questioner's posture and facial expression changed in ways that were consistent with an 
increase in tension, which was released when the horse made the final, correct tap. This 
provided a cue that the horse could use to tell it to stop tapping (Pfungst, 2010). 
 
It shows that Hans was not so mathematically clever after all, but he was certainly far more 
perceptive than the crowds could possibly have imagined. Thus, the participatory perception 
systems of horses – and this is true of all living beings – depends on the detection of small 
postural changes, and other ‘forms’ of communication, which would explain why Hans so 
easily picked up on the cues given by his human interlocutors, even if these cues were 
unconscious. For the enthusiastic crowds, however, their own participation with Clever Hans’ 
perceived mathematical brilliance was something bordering on the wonderous. They did not 
perceive that Hans was using their own human-induced set of participatory and transcendent 
phenomena to come up with the right answer. Instead, the crowd genuinely believed that Hans 
was good at mathematics and other complex anthropocentric mental antics.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Merleau-Ponty would suggest that for all these participants – horse, owner and crowd – that 
there is a perceptual chiasm of their bodies. They participate actively in the world. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty meant by the chiasm of the flesh. Clever Hans’ own engagement induced the 
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humans to assist through a transformation of their bodily actions, which then startles them with 
what they themselves unknowingly created yet bodily performed, clearly enough for a clever 
horse to “read”.  
 
Furthermore, in such a phenomenological field, as we have seen with Clever Hans, the 
consciousness of a being does not need to be cognitively knowable, but rather by participating 
in a bodily perception the participants invoke an obligation (Wood, 2004: 131), an obligation 
to accept that humans are not alone and that other beings participate with and among us, not 
necessarily as equals but as partipatory life forms whose existence within the interconnected 
web of life is important. Such obligations occur through instances in moments of time and 
space that precede and initiate possibilities of recognition, and such events disrupt and 
rearrange such experiences of time, self and being, and highlight the reductive shortcomings 
of our anthropocentric attitude toward (other) animals.  
 
In light of this, it does not matter whether an animal has the ability to reason, have 
consciousness, or is able to suffer. Nor does it matter whether an animal is broken down into 
the indeterminate sum of its parts as Charles Dickens has one of his antagonists describe a 
horse in Hard Times (1854): 
 
Quadruped, Graminivorous, Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-
teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs 
too. Hoofs hard but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth 
(Dickens, 1854: Chapter 2). 
 
The point is, for Merleau-Ponty, humans were intertwined participants in the dynamic world 
of swirling, interchanging, fluid horse phenomena of Clever Hans, not distant observers of a 
vastly reduced, definition of a horse in Hard Times.  
 
In the next chapter, I apply Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of the chiasm of the flesh to the ‘natural 
environment’ and the animals (human and non-human) involved with and living within that 
environment. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A RETURN TO THE WILD 
 
 
Deep in the forest a call was sounding, and as often as he heard this call, mysteriously 
thrilling and luring, he felt compelled to turn his back upon the fire and the beaten earth 
around it, and to plunge into the forest, and on and on, he knew not where or why; nor did he 
wonder where or why, the call sounding imperiously, deep in the forest 
 
(Jack London, The Call of the Wild) 
 
 
In this chapter, the idea is to show how a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology completely 
reconfigures ways of considering so-called wild animals33 in the natural environment and 
begins to point to a new ethic in conservation.  
 
Of course, one needs to first define what a ‘natural environment’ actually is. The same is true 
for the notions of ‘wild’ and ‘wilderness’. Section One of this chapter (Being-Wild) will address 
these points. I will show that ‘wild’ is not the simple binary opposite of ‘non-wild’ or 
‘domesticated’ or ‘tame’ or ‘civilised’ or ‘human’. Rather, it is something that mediates 
between and on various levels in all forms of life and in all forms of surroundings whether it is 
a spider on the wall of my apartment in the city of Cape Town or an elephant in the unfenced 
and untrammeled natural expanse of Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe. The important point 
is that ‘wildness’, as per Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh, is a fundamental dimension of 
all life. Having said that, this is a dissertation where wild animals and their conservation, 
traditionally understood, is the focus, so this chapter will concentrate on this aspect rather than 
just the broader sense of Merleau-Ponty’s project as set forth in The Visible and The Invisible. 
 
In the second section (Nature as Flesh) of this chapter, I will expand on how wild animals 
ought not to be taken as singular objects, but instead should be named and treated as expressing, 
communicating and interacting with other beings and their physical environment. The spatio-
temporal interactions of living beings with other beings and their surroundings is not 
mechanistic or deterministic as originally thought. These reductionist views historically led 
humans to treating (other) animals as automata, commodities or resources, as discussed. In 
contrast, for example, a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology does not treat a rhino as a ‘thing’, or 
 
33 The term ‘wild animal’ is in itself problematic in that it encompasses much more than being living in the 
wilderness, as I will demonstrate shortly. ‘Animal’ also includes the human ‘animal’ and ‘wild’, as will be seen 
shortly, is a state of being rather than just a location in a wild place. 
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static object or enclosed being, which is made up of parts or attributes that are deterministically 
animated by external forces. It rather treat the rhino  as a perceiving and expressing being, 
interacting in a meaningful way with her wild environment and communicating with other 
living beings in her geographical vicinity. In other words, living beings are not stand-alone 
entities, but embodied creatures always dynamically and purposefully inhabiting a broader 
ecological realm. In terms of conservation, the animal embedded physically and expressively 
in her environment plus her environment are understood as belonging together, but not 
combined as one, rather as intertwining yet distinct organisms. Louise du Toit states that there 
is “a necessary distance between the living body and its milieu – the precondition of its 
engagement with it is its ability to discern possibilities for engaging with the environment, i.e. 
possibilities for change, i.e. virtualities.”  The projection of a world within a milieu depends on 
some distance or spacing opening up between the body and its environment” (Du Toit, 2019: 
13). Thus, the living body and the environment are co-constituted and co-constituting in an 
ongoing way, in the ‘world’ of the animal. 
 
In the third section (Language of Being), I reveal how Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenology, 
when applied to a science like ecology, replaces the staid objectifying language of the empirical 
sciences, by dismantling the binaries between the body and the world, self and other, seer and 
seen, touch and touched, facts and ideas, sensibility and language, humanity and animality. It 
thereby better expresses the complex ambiguities and mutual intertwinings, characteristic of 
all life Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty replaces these opposing concepts with a form of chiasmic 
mediation. Chiasm, as we have seen, refers to an ‘encroachment’ or crossing over between two 
irreducible aspects of the body – the sensible and the sentient. The sensible body reveals a 
chiasmic structure that Merleau-Ponty says characterises every living being (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968: 137). We experience chiasmic interactions corporeally at the basis of our sensible 
exchanges with the surrounding world. As we saw in the previous chapter, they occur through 
an interaction that smudges the boundaries between what is joined, such that we can no longer 
say precisely where activity becomes passivity, where the seen becomes the seer, the touch 
becomes touched or where the self ends and other living beings or the world begins. Merleau-
Ponty thus reveals a new way of describing the relationship between the living body and the / 
its world.   
 
In the Phenomenology of Perception (1962), Merleau-Ponty started to understand that human 
language too was a carnal ‘wild’ phenomenon, rooted in sensorial experience with the world. 
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This is the key point of this chapter as we see how fundamental language becomes as the 
foundation stone pointing toward an eco-phenomenological conservation ethic. In the chapter 
entitled ‘The Body as Expression, and Speech’ in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty writes that the body’s first act of communication with the world is a spontaneous gesture 
toward it. In this third section of this chapter, I will show how language in both human and 
non-human is in fact a product of the wild environment, arising out of the bodily gesture.  
‘Wildness’, for Merleau-Ponty, manifests itself, among other things, through organisms’ 
capacity for  communication and language. Merleau-Ponty’s shows that human language is 
just another extension of the interconnectedness of participating with the natural environment. 
Language is a key to our interconnectedness with the wild, rather than that which would 
supposedly mark us as an ‘exception’ to the natural and wild world, because it is a physically 
as well as a tonally expressive component of being-wild. Language, as Merleau-Ponty shows, 
is not exclusively a human condition but an action that belongs to all life, not just in making 
noises but in bodily and a large variety of other forms of expression. Language is an 
inextricable extension of our participation in the sensuous natural world, which we share with 
all living bodies in this world. 
 
Developing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm, this section will also begin to show that things 
with no obvious point to their existence (like mosquitoes) in fact play an expressive and 
relational role in the lives of other beings. This kind of portrayal, as David Wood writes, 
“teaches us that the life, death and flourishing of things is tied up with other factors, conditions 
and creatures in ways for which we typically do not have a map, and under variability 
tolerances we do not know” (Wood, 2001: 16). Wood goes on to state that “we can study these 
things, of course. But as much as ecology is a science, it is also a counsel of caution, precisely 
because it deals with the interaction of widely disparate kinds of things” (Wood, 2001: 16). 
And so, through a Merleau-Pontian concept of language and the resultant renewal of the 
description of ecological functions – let’s call it ‘poetic ecology34 – there now begins to emerge 
the foundation of a conservation ethic. The interaction and interconnectedness of all life, rather 
than the simple preservation of numbers calculated and based on instrumental value, becomes 
the focal point in a conservation of wildlife.  
 
 
34 This is a term used by Craig Holrege (2016) in Meeting Nature as a Presence: Aldo Leopold and the Deeper 
Nature of Nature (Nature Institute). 
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To build upon and reinforce these concepts in Sections Two and Three respectively, I will 
include the ideas of two early ecologists, Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) and Aldo Leopold 
(1887-1948). The works of these two men are excellent examples of scientists who broke from 
the usual objective methods of regarding the natural world to adopt a conservation approach 
that implicitly, albeit it indirectly, follows a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology.  The aim of 
focusing on these proto-phenomenologists is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical 
concepts of flesh and chiasm begin to take shape in an applied sense. The choice of these two 
early ecologists is important in that they link the theoretical Merleau-Ponty, who himself did 
never apply his theories in a practical sense, to the prospect of a contemporary environmental 
ethic and a practical approach to wildlife conservation in the era of the Anthropocene. These 
men are also important in that they express, through an innovative use of descriptive language, 
a Merleau-Pontian style of phenomenology that completely avoids the anthropocentric pitfalls 
that plague conservation efforts in the modern world. 
 
Of the first of the two early ecologists (presented in the second section), it is significant that 
Merleau-Ponty’s own development of ideas explicitly makes use of Jakob von Uexküll’s in-
field studies of ticks and sea urchins (among others) and his concept of ‘Umwelt’ 
(surroundings). Uexküll gave Merleau-Ponty most of the foundational concepts into advancing 
his ideas of intertwining and the chiasm of the flesh (Umbelino, 2013: 352) and was able to 
lead Merleau-Ponty to an alternative way of thinking about wildness and how it entails a 
primordial interconnection with humans, wild animals and the natural environment. Uexküll 
also begins to pave the way for how animals bodily express themselves with other beings and 
their environment, which led Merleau-Ponty to draw his own conclusions regarding humans. 
 
The other ecologist is regarded as one of the greatest of the twentieth century. He is often cited 
as the father of the environmental movement and certainly in environmental philosophical 
circles. This is none other than Aldo Leopold, whose pioneering opus, The Sand County 
Almanac, (published posthumously in 1949) introduced the notion of a land ethic, a concept 
that was unprecedented at the time, and in many ways still remains peripheral to mainstream 
conservation policies as discussed in Chapter One. In the third section of this chapter, I will 
delve into Leopold’s thinking about the importance of preserving the wild environment as an 
applied version of Merleau-Ponty’s theories. Leopold broke protocol with scientific language 
in describing  his life in the wild. It is with his vivid descriptions of his experiences of the 
wilderness that Leopold was less a distant observer of nature and more a Merleau-Pontian 
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phenomenologist in and of nature. Leopold, as an example of how language shapes our relation 
to the wild environment and vice versa, coincidentally links to Merleau-Ponty’s own concept 
of language. The pages of Sand County Almanac are filled with wonderful examples of how 
language is shaped by the environment and vice versa. Leopold speaks of mountains as animate 
and dynamic. They too are forms of expression and communication. I will show what Leopold 
means by ‘thinking like a mountain’. Leopold also shows how seemingly insignificant animals 
are critical to the overall health of the entire ecosystem. Without them and their meaningful 
self-expression within their wild environment, there probably would not even be an ecosystem.  
 
I shall conclude this chapter (fourth section Ukama: The Interdependence of All that Exists) by 
showing just how deeply human communication is dependent on the wild environment. I will 
provide a real example of this by introducing a unique traditional Zimbabwean concept called 
Ukama.  
 
It is with these thoughts that I will lead into the final chapter. A chapter where I explore ways 
in which modern humans can re-discover the natural world that will possibly provide a new 
and better way of conserving the wild animals and wildness that underlies and ultimately makes 
possible all life.  
 
1. Being-wild 
 
The element of flesh is a connection and a relationship between beings, among beings, and 
their surrounding environment. But here is the key. The Merleau-Pontian concept of flesh is 
about the carnal, bodily interrelationship between all beings – human and non-human animal 
– both with each other and with the natural world. Recall that Merleau-Ponty held that the 
primacy of being was a “brute”, “wild being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 168 & 200). This suggests 
that the concept of the flesh is primal. It points to the fact that being is fundamentally bodily 
and corporeal (fleshy). The flesh is where the living being ‘encroaches’ upon the physical 
world that surrounds it and vice versa. Merleau-Ponty may have been referring to human bodies 
in this description of wild-being but it is obvious his concept of the flesh includes all (other) 
animals from dung beetles to elephants. As discussed in previous chapters, phenomenology is 
essentially about spatially and temporally embodied living beings perceiving the world around 
them in relation to their own activities and goals within this environment. Perception is made 
possible by there being living bodies that occupy distinct places at particular times, “bodies 
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endowed with a mobility that reflects their needs and desires” (Wood, 2001: 1). Perception is 
inextricably linked to every living creature’s perceptive, carnal embodiment in the world – in 
them having eyes, ears, paws, radar senses (as in bats), electroreceptors (as in sharks), muscles 
and other bodily components that give them mobility and functionality (or rather intentionality) 
in various dimensions within their surrounding natural environment. That embodiment 
manifests also in more complex, invisible ways, as in all animals having various desires and 
needs that shape and direct perception to include what they can do in that environment, which 
“could be said to constitute perception, rather than qualify it” (Wood, 2001: 2).  
 
All these embodied natural dimensions are characterized by the ontological characteristic of 
‘being-wild’. For all animals, even domesticated and human ones, the involvement in the world 
is one of ‘wildness’. Lawrence J. Cookson, in A Definition for Wildness, writes: 
 
In relation to wildness, an organism's internal quality is improved through the 
parsimonious arrangement and coordination of one's adaptations and internal 
drivers, while its external quality is achieved through attunement with one's 
surroundings. With wildness, an organism gains internal clarity, thereby presenting 
a consistent face or purpose to which other organisms can adapt (Cookson, 2011: 
online). 
 
‘Wildness’ then refers to an animal’s constitutive interconnection (‘attunement with’) to the 
natural world that they rely on for their survival and which forms the material basis for all their 
projects. Their lives (and ours) are shaped and conditioned by the earthly elements, and in turn 
help to shape them (‘presenting a consistent face … to which other organisms can adapt’). 
These include the air all living beings breathe, the water they drink, the soil that produces food, 
it is the planet’s specific distance from the sun, the spin of the earth that create the ocean 
currents which determine weather patterns such as wind and rainfall. These, in turn, support 
forests, savannahs and other natural environments that, in their pursuit of their own well-being 
and flourishing, are themselves elements essential for the continuation of all life on earth. 
Henry David Thoreau wrote the famous phrase, “In wildness is the preservation of the world” 
(Thoreau, 1906: Vol. 5. 205). In this sense, the flesh of the brute, carnal wild world that 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of is what enables and shapes, that carries, all our fleshy existence 
including both animal and human being.  
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But the process reverses. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm of the flesh – the intertwining 
and cross-reversibility - implies that the natural environment relies on wild animals’ 
participation with it. I will show in this chapter, following Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm 
(the “sensible sentient”) how wolves, birds, elephants and mosquitoes, as just some examples 
of millions, determine the shape and life of the natural environment and how the natural 
environment in turn shapes them and the other life forms in the same place. It is a perfect 
example of a chiasmic reversal of bodies that Merleau-Ponty speaks of.  
 
This new understanding of the world is made possible by there being living bodies that occupy 
distinct places at particular times, bodies endowed with a mobility that reflects their needs and 
desires. “These,” according to David Wood’s assessment of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
“are not just natural facts about the world, but fundamental dimensions of the world, 
dimensions that structure the very possibility of there being facts at all” (Wood, 2001: 1). For 
Wood, Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology is essentially “the pursuit of the 
relationalities of worldly engagement, both human and those of other creatures” (Wood, 2001: 
3). In this sense, the application of phenomenology to the natural environment starts to become 
an eco-phenomenology, a concept that points toward a radically new approach to wildlife 
conservation.  
 
Importantly, the new ‘world’ or ontology revealed by an eco-phenomenological approach, 
shows how much of a reduction and distortion is involved in taking living bodies as 
determinate, atomistic objects  operating like coded automata in an objective, static and 
physical setting. Instead, living bodies should be understood  as inextricable, intertwined 
members of a complex, chiasmic, fluctuating, open-ended ecosystem, the latter being a 
phenomenon that has been referred to variously in this dissertation as the ‘wilderness’, ‘nature’ 
or the ‘biosphere’.  
 
Under the construct of anthropocentrism, as we saw in the opening chapters, humans have 
rejected ‘wildness’ and their own ‘animality’ by producing a dichotomy where wildness and 
animality is an external, inferior and opposite ‘otherness’ or a least an insignificance to be 
transcended by human existence, development and progression. Yet, it is wildness and 
animality that create and sustain all life forms, including the human condition in the world . I 
shall demonstrate how humans, despite the modern insistence on a Cartesian detachment, 
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remain inseparable as animals from the wild environment and will argue that this is a key 
insight into bringing about the kind of world-view and world that flows from an eco-
phenomenological appreciation of life. It is clear that no matter how much we try to ignore 
animality within ourselves or even destroy wildness in other animals as we have seen with 
game farming in South Africa in Chapters One and Two, humans can never escape its necessity 
for our own animal existence and well-being. Poet laureate and environmentalist, Gary Snyder, 
points out that at a fundamental level ‘being human’ means ‘being wild’ since we are a wild 
species in our bodily existence – in breathing, eating, procreation and breeding (Snyder, 1990: 
15). Following a Merleau-Pontian concept of embodiment, Snyder states our bodies themselves 
are wholly wild in how we feed off, and contribute bodily to, our wild environment. This occurs 
in a myriad of daily interactions:  
 
The involuntary quick turn of the head at a shout, the vertigo of looking off a 
precipice, the heart-in-the-throat in a moment of danger, the catch of a breath, the 
quiet moments relaxing, staring, reflecting (Snyder, 1990: 17). 
 
These actions are not products of a modern society but of a time when we were truly wild 
human animals. Wildness remains with and in us, and in domestic animals as well. It is, says 
Snyder, the norm, not the exception and has always been part of the basic human experience 
(Snyder, 1990: 7). These insights need to be taken on board for an eco-phenomenological world 
to flourish.  
 
2. Nature as flesh 
 
Merleau-Ponty recognised a deep affinity between his notion of the ‘flesh’ and the natural 
environment (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 274). In his last published working note (added to the end 
of The Visible and the Invisible), written in March 1961, he writes: "Nature as the other side of 
humanity (as flesh, nowise as 'matter')" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 274). Nature or the natural 
environment is not the static, objective world of Descartes, not the inert and passive, dead 
matter of his mechanistic universe, but something inherently  alive, living and dynamic. The 
‘flesh’ that Merleau-Ponty speaks of both in the visible and invisible sense as discussed in the 
previous chapter is the elemental point where our humanity connects with nature in terms of 
our spatial positioning and temporal communication within our surrounding environment. I 
will explain in more detail as this section develops. 
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Although French and writing in French, Merleau-Ponty frequently used the German term 
‘Umwelt’ throughout his later writings and lecture courses. For example, one of Merleau-
Ponty’s working notes on the concept of nature states: “the body is not just a thing, but relation 
to an Umwelt.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1994: 270) Loosely translated, ‘Umwelt’ is German for 
environment or surroundings. Merleau-Ponty uses it in this sense as well as the sense as derived 
from biologist, Jakob von Uexküll, who added that ‘Umwelt’ is a biological foundation that 
lies at the very epicenter of the study of both communication and signification in the human 
and (other) animal (Uexküll, 2010: 12). In his theoretical development, Merleau-Ponty picks 
up on Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt when he begins to look to the natural sciences – especially 
those pertaining to the relations between  living organisms and their environment – to develop 
and expand his ideas on the interconnectedness of humans with their surroundings.  
 
Uexküll’s fieldwork was critical for placing Merleau-Ponty’s “research on an onto-
phenomenological path” (Umbelino, 2013: 352) because the concept of Umwelt encapsulates 
the fact that to be-in-the-world, the animal body is not just a measurable point in space, but a 
participatory entity embedded, shaped by and responding to its natural surroundings. Uexküll’s 
study of the behavior of wild animals within and with their own Umwelt is what Merleau-Ponty 
drew upon to establish his own ideas of the flesh and the relationship between the human body 
and the surrounding environment (Umbelino, 2013: 352). What we find here then, is that 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological investigations were built on the bedrock of the practical 
experiences of observing wild life-forms in their natural settings as recorded by Uexküll. 
 
In his seminal work A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (first published in 1934), 
Uexküll demonstrates that a genuine reciprocity takes place between living organisms and their 
environment. One of the strengths of Uexküll’s argument is that he  describes here the so-called 
‘lesser’ organisms that include ticks and sea urchins, which means the insuperable line (to use 
Bentham’s term) dividing those within and without the Club of Consideranda has been 
breached right from the start. For Uexküll, the way of being of any organism, from tick to tiger, 
is that of a continuously changing chiasmic relationship within its Umwelt. In other words, 
Uexküll argued that the living organism, every living organism, through its participation, 
unfolds an Umwelt; which in turn unfolds the whole of the organism (Uexküll, 2010: 10). In 
this sense, organism and Umwelt share a dynamic inseparable relationship by which living 
body and material surrounding interact with each other in a chiasmic way. Writing in the 
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Introduction of the  English version of Uexküll’s book (2010), Dorian Sagan sums up 
Uexküll’s primary conviction: 
 
Life is not just about matter and how it immediately interacts with itself but also 
how that matter interacts with interconnected systems that include organisms in 
their separately perceiving worlds – worlds that are necessarily incomplete, even 
for scientists and philosophers, who like their objects of study form only a tiny part 
of the giant, perhaps infinite universe they observe (Uexküll, 2010: 1). 
 
Essentially, what Uexküll is speaking of is the importance of analysing the multitude of living 
organisms that interconnect with each other and the physical environment and not each 
individual as a stand-alone entity. Unlike many ecologists, Uexküll concentrated his studies on 
the differences of wild animals’ perceptual worlds, rather than simply their functional 
attributes or the sum of their organic parts as we find in a ‘normal’ Linnean one. He thus by 
implication studies the life-worlds of non-human animals from a kind of phenomenological, 
i.e. subject-centred viewpoint. Using countless examples from his fieldwork, Uexküll is able 
to demonstrate throughout his book that animals’ and organisms’ perceptions, communications 
and behaviors are part of their purposeful action in the world, a characteristic that is thus not 
limited to humans (Uexküll, 2010: 3). Animals are not machine-like and robotic. Even 
Darwinian natural selection is unable to explain the orientation of present behaviors in wild 
animals toward a future end, for example, a squirrel burying a stash of nuts enough to see her 
through the harsh winter. For Uexküll, the Umwelt is not the environment objectified as 
physical substance, as a Cartesian or Linnean model would have it, but the surroundings of a 
living being, the world of significance as experienced by that being with its particular physical 
structure, needs and interests. 
 
Uexküll’s endeavor is undoubtedly phenomenological in that he describes wild beings not as 
stand-alone entities, but as organisms bound up in their dynamic surroundings. Uexküll begins 
his book (which he describes as a travelogue) by inviting the reader on “a stroll on a sunny day 
before a flowering meadow in which insects buzz and butterflies flutter” (Uexküll, 2010: 43). 
He then asks if we can imagine making a bubble around each of the animals living in the 
meadow:  
 
 159 
The bubble represents each animal’s environment and contains all the features 
available to the subject. As soon as we enter into one such bubble, the previous 
surroundings of the subject are completely reconfigured. Many qualities of the 
colourful meadow vanish completely, others lose their coherence with one another, 
and new connections are created. A new world arises in each bubble (Uexküll, 
2010: 43).  
 
For Uexküll, each and every living thing is a ‘subject’ that lives in its own world, of which it 
is the centre of perception which shapes the Umwelt into a meaningful whole, discerning for 
instance food, threats and opportunities. But rather than bracket the subject from its world as 
Husserl would have, Uexküll’s understanding is more in line with the early Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘body-subject’ which, as we have seen, would later evolve into the concept of the flesh. Uexküll 
points out that the bubble or Umwelt is never neutral, universal, or incidental, but is specific to 
each species, and even to each animal in a kaleidoscope of fluctuating changes. What shines 
forth in one Umwelt for one animal might fade into the background for another, depending on 
the subject’s mood, perceptual infrastructure and current purpose or intention. Each animal, 
therefore, co-constitutes its Umwelt through its physiognomy, stance, interests, experiential 
memory, and so on. The point is this biological existence cannot simply be described as a sum 
of its non-organic parts, as natural science tends to do, but has to be described as an active, 
open-ended, entwined part of a variety of disparate lives co-existing and co-participating in a 
biodiverse life system. Living beings, therefore, cannot be reduced to instrumental entities 
existing purely for human benefit and gratification but instead should be viewed as living and 
dynamically acting centres of interest.  They cannot be viewed as existing separately but are 
always  an interactive part of a large fluctuating elemental whole.  
 
Let us take for example, the description of a rhinoceros. Her lived world lies in the integration 
of her dynamic orientation towards the totality of her wild environment rather than separated 
from it. Such a distorted separation is clearly visible in the ‘objective’ description  below: 
 
Members of the rhinoceros family are some of the largest remaining megafauna, with all 
species able to reach or exceed one ton in weight. They have an herbivorous diet, small 
brains (400–600 g) for mammals of their size, one or two horns, and a thick (1.5–5 cm) 
protective skin formed from layers of collagen positioned in a lattice structure. They 
generally eat leafy material, although their ability to ferment food in their hindgut allows 
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them to subsist on more fibrous plant matter when necessary. Unlike 
other perissodactyls, the two African species of rhinoceros lack teeth at the front of their 
mouths, relying instead on their lips to pluck food (Owen-Smith, 1984: 490-495). 
   
By listing the separate attributes of an animal, viewing her as an objective thing with a list of 
attributes, we tend to commodify a rhinoceros and endow her with only instrumental value. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, a reductionist instrumental valuation of a rhino reduces her to a 
set of commodifiable attributes based on human needs and wants as well as to a mere a statistic 
(preserving population numbers) that, instead of providing a way of meaningful survival, 
instrumental value is, in fact, contributing to the destruction of her species and the natural 
environment she finds herself in. We learn instead from Uexküll’s approach that there is a lot 
more involved in the life of a rhino. A rhinoceros, or any other living organism, is far much 
more than Owen-Smith’s lineal, static and atomistic description above. In the process of 
grazing or browsing for food, or rolling in the mud, a rhinoceros is not simply blindly 
rehearsing a set of pre-established, instinctual  behavioursbut is in fact ‘becoming animal’ (as 
dynamic and temporal) and being who she is – a participatory being evolving and becoming 
within and in response to her wild environment, which in turn is shaped by her behaviour.  
 
Merleau-Ponty builds on Uexküll’s ideas with his formulation of participation, which he calls 
intertwining. Toadvine notes that Merleau-Ponty emphasises three consequences from a body’s 
embeddedness not just with its surroundings, but with other beings: First, the body as sensible-
sentient is an ‘exemplar sensible’ that demonstrates the kinship or ontological continuity 
between all sensible-sentient beings, for example a rhinoceros and her calf . Toadvine argues 
that for Merleau-Ponty in order to be sentient, the body must be sensible (Toadvine, 2011: 
339). The rhinoceros mother discloses an ontological continuity or kinship between herself as 
sentient and her calf as sensible. It is a kinship that is disclosed by the moment where a touch 
crosses over from organ (skin) to object (calf) and back again. What is most significant about 
the example of the touch touching, for Merleau-Ponty, is the link between sentience and 
sensibility, which first opens the body onto the world. Second, the rhinoceros’ relationship is 
reversible, like “obverse and reverse” or “two segments of one sole circular course” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968: 182). Just like the example of the handshake in the previous chapter, the calf too 
is sentient and his mother sensible, a process which reverses continuously.  
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Third, the sentient and sensible never strictly coincide but are always separated by a gap or 
divergence or dehiscence that defers their unity (Toadvine, Spring 2019) and protects their 
distinctness. This last point may at first seem problematic as it harks back to subjecthood and 
distances the body from nature, but Merleau-Ponty recognises there is a slight border or line 
(écart) that separates the rhinoceros and her calf. This is not to say though that the rhinoceros 
is a subject in the Cartesian sense but rather a being participating in, through and with her calf 
in their natural surroundings – Toadvine calls this participation unity-in-difference (Toadvine, 
2011: 339). Toadvine states that this interrelationship is an “exchange between the body and 
things that justifies speaking of a ‘flesh’ of things, a kinship between the sensing body and 
sensed things that makes their communication possible” (Toadvine, Spring 2019). In The 
Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty denies that this is a projection of a Cartesian subject 
but, as mentioned at the start of this chapter, rather a “carnal being…a prototype of Being, of 
which our body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant…” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 
179) His concept of intertwining “embraces an intercorporeity, an anonymous sensibility 
shared out among distinct bodies: just as my two hands communicate across the lateral synergy 
of my body, I can touch the sensibility of another” (Toadvine, Spring 2019). 
 
When a lion roars at night, he is not simply uttering a sound, but is inhabiting what we might 
call from our (limited human) perspective a language where he expresses his (unique relation 
to the) world that he experiences in a way we humans – following Nagel (1974) again – cannot 
begin to fathom or explain with our human perception, comprehension or objective 
observation. In short, Merleau-Ponty, drawing inspiration from Uexküll, teaches us that any 
living being’s world is filled with multitudinous colors, sounds, tastes, textures, attractions, 
threats and meanings that we human observers do not have full access to, just as we cannot 
grasp what sense Derrida’s cat makes when she sees his naked body. Elephants have acute 
senses of smell that inform their perception of their surroundings in a way humans cannot 
experience; painted dogs have a far more advanced hearing ability that informs their world, 
and bees see ultraviolet light rays. We can only imagine the richness and diversity, and the 
‘otherness’ of the environment that these other living bodies experience. Recall Uexküll saying 
‘A new world arises in each bubble’ as quoted above. Even within the ‘same’ space, each 
different animal will configure the surroundings differently from the rest.  
 
But what if we were to remove a body from its natural lived experience, like taking a wild 
animal out of the wild? Animal philosopher, Zipporah Weisberg, states that an animal removed 
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from her wild environment and placed into a new kind of phenomenological relationship that 
undermines the fulfillment of her functionality, is done a great injustice (Weisberg, 2015). 
Weisberg’s point here is the evolution and functionality of animals have always occurred 
within their wild environment. It is the wild environment that has shaped the animal. Being, as 
Merleau-Ponty stated, is a carnal, wild being. By taking the animal out of the wild, one is in 
essence taking away something fundamental to her being. Recall Merleau-Ponty saying, “the 
body is not just a thing, but relation to an Umwelt.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1994: 270) The wildness 
of an animal is thus not an inherent trait of its body as viewed in isolation, thing-like, but rather 
a very specific function or dimension of its constitutive relation to its Umwelt. Because the 
animal understands its life projects as they arise out of or are made possible by, the way their 
body is intertwined with, and operates in the familiar world, when the familiar world is 
removed, the animal loses their established bodily ‘I can’s’ and thus the fundamental meanings 
they discern in the world.  
 
• Being-elephant 
 
As a concrete example of such an injustice, we might think of a baby elephant violently 
removed from his wild herd in Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe and sold to a safari park 
or zoo in China. This is a genuine practice that has been carried out over the past five years by 
the Zimbabwean National Parks Authority, ostensibly so that money accrued can go back into 
conservation to build waterholes and fences in Hwange, but in truth it is for the economic 
benefit of a few high-ranking government officials (Russo, 2014; Cruise & Russo, 2017; Russo 
& Cruise, 2018). The elephant, if he doesn’t die, will continue to have a relation with his new 
Umwelt, but the relationship is inevitably mysterious, hostile, impoverished, dysfunctional, 
and a source of great misery. This is because selves, including animal selves, are co-constituted 
by their open-ended embodied relationship to the wild surroundings they are involved in. The 
animal will be alienated from its environment and from other strange living creatures, as much 
as from its own bodily capacities whose former ‘fit’ or interrelatedness with the physical 
surroundings has now also been lost.   
 
As we saw in Chapter Two with the sustainable development or economic model, because it 
strictly adheres to an instrumental  value paradigm, it has no way of objecting  to the young 
elephant’s capture and translocation because it willfully ignores the critical phenomena of 
experience and expression within his natural, wild surroundings that provide the essential 
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elements of being-elephant. Elephants in the wild are highly social beings and form some of 
the strongest family bonds of all animal species including humans. On their reductionist view, 
the elephant is being preserved and merely transported. However, from the perspective opened 
up by Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty, what they translocate is a mere elephant phenotype – in 
elephant terms, this individual has lost something vital and essential and to its being and well-
being.   
 
It is undeniable, even to an unemotive objective description, that by removing the baby 
elephant from its  expressive, life-long bond with a wild environment and its living inhabitants, 
one is in fact removing his embodied ‘wild-world’ that makes this elephant an elephant, or a 
becoming-elephant. It is the chiasmic relationship with the wild that determines how the 
elephant as embodied functions and operates in his wild environment. Without the natural 
bonds of a wild herd and the myriad of wild activities that accompany the functionality of the 
herd, the vital principles that guide the development and functioning of elephants such as 
touching, communicating vocally, foraging, suckling, sparring, breaking branches off trees and 
chasing guinea-fowl, a baby elephant that finds himself alone in a concrete cell ceases largely 
to be elephant. Recall Cookson’s definition of wildness in section one of this chapter:   
 
In relation to wildness, an organism's internal quality is improved through the 
parsimonious arrangement and coordination of one's adaptations and internal 
drivers, while its external quality is achieved through attunement with one's 
surroundings. With wildness, an organism gains internal clarity, thereby presenting 
a consistent face or purpose to which other organisms can adapt (Cookson, 2011: 
online). 
 
‘Wildness’, we discussed, refers to the baby elephant’s constitutive interconnection to the 
primordial world that he relies on for his survival and well-being. In the Chinese zoo, he is still 
an elephant in external appearance but not the elephant as shaped by his natural surroundings. 
Over time, the enclosed surroundings of the zoo will begin to shape the elephant and his 
offspring into a new creature which may retain some physical attributes of the elephant but it 
will lose much of the ways of expression as informed by its relation to the wild of what it means 
to be-elephant. Inevitably, its existence must from its own perspective have been experienced 
as greatly depleted of meaning and purpose.  
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We can see how this ties into Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh. The baby elephant is not a 
separate sum of listed parts but a sensuous body that intertwines with and dynamically 
embraces his environment. The flesh – the elemental line between the elephant’s body and his 
natural world – is crucial to the development of his being in that the wild environment co-
constitutes what it means to be elephant. The constant and continuous intermingling with mud, 
grass, branches, the rain and sky, siblings, other beings and his family herd all play important 
roles in forming his ‘elephant-ness’. This is not simply about the presence of an elephant 
intertwining in his Umwelt in the moment, but rather a gradual process of becoming elephant. 
The flesh is about the evolution of that elephant, his growth and development in response to a 
certain environment or Umwelt over time, and about the intricacies of the hidden and often 
complex social bonds and intricate language structures he shares  with other elephants, which 
makes or his an inherently social and relational existence. Take all of that away, and the 
elephant’s existence becomes infinitely impoverished, depleted of meaning.  
 
Uexküll introduces another point. The ecologist sheds further light on how animals try to create 
meaningful worlds for themselves in his discussion of ‘objects’ in those animals’ worlds – both 
living and inanimate – as ‘carriers of meaning’. He explains that a ‘thing’, be it a branch of a 
tree or the young elephants’ playful sibling, becomes a carrier of meaning as soon as it enters 
into a relationship with the animal (Uexküll, 2010: 140), and every carrier of meaning in 
reverse becomes the complement of the animal (Uexküll, 2010: 146). Indeed, animals 
(including humans) never actually relate to ‘things’ and other beings per se, never relate to 
them as mere, brute objects, but instead only to them as carriers of meaning, which they always 
co-constitute (Uexküll, 2010: 140). For example, the powerful and deep flowing body of water 
of the Zambezi River does not appear in the baby elephant’s lived perception as a mere object. 
Rather, he responds to it in terms of meaning: as  either something that may pleasurably cool 
his body and slate his thirst; or as something threatening, an element that may drown him or 
one that hides hungry crocodiles from view.  
 
However, the baby elephant cooped up in a cage in a Chinese zoo far from his African 
savannah-world has to experience a series of life-shattering and identity-shattering changes. 
Each time in his relation to the surroundings he finds himself in, he has to confront new and 
unfamiliar carriers of meaning, initially likely devoid of meaning or sense – in the truck, the 
airplane, the cold concrete, the human hurting him with a bull-hook. These carriers take him  
further and further away  from his true being or his evolutionary developed Umwelt, a wild 
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environment that has shaped what it means to be and become elephant. By the time the elephant 
reaches his enclosure in China, the objects around him are likely to carry  even less meaning 
for the elephant. If he survives, he becomes a shell of both his former and his potential self, 
since he ceases functioning as an elephant. He exists in form alone, or in a form that is not 
elephant-like because he does not live in his wild world.  
 
Uexküll’s characterization of animals as embodied purveyors of meaning accords ostensibly 
mundane or instinctual activities such as foraging for and consuming food, rolling in the mud, 
and frolicking, with a kind of existential depth – that brute wild carnal being of depth, shared 
also by  the waves and forests that Merleau-Ponty speaks of (as mentioned in Chapter Four). 
These dimensions of ‘animal’ life is something that sustainable utility practices completely 
ignore. In the quest for preserving animals for the sake of numbers, there is no or little 
consideration for the dynamic, relational embodiment of the juvenile elephant in his wild world 
among members of his social group, or for his way of being in the world and of becoming-
elephant.  
 
As we can see, Uexküll’s study, despite his insistence on an animal-subject similar to that of 
the body-subject in the early Merleau-Ponty, resonates closely with Merleau-Ponty’s later 
phenomenology in that it detaches itself from the reductionist subject perspective and provides 
an analysis from the perspective of the wild animal in his or her wild Umwelt. From this 
perspective, the animal self or subject is only itself in relation and in dynamic interaction with 
its Umwelt. This brings us back to Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm of the flesh – the point where the 
elephant-body and the surrounding world intermesh. The being and becoming of elephant “is 
not matter, is not mind, is not substance…it is midway between the spatio-temporal individual 
and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a 
fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of Being. Not a fact or a sum of facts” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139-40). 
 
The element of being is a function of the ‘flesh’ which both differentiates the living body of 
the elephant from his Umwelt and at the same time connects the elephant inextricably and 
constitutively to that same  Umwelt.  It is the very midway between the elephant and the world, 
which simultaneously allows for the elephant and his Umwelt to appear as such. The term 
‘chiasm’, applied here, refers to this more general ‘encroachment’ or crossing over between 
the two irreducible aspects of the body: the body in and being in, touching and being touched, 
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seeing and seen. The distinction within the body between  the sensible and sentient aspects has 
a parallel in every being, namely the dehiscence into visible (sensible) and invisible 
(meaningful) dimensions. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty sees the body as a prime exemplar of 
the nature of the sensible, material world as a whole. 
 
3. Language of being 
 
In the last paragraph of his final completed chapter The Intertwining – The Chiasm, Merleau-
Ponty wrote that the language of Being “is the voice of the things, the waves and forests” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 155). One could argue that the voice of things – the world or Umwelt – 
is what Merleau-Ponty meant as the ‘wild world’ or ‘wilderness’ or ‘biosphere’ – the world 
that encompasses a vast, interpenetrating web of perceptions and sensations of countless wild 
beings supported by meadows, streams, oceans and the icy mountain wind. This language goes 
beyond mere sounds or utterances but includes bodily expression and human languages too. 
 
As any ecologist will tell you, the biosphere is an ecosystem composed of living organisms and 
the inorganic factors from which they derive energy and nutrients. In typically linear scientific 
language biologists describe the biosphere thus: 
 
All life on Earth depends ultimately upon green plants, as well as upon water. 
Plants utilize sunlight in a process called photosynthesis to produce the food upon 
which animals feed and to provide, as a by-product, oxygen, which most animals 
require for respiration. At first, the oceans and the lands were teeming with large 
numbers of a few kinds of simple single-celled organisms, but slowly plants and 
animals of increasing complexity evolved. Interrelationships developed so that 
certain plants grew in association with certain other plants, and animals associated 
with the plants and with one another to form communities of organisms, including 
those of forests, grasslands, deserts, dunes, bogs, rivers, and lakes. Living 
communities and their nonliving environment are inseparably interrelated and 
constantly interact upon each other (Thompson et al., 24th September 2018: online). 
 
The description above, while it reads in typically linear fashion, later on starts to speak a little 
more of a flowing nature of the life-world: “In a stand of pines, there may be many species of 
insects, of birds, of mammals, each a separate breeding unit but each dependent on the others 
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for its continued existence.” The interconnectedness in the rigidly objective description is 
palpable and so is the description of a flow of movement: “the biosphere includes the cascade 
of energy, nutrients, water, and gases” and “micro-organisms that break down the remains of 
plants and animals into simpler components for recycling in the biosphere.” This once again 
emphasises that describing the natural environment cannot be done accurately by listing a sum 
of the parts without drawing on the fluctuating, dynamic phenomenological aspects of the life-
world.  
 
I will, in this section, break down the argument into sub-sections to demonstrate how this 
language of being develops. In sub-section 3.1 (The Call of the Wild), I will introduce Aldo 
Leopold’s notion of thinking like a mountain to show just how important the interconnection 
of the wild environment is to shaping expression and communication both with humans and 
wild animals, and vice versa. Sub-section 3.2 (All for One and One for All) emphasises that all 
bodies in the environment are equally important in shaping that environment. In sub-section 
3.3 (Poetic Ecology), I will show how phenomenology begins to change the language of 
objective science to enhance the description of wild animals and the wild environment and in 
the final sub-section (Merleau-Ponty’s Language of Being) I explore Merleau-Ponty’s own 
concept of language. 
 
3.1. The call of the wild 
 
Aldo Leopold, while most likely unfamiliar with philosophical theories such as 
phenomenology, provides one of the most elucidating actual phenomenological accounts of 
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the language of being. He calls it ‘thinking like a mountain’ 
and it is a good example of how the dynamic environment entices a living body – be it a wolf, 
a deer, or a coyote – to respond to its ways: 
 
A deep chesty bawl echoes from rimrock to rimrock, rolls down the mountain, and 
fades into the far blackness of the night. It is an outburst of wild defiant sorrow, of 
contempt for all the adversaries of the world. Every living thing (and perhaps many 
a dead one as well) pays heed to that call. To the deer it is a reminder of the way 
of all flesh, to the pine a forecast of midnight scuffles and of blood upon the snow, 
to the coyote a promise of gleanings to come, to the cowman a threat of red ink at 
the bank, to the hunter a challenge of fang against bullet. Yet behind these obvious 
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and immediate hopes and fears there lies a deeper meaning, known only to the 
mountain itself. Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to 
the howl of a wolf. Those unable to decipher the hidden meaning know 
nevertheless that it is there, for it is felt in all wolf country, and distinguishes that 
country from all other land. It tingles in the spine of all who hear wolves by night, 
or who scan their tracks by day. Even without sight or sound of wolf, it is implicit 
in a hundred small events: the midnight whinny of a pack horse, the rattle of rolling 
rocks, the bound of a fleeing deer, the way shadows lie under the spruces. Only the 
ineducable tyro can fail to sense the presence or absence of wolves, or the fact that 
mountains have a secret opinion about them (Leopold, 1970: 137-138).  
 
This description of the natural environment goes beyond just mere descriptions from sight and 
sound. The first is the notion of extended time (the mountain has lived long enough). Again, 
this points back to Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm of the flesh. The mountain relates to all that dwell 
on her slopes. The invisible bond and the interaction with the living bodies are co-constituted 
by the mountain. It is almost as if the inanimate mountain takes on a living form. This is 
something an objective account never expresses. This extract does not describe the wild 
environment as a static entity but rather as one that moves and flows (rolling rocks and fleeing 
deer). More specifically, Leopold’s description of wolves in the depths of the wilderness is far 
more open and multi-dimensional than that of the strictly empirical or linear one in that he 
describes ambiguities like mountains having a secret opinion about wolves, an ambiguity that 
an objective description discards as irrelevant. This kind of language describes Merleau-
Ponty’s chiasmic relationship between the mountain and the wild animals that dwell on its 
slopes. Leopold’s continued description of wolves highlights the point further. 
 
• Wolves 
 
Aldo Leopold, writing this account in 1949, was reflecting back on an experience he had had 
in 1909 when he was leading a crew for the newly formed United States Forest Service that 
was carrying out an inventory in Arizona and New Mexico. On one day: 
 
we were eating lunch on a high rimrock, at the foot of which a turbulent river 
elbowed its way. We saw what we thought was a doe fording the torrent, her breast 
awash in white water. When she climbed the bank toward us and shook out her tail, 
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we realized our error: it was a wolf. A half-dozen others, evidently grown pups, 
sprang from the willows and all joined in a welcoming mêlée of wagging tails and 
playful maulings. What was literally a pile of wolves writhed and tumbled in the 
center of an open flat at the foot of our rimrock. In those days we had never heard 
of passing up a chance to kill a wolf. In a second we were pumping lead into the 
pack, but with more excitement than accuracy: how to aim a steep downhill shot is 
always confusing. When our rifles were empty, the old wolf was down, and a pup 
was dragging a leg into impassable slide-rocks. We reached the old wolf in time to 
watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes. I realized then, and have known ever 
since, that there was something new to me in those eyes – something known only 
to her and the mountain (Leopold, 1970: 138). 
 
Like Derrida, and Levinas to some extent, Leopold acknowledges the gaze / face of the wolf, 
specifically the acknowledgement that the wolf was trying to make some sense of him through 
her eyes as much as Leopold was trying to understand the wolf trying to understand him. Yet 
again, we see the sentient-sensible reversal play out between the gazer and the gazed upon – 
hunter at wolf, wolf at hunter.  
 
With Leopold, the gaze occurs in a far more encompassing Merleau-Pontian sense, however 
because what Leopold is discovering is not just a bi-dimensional encounter between hunter and 
hunted, but a sensation through the dying eyes of the wolf of seeing something bigger, more 
comprehensive and longer lasting. This ‘something’ in the gaze changed his outlook on the 
world forever because it spoke to him of a larger world to which some form of obligation, 
deference or respect was owed. The specific experience “rooted for Leopold a budding 
recognition of the living quality of the earth as a whole” which prompted him out of a dogmatic 
slumber and from then on he  “strove to give voice to a depth of nature that transcends the 
grasp of the kind of scientific ecology in which he was steeped” (Holredge, 2016: 15). At the 
time that he killed that wolf – young “and full of trigger-itch” – the prevailing consensus among 
conservationists (and which sadly remains the utilitarian thinking among many private game 
ranchers and conservationists to this day) was that “fewer wolves meant more deer, that no 
wolves would mean hunters' paradise” (Leopold, 1970: 138). Leopold sensed that “neither the 
wolf, nor the mountain agreed with such a view.” We have not learned to think like a mountain, 
he wrote (Leopold, 1970: 139). What he meant was that the conservation policy of humans 
meddling in nature in this way was wrong, and that we had to start looking not only at the way 
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we perceive, but also, following Uexküll’s studies of animals, at the way we think nature itself 
perceives our interferences. In the subsequent years, Leopold watched “state after state 
extirpate its wolves”. Then he watched the wolf-less mountains “wrinkle with a maze of new 
deer trails” with “every edible bush and seedling browsed, first to an anemic desuetude, and 
then to death.” The trees became defoliated and finally, the denuded, dusty slopes of the 
mountain could no longer support the deer and they too disappeared “dead of their own too-
much” (Leopold, 1970: 139). Hence, lamented Leopold, “we now have dustbowls, and rivers 
washing the future into the sea” (Leopold, 1970: 140). This is the long-term picture of 
devastation to which the long-living mountain had access, of which it had a secret knowledge.  
 
In fact, the extirpation of wolves had a far greater impact on the mountain than even Leopold 
could have imagined. The insistence of looking at the entire chiasmic nature of the life-world, 
both animate and inanimate, rather than a list of determinate objects, revealed what 
environmental writer, George Monbiot, has described as “one of the most exciting scientific 
findings over the past half-century” (Monbiot, 2017: YouTube). What was discovered, as 
Merleau-Ponty had described, was the chiasmic cross-reversibility between living beings and 
the environment. I showed how the wild environment shapes what it means to be and become 
a rhinoceros or an elephant, but here with the case of wolves, it is they that shape the wild 
environment too. 
 
What Monbiot refers to as a ‘trophic cascade’ (Monbiot, 2017: YouTube) might also be 
interpreted through Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘chiasm’. It was this phenomenon that occurred 
after the reintroduction of wolves into the Yellowstone National Park in the United States in 
1995. It was the first time the area had seen wolves since they had been extirpated by the ilk of 
the young Leopold seventy years prior. A trophic cascade is an ecological process which starts 
at the top of the food-chain and cascades all the way down to the bottom (Monbiot, 2017: 
YouTube). Wolves are the apex predator at the top of the food-chain (as the young Leopold 
was acutely aware in 1909) with deer somewhat down toward the bottom, just above plants. 
The interesting point is the cascade is not a linear downward movement but something far more 
mutual and intertwined. What the young Leopold became aware of as he got older was that 
wolves don’t just kill some species like deer, they in fact give life to many more other species 
thanks to the chiasmic interconnectedness of all animals within their Umwelt. Here is the story 
of the wolves of Yellowstone National Park: 
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Before the wolves were introduced, there was (just as Leopold had noticed) an overpopulation 
of deer and elk within the park that, despite human attempts to cull the numbers, had reduced 
much of the vegetation to almost nothing. However, as soon as the wolves were introduced, 
even though few in number, “they began to have some of the most remarkable effects” 
(Monbiot, 2017: YouTube). First, the wolves killed some of the deer and elk, which in turn 
provided an opportunity for an increase of new growth in various plants from grasses to trees. 
The latter had been indiscriminately browsed by the elk, who now avoided the thickets where 
they could be easily surprised by wolves. The herds also avoided the open areas such as the 
valley floors and gorges where they could likewise be seen and then trapped by the wolves. 
The change in behavior of the deer and elk radically altered the vegetation. Forests and thickets 
regenerated everywhere as a result of the herbivores avoiding these areas. The return of the 
trees, in turn, brought an influx of birds – the numbers of song and migratory birds increased 
greatly – as well as did beavers who rely on trees for their own survival. Beavers are ecosystem 
engineers, their dams create habitats for other species like otters, muskrats, ducks, fish, 
amphibians and reptiles, all of whom made a comeback. The wolves also thinned out the coyote 
population and as a result of that, the number of rabbits and mice increased which, in turn, 
meant more hawks, weasels, foxes and badgers. Ravens and bald eagles arrived to feed on the 
carrion of the carcasses left behind by the wolves. The numbers of bears increased too, partly 
from the increased carrion and partly because of a proliferation of berries from the new trees 
and shrubs.   
 
In a typical Merleau-Pontian chiasm of the flesh, this shows how important and formative 
wolves are to the wild environment as much as the wild environment is important to them. But 
the chiasm goes much further. Leopold could never have known (although probably could 
imagine) that the reintroduction of wolves had an even more profound impact, even beyond a 
living ecological one. The wolves had an influence on the behavior of the inanimate world too, 
most significantly the rivers. Due to the increase of vegetation on the riverbanks and a 
regeneration of beaver numbers, the rivers became more stabilized. They began to meander 
less, there was less erosion from the banks, channels narrowed and more pools formed thus 
further creating a better environment for the myriad of thriving species in and around the rivers. 
The renewed growth of grasslands on the valley floors and trees on the mountainsides also 
prevented soil erosion, which had been widespread before the reintroduction of wolves 
(Monbiot, 2017: YouTube). The wolves, therefore, not only transformed the living ecosystem 
of the Yellowstone National Park but also its physical geography. The process of gradual 
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decline foreseen by the mountain in Leopold’s description, could be reversed to a large extent, 
by reintroducing the wolf, whose disappearance had been mourned by the mountain. 
 
Overall, the entire health of the park improved drastically, all thanks to a few wolves being 
reintroduced back into the life-world. This is what Leopold meant by thinking like a mountain, 
which is holistical and long-term, and highlights something that a study in Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology points to, namely conserving wild animals is not simply to preserve atomistic 
numbers of some species (the deer) from others (the wolves) for anthropocentric gratification 
(hunting). The wolf is no longer only a predator to be killed for ultimate human benefit. It is 
also not simply part of a chiasmic relationship with other living beings and the natural 
environment in both living and non-living forms. It is the wild presence of being in the wild 
landscape that makes itself known through all the wild, purposeful interactions between 
wolves, deer, ravens, beavers, fish, trees, water, soil and the mountain.  
 
3.2. All for one and one for all 
 
African elephants operate in the biosphere in a similar manner to wolves. Biologists often refer 
to African elephants as ecosystem ‘architects’ and ‘gardeners’ (Selier et al., 2016: 6). They 
break branches off trees, sometimes the entire tree itself, that then creates microhabitats for 
seedlings and small vertebrates, like dwarf mongooses and invertebrate animals like butterflies. 
Elephant dung is a food source for dung beetles and a variety of birds like the spurfowl and 
quails, which in turn nourish the soil and provide a seed dispersal mechanism for many tree 
and plant species. Other bird species such as the ground hornbill and the pearl-spotted owlet 
rely on elephants to create nesting sites in hollows of the old dead trees knocked over by them. 
In the dry months, elephants dig holes in the dry riverbeds to access water, which is then 
available to all other water-dependent species. Their large size creates pathways through the 
thickets for other smaller species like impala to follow and even for humans when hiking 
through the African bush. Through their feeding habits they make browse available for other 
browsers, they maintain structure in savannahs by reducing the tree to grass ratio and create 
nutrient rich microclimates underneath dead trees. Overall their effect is to increase and help 
support biodiversity, from mites to mammals (Selier et al., 2016: 6). Again, this highlights how 
important species like elephants are for shaping the natural environment and vice versa – an 
elephant ‘elephant’ most eloquently and wildly if it can engage in all these activities in its 
preferred habitat or Umwelt. 
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The African elephant, like the wolf, is also an ‘umbrella species’ in that it requires large areas 
of suitable habitat to maintain viable populations that support an array of associated species 
(Carignan & Villard 2002 in Selier et al., 2016: 6). Elephants have vast ranges and require large 
intact areas to maintain their populations. Selier et al. state that by creating such vast areas in 
which we protect elephants, “we ultimately protect many other species that share their habitat 
with elephants” (Selier et al., 2016: 6). However, in South Africa, the high level of fencing, 
especially in the many smaller private reserves, as well as natural resource manipulation, such 
as the provisioning of perennial artificial water supplies (which are evident even in the largest 
of the national parks), impacts negatively on the movement patterns and consequently on the 
intensity of the wild habitat used by elephants. This leads directly to wilderness degradation. 
Wild habitat degradation in small fenced reserves, in conjunction with severe droughts, 
negatively affects elephants and other animals in the area. Within South Africa, there are only 
two elephant subpopulations that can move naturally as fences restrict movements elsewhere35 
(Selier et al., 2016: 9). 
 
Yet, it is not only the charismatic megafauna that should be viewed in this chiasmic light. I 
have briefly mentioned dung beetles. They are as important as elephants in dispersing and 
breaking down the tons of dung dropped by all animals, not just elephants. The great forests 
and savannahs of Africa are fertilised by legions of dung beetles rolling, dispersing and burying 
dung. The rolling also scatters the seeds necessary for growth and rejuvenation of vegetation. 
Take the lowly dung beetle out of the ecosystem and we will likely see the whole system 
collapse. Leopold himself uses the example of birds in a similar way, beginning with the ruffed 
grouse:  
 
Everybody knows, for example, that the autumn landscape in the north woods is 
the land, plus a red maple, plus a ruffed grouse. In terms of conventional physics, 
the grouse represents only a millionth of either the mass or the energy of an acre. 
Yet subtract the grouse and the whole thing is dead (Leopold, 1970: 146). 
  
 
35 These are elephants in the Great Kruger Park area who can move between South Africa. Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique; and elephants in northern Kwa-Zulu Natal who range freely in a narrow corridor between South 
African and southern Mozambique. 
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Leopold speaks here of a ‘motive power’ (Leopold, 1970: 146). He states that “the beauty of 
the world lies not in the particular loveliness of the grouse itself, but in the unity of the life 
force of which it is an essential part” (Leopold, 1970: 146). ‘Motive power’ is the dynamic 
pulsating force of the chiasmic relationship between the bodily expressions of an animal 
shaping its natural environment and vice versa over time. Similar to the movement within a 
trophic cascade, ‘motive power’ means that the enduring living presence of a species triggers 
a domino-like movement into the larger whole of the wild landscape in that the landscape 
functions as a whole thanks to the actions of that animal. Whether it is American north woods, 
the wolf of the mountains, “the blue jay of the hickory groves, the whiskey jack of the muskegs, 
the piñonero of juniper foothills” (Leopold, 1970: 146-147) or countless other unseen and 
unheard of creatures, they are constantly  shaping and being shaped by the wild environment 
that they inhabit. Of these activities of wild animals, is the importance of the passage of time 
as David Wood writes:  
 
On the basis of our experience of time and the temporality of our experience, we 
grasp the continuous identities of things, the coordination of their pulsing rhythms, 
and many virtual and imaginative ways in which even in the instant we enter a 
connectedness that transcends the moment (Wood, 2001: 4). 
 
By thinking of time “as a series of discrete now-points, or simply ‘life in the present’, relational 
complexity is dead” (Wood, 2001: 3). It is the invisible part of time – the past and future – of 
how a being, such as an elephant or wolf, moves through the process of becoming and being 
in their wild surroundings that have long-term ramifications for the wild environment. The 
presence and the presently visible hides what is at stake in the longer run, as Leopold has also 
shown. For example, the presence of an elephant knocking over a tree hides the fact that the 
fallen tree will shape and create a new world in time, not just for the future of elephants, but 
for all the grazers, browsers, insectivores and seed-planters whose futures depend on the fact 
the tree was knocked over. Thus, through the process of time – Leopold’s ‘motive power’ – a 
being is inextricably intertwined with its surroundings and vice versa. The long-term invisible 
temporal movements of the grouse, the wolf, the dung beetle and the elephant are critical for 
the survival of the wild environment as a whole, just as the intricate and dynamic interrelations 
that make up the wild environment nourishes and gives life to these animals over time. Wood 
states:  
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What the ecological perspective teaches us is that things with no obvious point to 
their existence play a role in the life-cycles of other beings. It teaches us that the 
survival of a particular species may depend on the preservation of an environment 
with very specific features (Wood, 2001: 16). 
 
Every animal therefore plays a vital role in the ecosystem as much as the ecosystem plays a 
vital role in their being and becoming. It is a case, using Dumas’ famous line, of ‘all for one 
and one for all’. Even the mosquito plays an essential role. There are 3,500 named species of 
mosquito. They live on almost every continent and in every habitat and serve important 
functions in numerous ecosystems (Fang, 2010). The larvae of mosquitoes live in water and 
provide food for fish and other wildlife, including larger larvae of other species such as 
dragonflies. The larvae themselves eat microscopic organic matter in the water, helping to 
recycle it. Adult mosquitoes make up part of the diet of many insect-eating animals, such as 
birds, bats, adult dragonflies and spiders. They also help pollinate a wide variety of plants 
(Miller, 2012). 
 
Of course, dare I say it, they are also quite effective at eradicating humans, which, as we know, 
are far worse than deer as over-populated destroyers of the life-world. Malaria infects some 
247-million people worldwide annually and kills nearly one million. Mosquitoes also spread 
yellow fever, dengue fever, Japanese encephalitis, Rift Valley fever, Chikungunya virus and 
West Nile virus. However, given the huge humanitarian and economic36 consequences of 
mosquito-spread disease, few [humans] would suggest that the costs of an increased human 
population would outweigh the benefits of a healthier one. The notion of every creature having 
a vital place in nature may not be enough to plead the mosquito's case.  
 
Having said that, there are some unintended negative costs on other species, especially the 
more vulnerable ones, resulting from the human attempt to eradicate mosquitoes. A few years 
ago, I spent some time on the shores of Lake Malawi. It is a particularly fascinating lake in that 
it is isolated from the other lakes of the rift valley with no major river or tributary flowing into 
it. Lake Malawi has over five hundred species of cichlids – small colourful fish that have 
 
36 Countries freed of their high malaria burden, for example in sub-Saharan Africa, might recover the 1.3% of 
growth in gross domestic product that the World Health Organization estimates they are cost by the disease each 
year, potentially accelerating their development (Fang, 2010). 
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evolved from a single species around fifteen thousand years ago, which, in evolutionary time, 
is amazingly quick. The rapid ‘radiation’ from a single parent species into many closely related 
species evolved with different modifications to allow them to specialise in various aspects of 
the lake’s habitat. The Malawians call the brightest ones mbuna meaning ‘rockfish’, who have 
evolved to adapt to the protective rocky caves and gullies near the shore, and utaka have 
evolved to exist only in open water. There are many more species. These fish are highly 
endemic in that they exist here and nowhere else in the world. Lake Malawi therefore is a 
treasure-trove of endemic fish and contains more species of freshwater fish than any other body 
of freshwater in the world, greater than the combined freshwater species of Europe and North 
America, so it is essential that they and their habitat are protected from overfishing and habitat 
destruction (Cruise, 2012: 406). 
 
Unfortunately, that is where our headlong quest to eradicate mosquitoes comes in. Lake 
Malawi, given the large body of water in tropical Africa, is also one of the worse places for 
malaria. Consequently, I witnessed European members of a major global health organization 
make a big fanfare of handing out dozens of mosquito nets to all the families of a lake-side 
village. This spectacle was repeated village after village until thousands of nets had been 
received along the length of the lake. But the villagers, already long-used to living in a malaria-
infested area, discovered a better use for them – as fishing nets. Thanks to the fine weave of 
the mesh, their haul of fish doubled in size and now included the rarer, smaller cichlids and all 
the juveniles, thus doubling the threat to an already-endangered number of species of fish 
(Cruise, 2012: 407). 
 
3.3. Poetic ecology 
 
Poetic ecology is both about listening to nature’s voice and and our expression about nature. 
Wood says there is a contrast between a precise science and a field science (Wood, 2001: 16). 
A precise science fundamentally idealises its objects, and in so doing, it can develop highly 
sophisticated theoretical structures – most notably in mathematics. A field science, one that 
deals with ‘experience’ and ‘embodiment’, deals with the interaction of many quite different 
sorts of things, allowing no consistent method of idealisation or abstraction, and inhibiting 
complex axiological development. Ecology is a field science (Wood, 2001: 16), and an eco-
phenomenological pursuit, as demonstrated by Uexküll and Leopold, reinforces this 
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complexity further. This complexity (?) is shown clearly in this extract of Leopold’s, called 
The Song of The Gavilan:  
 
This song of the waters is audible to every ear, but there is other music in these 
hills, by no means audible to all. To hear even a few notes of it you must first live 
here for a long time, and you must know the speech of hills and rivers. Then on a 
still night, when the campfire is low and the Pleiades have climbed over rimrocks, 
sit quietly and listen for a wolf to howl, and think hard of everything you have seen 
and tried to understand. Then you may hear it — a vast pulsing harmony — its 
score inscribed on a thousand hills, its notes the lives and deaths of plants and 
animals, its rhythms spanning the seconds and the centuries (Leopold, 1970: 158).  
 
One can glean from this extract that Leopold does not view ecology as a precise science. He 
does not list the sum of the parts in a chronological or Linnean way but instead describes things 
in a different dimension. Leopold speaks here of the importance of time, of movement, 
rhythms, sounds, the invisible and the barely audible and barely detectable. Craig Holredge 
states that Leopold “articulates a sensory-supersensory experience of the natural world” 
(Holredge, 2016: 16). This is no longer science in the usual empirical sense. As one 
commentator calls it, it is ‘poetic science’ (Berthold, 2004 in Holredge, 2016: 16).  Leopold’s 
experience cannot be described in simple empirical language, because such language tends to 
ignore the full phenomenological force of the experience, which prompts Leopold to instead 
paint vivid images that suggest what is really at work in nature. This is something that we can 
perceive if we relearn to engage with the wild in the right way. Holredge maintains that Leopold 
is hinting at what is needed to prepare for such experiences: You need to connect yourself with 
a place over extended time by being immersed in it and being attentive and participate by 
noticing and taking in what is happening around you as I was able to do in the Kalahari Desert. 
Leopold learned to see how mountains ‘think’ and how rivers, trees, deer and wolves are all 
dynamically interwoven. “He didn’t just think about nature in terms of human needs, but he 
was able to think with nature” (Holredge, 2016: 16; emphasis added). Holredge points out that:  
 
Conventional ecological thinking considers nature’s beings and happenings in 
terms of causes and effects and aims to explain all the connections. Leopold could 
never have written about the wolf or the landscape of the Gavilan River in the way 
he did had his mind been confined to seeing nature only in terms of causal links, 
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food webs or energy flows. In these essays [The Sand County Almanac] he is 
portraying and not explaining nature. To do this you have to step back from causal 
thinking, renounce the drive to explain, and focus your mind on what shows itself, 
what speaks in the connections (Holredge, 2016: 16). 
 
Thus, Leopold, in his portrayal rather than explanation of the wild environment, points to a 
new way of encountering it. This kind of portrayal of ecology points toward a new ethic, one 
that shows that things with no obvious point to their existence (like mosquitoes) play a 
relational and co-constitutional role in the lives of all other beings. This kind of portrayal, as 
Wood writes, “teaches us that the life, death and flourishing of things is tied up with other 
factors, conditions and creatures in ways for which we typically do not have a map, and under 
variability tolerances we do not know” (Wood, 2001: 16). Wood goes on to state that “we can 
study these things, of course. But as much as ecology is a science, it is also a counsel of ethical 
caution, precisely because it deals with the interaction of widely disparate kinds of things” 
(Wood, 2001: 16). And so, through a renewal of the description of ecological functions – a new 
poetic ecology – now begins the foundation of a new conservation of wildlife ethic. The 
interaction and interconnectedness of all life, not the simple preservation of numbers through 
instrumental value, thereby becomes the focal point in a conservation of wildlife.  
 
3.4. Merleau-Ponty’s language of being  
 
Leopold’s poetic ecology is related to what Merleau-Ponty was getting at when he spoke of the 
chiasmic exchange between the living body and the world that surrounds it. In  Phenomenology 
of Perception (1962), Merleau-Ponty started to understand that human language was a carnal 
phenomenon, rooted in sensorial experience of and with the world. In the chapter entitled The 
Body as Expression, and Speech, Merleau-Ponty writes that the body’s first act of 
communication with the world is a spontaneous gesture toward it. When I feel anger, my body 
responds in an angry fashion, my fists clench, my shoulders stiffen, the jaw sets hard and my 
face reddens as I square up to that which angers me. This is a gesture that spontaneously 
communicates the emotion I feel at that precise moment.  
 
But the communication reverses. The angry gesture speaks directly back to the human body of 
the perceiver and is understood without any interior reflection, as Merleau-Ponty explains: 
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Faced with an angry or threatening gesture, I have no need, in order to understand 
it, to [mentally] recall the feelings which I myself experienced when I used these 
gestures on my own account … I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a 
psychic fact hidden behind a gesture, I read anger in it. The gesture does not make 
me think of anger, it is anger itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 184). 
 
Speech, says Merleau-Ponty, is just such a gesture. It is a vocal gesticulation where the meaning 
is inseparable from the sound. It originates from the body’s natural capacity to resonate with 
other bodies and the environment as a whole to hear and be heard in the world of flesh:  
 
the meaning of words must be finally induced by the words themselves, or more 
exactly, their conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of subtraction from a 
gestural meaning which is immanent in speech (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 184). 
 
Speech, language and meaning, therefore, are not external mediums that we arbitrarily assign 
to a sound or word, but instead are entwined in the sensory world. Language is not just a set of 
arbitrary and agreed upon words or ‘signs’ linked by a formal system of syntactic and 
grammatical rules that represent actual things, actions and events. As children, humans do not 
learn language mentally as a coded system separate from the world, but bodily. By laughing 
with joy at the sensation of warm water in a bath, squealing in frustration at not being able to 
reach the cookie jar on the counter, babbling with our pets and mimicking the sound of our 
parents, we gradually begin to enter into specific melodies, accents and echoes of our language.  
 
… the whole of the spoken language surrounding the child snaps him up like a 
whirlwind, tempts him by its internal articulations (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 40). 
 
Thus, we acquire new words and phrases through tonality, bodily and sensory, the way they 
feel as they roll off the tongue, the way it connects with the body’s gestural emotion. Abram 
writes that Merleau-Ponty took linguistic meaning to be “rooted in the felt experience induced 
by specific sounds and sound-shapes as they echo and contrast with one another, each language 
a kind of song, a particular way of ‘singing the world’” (Abram, 1997: 76). Thus, we share, on 
his understanding, the bodily roots of language with all other embodied creatures, creatures 
who are similarly fleshy, and can therefore also hear and be heard in the world. 
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I spent a few years living in France. When I first moved there, I could not understand the words 
of the French language but I could understand their meaning on one particular occasion. While 
sitting at a street-side café in the Mediterranean town of Nice where I lived, I saw two friends 
meeting after what must have been a long time. The sounds were clearly of surprise and elation. 
Their tonal inflections were like the song of two birds singing to each other, like a musical 
duet. The interlocuters echoed each other in gesture and sound as they tuned into each other, 
remembering each other and expressing their emotion at meeting each other after so long. As 
an Anglophone eavesdropper, I was still able to understand precisely what was being 
communicated. This is because it was not the explicit meaning of the words, as much as the 
phonetic melody, together with the bodily gestures of the conversation, that carried the bulk of 
the communication. The explicit meanings of the words were in fact secondary to the carnal 
primacy of vocally gesticulating them. As Abram, referring to Merleau-Ponty directly, states: 
 
it is the sensuous, gestural significance of spoken sounds – their direct bodily 
resonance – that makes verbal communication possible at all. It is this expressive 
potency – the soundful influence of spoken words upon the sensing body – that 
supports all the more abstract and conventional meanings that we assign to words 
(Abram, 1997: 79-80). 
 
Here we find a crucial element of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language. By affirming that 
linguistic meaning is bodily expressive, gestural and melodic, we find that language and 
meaning-making are not exclusively human properties. The communication within a flock of 
babblers in a tree, the deep rumbling of a herd of elephants as they browse through a thicket of 
trees, the yip of a jackal and the mournful cry of a nightjar late at night reverberate with a 
significance that is not much different from our own conversations. We realise that they too 
speak a language, a language like ours that is rooted in, and responsive to, the bodily experience 
with the world together with others. For Merleau-Ponty, even the most abstract of meanings is 
ultimately rooted in embodied, concrete experience. 
 
Like humans, lions, as a good example, are social by nature and have similar communication 
behaviours. They make a variety of calls, each with a complex variety of inflections of volume, 
intensity, tempo and tone. These include roars, grunts, moans, growls, snarls, meows, purrs, 
hums, puffs and woofs. Each sound and how it is delivered has a different meaning. When a 
mother lioness is looking for her cubs, she will call very softly for them.  The cubs recognise 
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this sound and call back to her to show where they are. Lions are famous for their deep 
resonating roars that can be heard up to eight kilometers away. They roar for a number of 
reasons; advertising territorial ownership, intimidation of rivals, locating pride members and 
strengthening social bonds. Roaring is most commonly done when the lions are most active, 
and as such can be heard mostly at night, especially just before dawn. Like the two people 
greeting each other at the café in Nice, lions do not only communicate with each other vocally. 
The act is often accompanied by bodily gesticulation. In fact, lions perform a very similar 
greeting ceremony to humans, especially after a lengthy separation; or to reaffirm social ties 
and confirm pride membership. It begins with a pair of lions approaching each other, often 
moaning or grunting and moving their lips, before rubbing their heads together, and moving 
on to rubbing each other’s sides, usually with the tail held high or draped over the other lion, 
similar to a pair of humans hugging, minus (in our case) the very expressive tail. As with most 
mammals, human included, when lions feel threatened, they show off their teeth and try to 
make themselves look as big as possible by standing on their tiptoes.  If a dominant male wants 
to show another pride member, say one of his cubs, that he is not happy, he will give him a 
sharp swat with his paw or a gentle bite to the neck.  He doesn’t want to hurt the cub much; 
just to let the little fellow know he has stepped out of line.  To express they are happy and 
relaxed in each other’s company, lions will lick or gnaw softly at each other. 
 
Importantly, such communication is not only restricted to living beings. To the sensing body, 
all phenomena, even rivers, trees and mountains, are animate in some sense because they 
solicit participation of the senses. In Africa, elephants’ physiognomy and expression are 
different depending on whether they dwell in a forest or a savannah biome. Forest elephants 
have developed to be smaller in size and have narrow tusks to better move through the dense 
foliage. They also browse rather than graze, whereas savannah elephants are bulkier, have 
wider outspread tusks and graze more. There is also much more jostling and sparring on the 
open plains, with herds being larger and typically far more spread out, than the elephants in 
forests who stick close to each other in small family groups. Forest elephants tend to be far 
more secretive. 
 
The inanimate natural world helps to determine and shape human expression too. In the chapter 
The Body as Expression, and Speech Merleau-Ponty writes:  
 
 182 
It is the body which points out, and which speaks…This disclosure [of the body’s 
immanent expressiveness]…extends, as we shall see, to the whole sensible world, 
and our gaze, prompted by the experience of our own body, will discover in all 
other ‘objects’ the miracle of expression (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 184). 
 
Thus, we speak of howling winds, whispering willows, babbling brooks and rumbling thunder 
while, in return, our own language is nourished by the sounds of the natural world. 
Onomatopoeic words like ‘whoosh’, ‘splash’, ‘wash’, ‘hush’, ‘rush’ and ‘knock’, ‘block’, 
‘rock’ are good examples of our carnal reciprocity with the inanimate-animate environment. 
For Merleau-Ponty, human language originates from the continuous interplay between the 
living body and the natural world – “language ‘belongs’ to the animate landscape as much as 
it ‘belongs’ to ourselves” (Abram, 1997: 82). With lions, one of the reasons they roar mostly 
at dawn, is because then the ambient temperatures across the African savannah or the Kalahari 
Desert are at their coolest. The denser, cooler still air enables the sound to be carried much 
further, thus allowing pride members to locate each other more effectively. In this sense too, 
the language of lions, this perceptual participation, is co-determined by the complexion of their 
surrounding environment, as it is co-determined by the bodily and vocal capacities and 
instinctual directedness upon their environment. 
 
Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between genuine, expressive, poetic language of the land 
and a language that simply repeats established formulas, like the contemporary sterilized 
approach of a Cartesian or objective manner in describing wild animals and the natural world. 
The latter carries little meaning in the expression of words and functions solely on the memory 
of the former. This ‘expressionless’ language, however, is treated as an established institution, 
but it is one that must first establish itself on the basis of expressive language of the land – the 
truly meaningful one. All scientific language is finally rooted in lived, embodied experience, 
however much scientific and ‘objectifying’ language may want to purge itself of such. 
Authentic expressive, ‘wild’, language is inherently poetic and creative in that it also uses 
established words in a variety of unique ways (as we saw with Derrida’s manipulation of 
diacritics previously, and with Leopold’s creative and evocative descriptions of the wilderness 
which start to do justice to its enigmatically complex nature). This creativity alters the 
established language structure to move and gesticulate with it, subjecting the whole structure 
to what Merleau-Ponty called a “coherent deformation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 39-83). 
Language is alive and open, because it is continually becoming and then altered time and again. 
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This ‘poetic productivity’ then is a carnal medium with living roots in our perceptual 
participation of the world around us (Abram, 1997: 84). This is why we should speak of ‘poetic 
ecology’ or ‘eco-phenomenological poetry’ rather than simply ‘language’. 
 
It is important to understand that Merleau-Ponty, particularly in his later writings, made it clear 
that human language arises from a world “whose wild participatory logic ramifies and 
elaborates itself in language” (Abram, 1997: 84). Language and meaning, therefore, are directly 
related to the earth’s ecology. It is, returning once again to Merleau-Ponty in the final paragraph 
in the The Visible and The Invisible, “the very voice of the things, the waves, and the forests” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 155). 
 
4. Ukama: the interdependence of all that exists 
 
Many years ago, while camping in Hwange, Zimbabwe’s largest national park, I discovered a 
relatively unknown African philosophical concept that epitomises Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology and how all that exists is in some way intertwined with the natural world. I 
had arrived at a remote camp deep in the park to find an old Shona man living there. He was 
in charge of maintaining the campsite, which was little more than a designated patch under a 
large Marula tree.  As I pitched the tent, the man went into the bush to collect some firewood 
for me. There were many elephants about at the time, a herd of at least fifty scattered around 
the perimeter of the campsite and I was astonished at the bravery, or stupidity, of the old man 
to wander blithely among them, humming softly as he went about his business. The elephants 
for their part, seemed to pay him little attention. They grazed on about him with that deep 
rumbling so typical among a large herd.  
 
“Weren’t you scared of the elephants?” I asked him when he returned. 
“They are my friends,” was his reply. “They know me. If they come near, I talk to them and 
they listen.” 
 
It struck me then how much modern humans had become disconnected from the biosphere and 
our thought, speech and actions, we have become like those poor baby elephants that find 
themselves in a concrete cell in China, dislodged from our own wild nature. This old man 
instead belonged to an ancient African way of living that was bodily attuned to the wild world. 
Here he was, in the midst of, and communicating and engaging with, one of the most dangerous 
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animals on earth, without fear or detachment. He moved effortlessly in the natural world using 
soothing tones and body language, or at least a language they could understand, that explained 
to the elephants that they had nothing to fear from him.  The old man was able to speak their 
language and, in doing so, integrate effortlessly with his living surroundings by using forms of 
bodily and voice expression that could be ‘read’ or interpreted by the elephants. Detached from 
wild nature, I, the outsider from a civilized world, had developed a fear for the wild 
environment because I had lost the vital principle of my own development and function as a 
human animal, the ability both to speak and to hear the language of the wild.  
 
On chatting further with the old man around the fire later that night, he explained that his ability 
to speak the language of elephants was because of an entrenched part of his traditional culture. 
He called it Ukama, a Shona word that implies the ‘interdependence of all that exists.’ 
According to the old Shona tradition, Ukama is the reality that all things are closely related and 
depend on one another for existence. Humans exist in a community that depends, not only on 
other humans, but also on the natural world of animals, plants and other elements in the 
universe, including the community of ancestors and future generations to come, which is 
basically everything. Similar to the idea of Western philosopher Merleau-Ponty, in the strict 
sense of Ukama, there are no inanimate things in the universe. All things, including rocks, 
rivers, mountains, trees, animals and humans are carriers of the same life principle in various 
degrees, and they all speak the language of being. 
 
Back then, when I first heard this term around a fire surrounded by elephants under a starry 
African night, the notion of Ukama was largely unheard of beyond the Shona culture. However, 
the concept has begun to enter the realms of philosophical discourse, especially among African 
scholars. It is particularly relevant when it comes to philosophical issues of the environment 
and conservation. It must be noted that Ukama is not to be confused with a related southern 
African term, Ubuntu, which only focuses on human relationships with other humans. Ubuntu 
is a South African ethical ideology focusing on people's allegiances and relations with each 
other. A rough translation of the principle of Ubuntu is “humanity towards others”. Another 
translation could be: “the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity” 
(Ubuntu: Official Documentation, 2013). 
 
Philosopher specialising in African Ethics, Munyaradzi Felix Murove, is one of the thinkers 
who works in this tradition, and he points out that Ukama is concerned about the environment 
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and human relationship with the biosphere, as the concept affirms human relatedness with the 
earth and all life (Murove, 2009: 316). Since humans are dependent on the biosphere – the air, 
soil, water, and (other) animals – for their survival, and their means of communication, it stands 
to reason they ought to protect it in its natural form. This is because, in the final instance, 
Ukama understands that the well-being of humans and the well-being of the rest of the natural 
world cannot be separated out. This obligation to protect crucially includes communication 
with all living bodies. It is another example of chiasm in that one relies on the other, not just a 
one-sided (?) anthropocentric version of protection. Any tampering with the air, the soil, the 
water and the animals, or loss of the language of the wild, will negatively impact on the natural 
environment, the wild animals and ultimately also on humans. Being human, therefore, is 
intricately connected with being-wild.  What is more, Murove insists that Ukama is not just a 
Shona concept, but one that supports a traditional (sub-Saharan) African worldview (Murove, 
2009). In fact, some scholars have gone as far as to say that in fact all indigenous and ancient 
cultures across the globe support a concept of interdependence with the wild environment 
(Ikeke, 2015).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Ukama strongly echoes the kind of ecological phenomenology or eco-phenomenology that 
Merleau-Ponty has pioneered in Western thinking. Brown and Toadvine in the introduction to 
Eco-phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself (2003) write that:: 
 
 … an eco-phenomenology offers a methodological bridge between the natural 
world and our own or rather the rediscovery of the bridge that we are and have 
always been but thanks to our collective amnesia have forgotten almost 
irretrievably. It is not enough to diagnose our forgetting; there is also a matter of 
remembering the earth (Brown & Toadvine, 2003: xx).  
 
This alternative experience and account of the wild environment, like Ukama, is potentially 
revolutionary. It is a reconceptualisation that circumvents the problems concerning both 
intrinsic value moral consideration of individual animals or privileged species, as well as 
simple (strong and weak) anthropocentrism. In the final chapter, I shall show some important 
examples of just how revolutionary this reconceptualisation is by looking into practical policy 
implications. These illustrations serve as ideas on how an eco-phenomenological approach can 
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be put into practice. They by no means exhaust the potential of phenomenology as a new 
conservation policy, but point toward a process that includes hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
new approaches. The illustrations also bring into the fold other environmental philosophical 
fields such as eco-centrism, biocentrism and deep ecology – disciplines that all eschew 
anthropocentrism but can benefit in terms of rigorous analysis from the groundwork laid down 
by Merleau-Ponty.  
 
As discussed in the opening paragraphs of this dissertation, the world is faced with an 
ecological crisis. Confronted by anthropogenic destruction of wild animals and the wild 
environment, some of us feel an unease about the extent of destruction wrought by human 
animals. This unease is a moral one at its base, a moral urge that calls for changes in our 
behaviour. As I have shown throughout this chapter, the intersection of ecology with 
phenomenology begets a new cross-disciplinary enquiry, namely eco-phenomenology. This is 
an extension of the radical phenomenology pioneered by Merleau-Ponty, and illustrated in 
practice by the studies of Von Uexküll and the observations of Leopold, that points to a fresh 
way of looking at the interrelationship between living organisms and the wild world in an 
axiological dimension. Eco-phenomenology lends support to the hope that there could actually 
be a viable and productive response to the ecological crisis of modern times, a response that 
finally overcomes the excesses and distortions of anthropocentrism. Of course, humans 
dwelling in modern societies, as previously mentioned, have lost touch with the wild 
environment. Environment philosopher Holmes Rolston III sums it up best: 
 
We modern humans, increasingly competent about making our way through the 
natural world, have been decreasingly confident about its values, its meanings. The 
correlation is not accidental. It is hard to discover meaning in a world where value 
appears only at the human touch, hard to locate meaning when we are engulfed in 
the sheer instrumentality, whether of artifacts or natural resources (Holmes Rolston 
III, 1988: xi). 
 
One possible solution of many then for modern human well-being and survival as well as the 
conservation of other animals in the Anthropocene is to rediscover Ukama and begin a process 
called ‘rewilding’. Rewilding is not just about restoring ecosystems that have been under plow, 
or cement, but instead a “re-involvement”, an “opportunity for people to engage with and 
delight in the natural world” (Monbiot, 2013: 11). It is equally important that humans learn to 
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re-wild themselves and alter their perception of the world. The natural environment is not 
simply a collection of species (including humans) but, in the spirit of Ukama and a Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology, “of their ever-shifting relationship with each other and the natural 
environment” (Monbiot, 2013: 9). In short, by rewilding ourselves we are respecting and 
sustaining the life-giving relations among us and rewilding our Umwelt and vice versa. 
 
It is with this notion of rewilding in mind that I now turn to the final chapter. Here I shall flesh 
out some possibilities of beneficial co-existence between humans, wild animals and the wild 
environment (biosphere/Umwelt) where new possibilities of a conservation ethic will be 
conveyed.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ECO-PHENOMENOLOGY AS CONSERVATION 
 
Populations of species that were dangerously small will have space to grow. Rare and local 
species previously doomed by development will escape their fate. The unknown species will 
no longer remain silent…People will have closer access to a world that is complex and 
beautiful beyond our present imagining…. 
Living Earth, all of it, can continue to breathe.  
(E.O. Wilson’s concept of Half Earth, December 2016) 
 
In this the final chapter, Merleau-Ponty’s ontological endeavour is transmuted into an applied 
one. It moves from the field of ontology via a reform of language onto action because, in order 
to be effective in wildlife conservation, the discipline has to migrate from the theoretical to the 
practical.  
 
It may seem surprising that phenomenology – especially from the perspective of the 
theoretically-weighted enquiries of all the principal phenomenologists – can play a crucial 
practical role in reorienting our approach to wildlife conservation. This is especially true when 
it comes to nebulous philosophical notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘being’. And yet, as we have 
seen, the discipline of phenomenology is particularly well-suited as a practical alternative to 
anthropocentrism and its resultant riders of instrumentalism and other economic-centred 
paradigms. The reason, as I have mentioned so often before, is because phenomenology takes 
its starting point in the world as we experience it. No matter the differing versions of 
phenomenology, its cornerstone is on the primacy of direct, immediate and sensory experience. 
A Merleau-Pontian style of phenomenology facilitates a move toward practical endeavours, 
such as the conservation of wildlife and through that the preservation of the natural 
environment.   
 
As I hope to have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, phenomenology, particularly how 
Merleau-Ponty developed it with his notions of chiasm and intertwining, suggests a 
fundamental alternative to the myopic obsession with anthropocentrism and other legacies of 
Cartesian dualism in wildlife conservation and resultant policies. Brown and Toadvine state 
that from its roots in experience “phenomenology provides an open horizon for the exploration 
of all facets of our relationship with nature outside of narrowly prescribed disciplinary 
boundaries.” (Brown & Toadvine, 2003: xii) They maintain that throughout its development, 
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phenomenology seems “to promise a methodological route toward the disclosure of an 
‘alternative’ conception of nature” (Brown & Toadvine, 2003: xi-xii), one that would avoid the 
reductionism of economically-centred anthropocentrism.  
 
As one important avenue to be explored within eco-phenomenology of many, I will begin this 
final chapter (Section Two: Reforming Anthropocentric Language) by exploring how language 
applies to the human orientation in the natural world. Just as feminism did to affect a major 
paradigm shift in Western thinking against sexism, a change in how we use language is the 
first and most fundamental of tools in tackling anthropocentrism. As shown in the previous 
chapter, language originates from our chiasmic relationship with wild nature. Language is not 
on the side of an abstract Cartesian mind lording it over ‘mere matter’, as held by a dualistic 
approach to language. Here I will provide some concrete examples of how eco-phenomenology 
breaks down that construct following on from the discussion of language in Chapter Five. Some 
radical adjustments to our common lexicon, which is heavily weighted in anthropocentric 
Cartesian binaries, are crucial if we want to make progress towards alternative praxis .  
 
The alternative practical approach to wildlife conservation, once the desk has been cleared of 
linguistic pitfalls, will then begin to take shape. Recall that the fundamental tenet of 
economically-centred weak anthropocentrism is to provide meaningful (economic) benefits 
solely for human animals. It will be demonstrated here that a Merleau-Ponty style 
phenomenology succeeds in providing that sought-after human well-being, but obviously 
without the anthropocentric exploitation and dominance of wild animals in order to do so. The 
new approach to wildlife conservation is about applying a Merleau-Pontian view of an 
intertwined acceptance and relationship with the natural world and the wild animals that share 
the space with us. It is one that paves the way to a healthier, happier being, both for animal and 
human species.  
 
As this dissertation has progressed, a development of an alternative pragmatism has already 
begun to form. I have shown that the alternative conservation approach must be a non-
instrumental valuation of wild animals. As I hope to have demonstrated, a wild animal loses 
some of its essence when it is taken from the wild. This is true of humans too, and in the second 
section of the chapter I will demonstrate how important our interconnection with our wild 
environment really is.  
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Ultimately, though, this dissertation focuses on the conservation of wild animals. As shown in 
the previous chapters, the focus is on the ontological importance of being wild rather than 
commodifying (some) wild animals simply to maintain their numbers. The latter, dominant 
aim  is achieved often at the expense of the well-being of the conserved animals themselves, 
but also of other, economically unvalued, wild animals (such as insects, amphibians and other 
lesser- or unknown beings) as well as of the natural environment itself. Conservation, therefore, 
needs to focus, not just on individual animals, but instead always on their chiasmic relationship 
with other beings and their surrounding environment. From this, the Merleau-Pointian 
construct progresses to elucidate the inextricable and intertwined human and (other) animal 
setting within wild nature, all sharing in the primordial, relational element that he calls ‘flesh’. 
In the third section of this chapter (Rewilding Land, Sea and Human Life), I shall introduce the 
notion of ‘rewilding’ – an applied concept that to my mind encompasses the phenomenological 
ethos as set out by Merleau-Ponty. Critically, I will show that without the wild environment, 
not only are most wild species doomed, but the human species will be too, and no amount of 
economically-centred pragmatism would be able to prevent that. 
 
The point of this final chapter then is to provide some practical examples of a Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology and to expand on the idea that all living beings are not stand-alone entities to 
be taken individually but  must instead be understood a belonging together in a chiasmically 
interconnected web of life that depends on each other for their species being and well-being. 
At the heart of it is the wildness-of-being. It is the natural environment that drives the very 
existence of all life on Earth. Ultimately, if humans are to successfully conserve species in the 
Anthropocene, we need to preserve that which keeps us all alive and thriving – wildness. 
 
1. Preparing the ground for a paradigm shift 
 
Aldo Leopold wrote: “Ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process of 
ecological evolution” (Leopold, 1970: 238). He states that, philosophically, an ethic “is a 
differentiation of social from anti-social conduct” while, ecologically, an ethic “is a limitation 
on freedom of action in the struggle for existence” (Leopold, 1970: 238). The two versions, 
according to Leopold, amount to the same thing in that a being “has its origin in the tendency 
of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls 
these ‘symbioses’” (Leopold, 1970: 238). Merleau-Ponty calls it ‘chiasm’. In short, any ethic 
ultimately has its roots in an ontological chiasmic interrelationship between a living body and 
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its surrounding environment. This includes all living bodies. Developing his idea further, 
Leopold writes that the single premise on which any ethic rests is simply that “a human is a 
plain member – a citizen – of a co-operative land community” (Leopold, 1970: 239-240). In 
other words, rather than being detached and aloof from the natural world, humans are a part of 
and a member of a co-operative community of the land. This is Leopold’s famous notion of a 
‘land ethic’, one that is extended, not just to all other humans and all other animals, but to also 
include things like soil, rocks, water, air and plants. In a ‘land ethic’, humans have moral 
obligations towards the larger ‘cooperative community of the land’. As we saw in the second 
chapter, preserving some animals at the expense of others (limited, instrumentally inspired 
conservation) has caused irreparable harm to the natural environment. This I highlighted again 
in the previous chapter when it was demonstrated how crucial wolves are to the entire 
ecosystem. Similarly, when humans remove grass cover and plough the surface of the land to 
plant vast mono-crops for human consumption, or burn down great swathes of rainforest to 
make space for livestock, the nutrient-rich soil either is destroyed (through excessive chemical 
fertilisation) or it disappears as run-off into the oceans because the crops are not as effective as 
grasslands or forests in holding it in place. A land ethic, therefore, is one that is based on a 
moral compunction to  preserve the entire biosphere – soils, water, air, plants – and the complex 
interdependent relations it consists of, since any harm to the land and all its natural elements is 
ultimately a harm to wild animals and humans too.   
 
This importance of the natural environment in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is the primary 
aspect in forming an alternative concept to wildlife conservation. This is the point where 
phenomenology becomes eco-phenomenology. Brown and Toadvine state that eco-
phenomenology is: 
 
based on a double claim: first, that an adequate account of our ecological situation 
requires the methods and insights of phenomenology; and second, that 
phenomenology, led by its own momentum, becomes a philosophical ecology, that 
is, a study of the interrelationship between organism and world in its metaphysical 
and axiological dimensions (Brown & Toadvine, 2003: xii-xiii). 
 
This quote captures the heart of this dissertation’s contribution too. Only phenomenology gives 
us an adequate (non-anthropocentric, accurate, and fair) description of ‘our ecological 
situation’, of our fleshly existence immersed in dynamic interaction with a fleshly world.  That 
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is, only phenomenology overcomes the disastrous distancing dichotomies established by 
Western philosophy and shows us the richly textured nature of our wild human existence. This 
is how, in the quote above, phenomenology ‘led by its own momentum’ naturally becomes or 
results in an ecology. Eco-phenomenology, therefore, recognizes that the axiological qualities 
of the natural world are inherent and ineliminable, and by allying itself with the science of 
ecology, which is a study of in-field experience of the natural world, it offers a (practical) return 
to a world that humans have tried very hard to alienate themselves from. This is achieved 
through a Merleau-Pontian reconceptualisation of the human and (other) animal position and 
role in nature without which, as I shall demonstrate shortly, we threaten the very existence of 
all life.  
 
Furthermore, phenomenology is adaptable to a range of other pragmatic disciplines, both inside 
and outside academia. The environmental philosophical disciplines as formulated by bio-
centrists Paul Taylor and Albert Schweitzer, holists or eco-centrists such as J. Baird Callicott 
and Holmes Rolston III and the deep ecologies of Arne Naess and Warwick Fox can be 
augmented and strengthened through a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Broadly, bio-
centrism is an ethical point of view that extends inherent value to all living things (Derr & 
McNamara, 2003: 21). It is an understanding of how the earth works, particularly as it relates 
to biodiversity. In this sense, it shares in eco-phenomenology’s negation of anthropocentrism. 
The related eco-centrism extends inherent value to the whole of nature. Deep ecology is 
an ecological and environmental philosophy promoting the inherent worth of all living beings 
regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs. It also considers a restructuring of 
modern human societies in accordance with such ideas. I will not go into detail on these 
notions. Instead, I would like to focus on more specific practical procedures that can benefit 
from an eco-phenomenological approach to wildlife conservation. 
 
One of the fields is linguistics, which, if reformed, could be one of the most effective pragmatic 
tools in wildlife conservation. 
 
2.   Reforming anthropocentric language 
 
Since Cartesian dualism and its resultant anthropocentrism is, as I have argued, the root cause 
of human alienation from the natural world and the resultant decline of wild species, one of the 
first jobs of an eco-phenomenology is to reform the anthropocentric dominance within our 
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every-day lexicon. Joan Dunayer in her book, Animal Equality: Language and Liberation 
(2001), argues that every-day language is ‘speciesist’:  
 
Deceptive language perpetuates speciesism, the failure to accord non-human 
animals equal consideration or respect. Like sexism and racism, speciesism is a 
form of self-aggrandizing prejudice. Bigotry requires self-deception. Speciesism 
can’t survive without lies. Standard English usage supplies these lies in 
abundance. Linguistically the lies take many forms, from euphemism to false 
definition. We lie with our word choices. We lie with our syntax. We even lie with 
our punctuation (Dunayer, 2001: 1). 
 
I will attend to those lies a little further on in this section but would like to first defend the 
claim that language is a powerful tool that can intensify biases towards ethnic groups, genders 
or minorities (Keeley 2011). This is something early feminist philosophers identified and 
endeavored to reform. Certainly, until the 1960s there was a widespread sexist attitude in 
Western society which found wide and enduring expression in linguistic conventions. Feminist 
philosophy has been effective in dismantling this attitude by discarding sexist aberrations in 
language. The main focus of feminists was to have society acknowledge the unconscious ways 
that language both silences and emphasises gender in negative ways. A major part of the 
language reform focused on when words or phrases make one gender, typically women, 
subjugated or invisible compared to the other. The most popular examples are the pronoun ‘he’ 
or the word ‘man’ to refer to both genders taken together. These usages have become 
anachronistic thanks to feminist reform of language. Notice how often in this dissertation I 
have interchanged  the feminine and masculine forms of pronouns when describing an 
individual animal that is otherwise genderless in the discourse – the rhino in her embodied 
world, the baby elephant in his concrete cell. Common usage of such descriptions where the 
gender is not clear, would always be referred to in the masculine (Saul & Diaz-Léon, 2017). 
Feminist language philosophers have argued, therefore, that these words participate in 
rendering women invisible.  The fact that the pronouns or words for the male gender can be 
also be used to refer to the female gender shows how maleness is dominant and femaleness is 
subjugated (Saul & Diaz-Léon, 2017).  
 
The same process of language reform needs to occur in order to tackle anthropocentrism.  In 
the last section of her book, Dunayer provides comprehensive style guidelines and a thesaurus 
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to counter and provide alternatives to prevailing anthropocentric terms (Dunayer, 2001: 179-
202). I will explore some of them, but will add a little more philosophical flesh in what  follows.  
 
2.1. ‘animal’ 
 
The biggest obstacle (or lie) to overcome has to do with the noun ‘animal’. Derrida was one of 
the first to highlight this particular problem:  
 
Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give. These humans 
are found giving it to themselves, this word, but as if they had received it as an 
inheritance. They are giving themselves the word in order to corral a large number 
of living beings within a single concept: “The Animal”, they say” (Derrida, 2008: 
9). 
 
As is evident throughout this dissertation, the word ‘animal’, following the Cartesian bias in 
our common lexicon, has come to represent all beings that are not human, or it represents 
humans that act like wild animals (supposedly). The original Latin word is ‘animalus’, which 
means ‘having breath’. Humans, as we discussed at length, also breathe. They too have flesh 
and participate in the world as every other living being does, but my computer’s dictionary 
(Apple Dictionary, Version 2.2.1, 2005-2016) shows how much we lie in using the word 
‘animal’ (my highlighted points in italic):   
 
- any such living organism other than a human being; 
- a mammal, as opposed to a bird, reptile, fish, or insect: the snowfall seemed to 
have chased all birds, animals, and men37 indoors; 
- a person whose behavior is regarded as devoid of human attributes or civilizing 
influences, esp. someone who is very cruel, violent, or repulsive: those men are 
animals — what they did to that boy was savage.  
 
According to the dictionary, to be human is to be un-animal; to be animal is to be sub-human 
or inhumane. Animal traits are only ascribed to humans if they are seen as having aberrant 
 
37 Note also the archaic use of the gender specific. 
 195 
behavior. The online thesaurus similarly captures our anthropocentric usages of the term. 
Animals are described as:  
 
- endangered animals, creature, beast, living thing; informal critter, beastie; 
(animals) wildlife, fauna.  
- the man was an animal brute, beast, monster, devil, demon, fiend; informal 
swine, bastard, pig (Apple Thesaurus, Version 2.2.1, 2005-2016) 
 
The adjective describes animals as: “Carnal, fleshly, bodily, physical; brutish, beastly, 
bestial, unrefined, uncultured, coarse.” (Apple Thesaurus, Version 2.2.1, 2005-2016) 
Those first three words are telling in that in spite of their detachment from the human, 
they reflect Merleau-Ponty’s description of every living being, including humans. 
 
To counter this, as I have done throughout this dissertation, one can use brackets around the 
word (other) when referring to non-human animals. By doing this, I have exposed the lie and 
demonstrated that humans are animals too. Commonly, progressive writers attempting to avoid 
an anthropocentric discourse would use the term ‘non-human animal’ This, however, remains 
anthropocentric. The dualistic nature of the binary is retained, and the hierarchy enforced with 
the use of the negation or absence of the salient norm – human versus non-human.  
 
In his defiance of the use of the word ‘animal’ Derrida wrote:  
 
I avoid speaking about animals in general, for me they are not ‘animals’. When one 
says ‘animals’, one has already started to not understand anything and has started 
to close the animal into a cage (Derrida, 2008: YouTube).  
 
As Derrida points out, our use of the term is designed to lump all other animals into a class 
outside our own, to put them into a linguistic cage that excludes them from the anthropocentric 
club of creatures with moral standing.  
 
We use derogatory words to entrench the hierarchical dichotomy and the word ‘animal’ is such 
a word. By removing the animal from the human, and placing a Cartesian abyss between them, 
we have successfully set ourselves apart and above all other animals. Once it is accepted that 
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humans are also animals, only then will there be a reconfiguration of our thoughts to accept we 
are just one species amongst hundreds of thousands.  
 
2.2. Pronouns and punctuation 
 
As with masculine-centred language used against women, the use of pronouns weighs heavily 
against (other) animals. An individual animal in English is commonly referred to as ‘it’. Unless 
the relationship is personal, like a pet that has a name, then ‘he’ or ‘she’ is used when referring 
to the animal. This also applies to using ‘who’ and ‘whom.’ If the animal has a personal 
relationship with the person, then “who” or “whom” tends to be used. In most cases, though, 
the standard rule is  exclusively to use ‘which’ or ‘that’ as follows: 
Personal: “My cat whom I call Hyena, is twenty years old. She requires a lot of attention.”   
Generic: “The lion, which was stalking a buffalo, had a limp. It seemed to be in pain.” 
This sort of language designates object or ‘thing-like’ status’ to animals. (Other) animals in our 
language are not to have feelings or emotions, or a subjective point of view. Due to this 
objectification in language humans easily ignore the sentience and interests of other animals 
and a switch to seeing them as pure objects that may be instrumentally utilized, is easily made. 
 
Let us take trophy hunting as another example. This is the activity that many proponents, as 
we saw in Chapter One, laud as a successful weak anthropocentric approach to conservation, 
but our language systematically hides the violence and destruction meted out on wild animals 
hunted as trophies. Hunted animals are referred to as ‘game’, as if the activity was a sport, 
which, in fact, it is often described as. By using ‘game’ and ‘sport’ instead of ‘victim’ and 
‘murder’ the language implies that there are two contestants in a game of equals pitted against 
each other. This may have been the case in prehistoric days when the only weapons the human 
hunter possessed were his bare hands, a sharp stick and some rocks to throw. Nowadays, with 
sophisticated long-range high-caliber weaponry complete with telescopic sights propped on the 
cross bar of an equally sophisticated vehicle with air-conditioning, it is a grossly one-sided 
contest, hardly worthy of being called a sport. Sport is also a form of entertainment, a source 
of amusement and pleasure, which may be true for the hunter but not so much for the hunted.  
 
 197 
The objectification in hunting language continues. When a trophy-hunter shoots a wild animal, 
he ‘bags it’, he doesn’t say ‘murder her’ or even ‘kill her’. When we read about an animal’s 
‘feelings’, they are normally written with quotation marks, as I have just done. Punctuation 
shows that humans do not believe wild animals really have feelings, at least not ‘developed’ 
feelings in a human sense (note the quotation marks again), which in line with our 
anthropocentric habits simply translates into treating them as morally irrelevant. ‘Game farms’ 
or ‘game ranches’ are euphemisms for ‘death camps’, ‘places of slaughter’ or ‘killing areas’ 
while ‘wildlife management’ should really be ‘promoting death’ or even ‘exploiting wild 
animals for slaughter’ or ‘for money’; ‘carcasses’ should be ‘corpses’ and, most significantly, 
‘conservation’ simply ought to be ‘regulated killing’.  
 
At a public stakeholder meeting at Skukuza, Kruger National Park’s main camp, in March 
2017, park officials were attempting to justify their decision to cull (another euphemism for 
‘killing’) a few hundred buffalo. In her attempt to explain that buffalo meat will cover some of 
the food-shortage needs of impoverished school children living alongside the park, SANParks 
Social and Economic Scientist, Louise Swemmer, kept replacing the word ‘buffalo’ with 
‘protein’ (recorded personally, March 2017). Her intention was to convince the assembled 
stakeholders to regard the value of the animal as a consumable (?) entity rather than as a living 
being. That is until I spoke up, stating: “I had seen a herd of hundred protein as I entered the 
park earlier today. The herd had dozens of newly born proteins and there was an old male 
protein with the largest horns I had seen.” It was only then that the assembly saw the folly of 
the term. The buffalo had been reduced from a great heaving phalanx of breathing, snorting, 
grazing, nurturing bodies of tough scarred hides and sweeping horns, sharing in our fleshy 
existence, to a nitrogenous compound of long-chain molecules.  
 
It is obvious, therefore, that language hides the violent intent that humans have toward (other) 
animals. To reduce animals to molecular entities or automata in our descriptions of them is 
denying that animal’s true being and opens the door to a limitless exploitation and violence.  
 
2.3. Terms of conflict 
 
Another problematic term, especially as it relates to conservation, is ‘human-wildlife conflict’ 
or HWC – a buzzword (or buzz-anagram) that stems from its simplicity and ease of usage to 
describe a diversity of situations involving wildlife (Davidar, 2018). Throughout South Africa 
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(and indeed Africa and the rest of the world), as humans expand deeper into the wilderness, 
they come into more contact with wild animals.  Humans describe all these forms of contact as 
‘conflict’. The term comes up frequently in all conservation literature from the IUCN and 
CITES to the World Bank and individual governments.  
 
A typical case of HWC would be elephants ‘raiding’ crops and lions ‘attacking’ livestock. The 
term is defined by the IUCN World Parks Congress as: “when the needs and behavior of 
wildlife impact negatively on the goals of humans or when the goals of humans negatively 
impact the needs of wildlife” (Madden, 2004). At first glance, it seems like a balanced 
statement until one reads the following line: “These conflicts may result when wildlife damage 
crops, injure or kill domestic animals, threaten or kill people” (Madden, 2004). With the latter 
part of this statement, the culpability of such conflict lies entirely with elephants or lions with 
connotations of them consciously and deliberately initiating the conflict. This implies that a 
human retaliation for their misdemeanors is justified.  
 
Another glance at my online dictionary, shows that the word ‘conflict’ is defined as 
a serious incompatibility between two or more opinions, principles, or interests; or a prolonged 
armed struggle (Apple Dictionary). This implies that wild animals are consciously asserting 
their interests to undermine human goals and assuming the role of combatants. Such 
implications promote human antagonism towards wildlife that can exacerbate the problem 
further, hinder resolution and can result in people directing their anger and frustration on 
wildlife with potentially adverse conservation outcomes for endangered species (Peterson et 
al., 2002; Brook et al., 2003; Redpath et al., 2015 in Davidar, 2018). But even more importantly 
and more fundamentally, as phenomenology teaches us, this type of language use distorts both 
the lives and life projects of the other animals, as well as our experiences of them and our 
interdependencies within the land community (Leopold).  
 
One of those outcomes, especially in South Africa, is the labelling of a wild animal as a 
‘damage-causing animal’ or ‘problem animal’. If an animal (say a leopard) gets labelled thus, 
even if endangered and otherwise not allowed to be hunted, it may be legally ‘removed’. The 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, (10/2004): Norms and Standards for 
the management of damage-causing animals in South Africa defines a damage-causing animal 
as: 
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an individual animal or group of animals, as the case may be, that, when in conflict 
with human activities, there is proof that it causes substantial loss to livestock or to 
wild animals, causes substantial damage to cultivated trees, crops or other property; 
or presents an imminent threat to human life (Government Gazette, 2016: 7-8).  
 
Again, the blame lies with the wild animal, not the humans and livestock who encroached onto  
his or her natural habitat. The leopard is really just going about her normal leopard-business 
just as her species has done for tens of thousands of years. The delinquency in behavior rests 
entirely with the human animal who can and should know better and should investigate 
alternative approaches in order to respect the whole land ethic.  
 
The other intriguing part of the above definition is the part where a wild predatory animal, who 
causes substantial loss amongst other wild animals, is also labelled a problem. The hidden 
implication here is that many ‘wild animals’ in South Africa are, in fact, ‘ranched animals’ 
meaning that a predator that normally would hunt wild buffalo and impala is, in these situations, 
eating the prized quasi-domesticated buffalo and impala, and thus the ranch owner’s profits. 
The onus is again placed on the predator to make a conscious distinction between her natural 
wild food and quasi-domesticated livestock of the same species. The law implies that the 
leopard ought to know the difference between animals she may hunt and those that strictly 
belong to the human rancher, animals she may not hunt. Once a wild animal, such as a leopard, 
is identified as a ‘problem animal’, methods to manage her include translocation, or the use of 
cage traps, poison collars, darting, call and shoot, foothold traps, hounds, poison firing 
apparatus and denning. (Government Gazette, 2016: 16) In other words, apart from the option 
of translocation, the leopard is most likely to be killed with impunity.  
 
However, often in fact the ‘problem animal’ is the solution, if only humans would allow their 
conservation efforts to be directed by a broader perspective, stemming from respect for the 
longer-term well-being / flourishing of the whole, interdependent, land community. Research 
has shown that in many cases the removal (killing or relocation) of an individual predator may 
in fact exacerbate the problem at hand, as we have so clearly seen in the example of the wolves 
of Yellowstone Park. A livestock farmer’s resident predators can be his best allies, because 
dominant territorial predators actually prevent outsiders and (sometimes) other predators from 
entering and operating in their territories. Research by the Cape Leopard Trust shows that in 
areas where a dominant predator prevails, there is the lowest incidence of predation, because 
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other more opportune predators are limited territorially. Stable predator population densities 
are lower and more manageable than ones where predators are persecuted. Removal of the 
dominant predator results in an influx of many more predators competing for the vacant 
territory (Cape Leopard Trust: website). 
 
Conflict terminology, therefore, is provocative and emotional and often creates more problems 
than it solves, because it isolates single animals or single species from the whole in which they 
function, and thereby distorts our understanding of the living system. In most cases, it is the 
humans that are problematic; i.e. human lack of respect for wild land communities lead to land 
degradation and all the associated problems. Human agricultural and livestock farming, 
human-on-human conflict and urban expansion into wilderness areas are the root causes of 
HWC. For example, I have often heard conservationists and villagers lament that there are ‘too 
many elephants’ in Botswana. Consequently, they all cry foul over the increase of HWC 
incidents especially when elephants ‘raid’ crops. Yet, overall elephant numbers are declining 
in Botswana (Chase et al., 2016). In reality, this means if there is an increase in wildlife-related 
incidences, it is because there has come to be far less space for elephants to range and forage 
than in the past. In short, it is the crops that have ‘raided’ or rather ‘invaded’ the habitat of 
elephants, not the other way around. Davidar makes the point that in the Anthropocene: 
 
where the rate of species extinction is accelerating there is a growing realisation 
that humans need to move beyond their past history which has framed the narrative 
regarding wildlife… This term [HWC] which is problematic, semantically 
incorrect and which masks the underlying complexities of particular situations, 
needs to be avoided (Davidar, 2018). 
 
Davidar maintains that more precise description than HWC would lead to better solutions. For 
example, the antagonism with elephants in Botswana is mostly over them raiding crops. When 
crop-raiding is described as ‘crop-raiding’ instead of ‘conflict’ then better solutions to mitigate 
crop-raiding may emerge. Already, better mitigation techniques are being successfully 
deployed, like the use of beehives and capsicum hedges encircling a crop. Elephants, it has 
been discovered, are terrified of bees and wholly detest the smell of chili peppers (King et al., 
2011). Davidar did not draw on phenomenological insights explicitly, but her point is valid and 
can also be deduced and enriched from a phenomenological perspective. By taking into account 
how elephants meaningfully live their world, their subjective likes (crops) and dislikes (bees 
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and capsicum), their long term interests can also be better served and new ways of living 
together, even cooperating within the land community, can start to open up. The conflict 
paradigm is clearly not the only game in town.   
 
2.4. Raiding crops 
 
If we go further and accept that the situation is really about the raiding of crops and not crop-
raiding elephants, then we acknowledge that the problem is of human rather than elephant 
origin. The solution to the problem would be to acknowledge the Merleau-Pontian chiasm 
between elephants and their natural environment. The idea is to maintain as much of the natural 
environment for elephants (and other wild animals) as possible for them to roam freely and to 
find alternatives where agricultural expansion into the last vestiges of their natural environment 
is minimised or scaled back.  
 
However, with rapidly expanding human populations and increasing concerns over food 
security, one would think that notions of reducing available agricultural land are improbable. 
This is not the case, according to a French sustainability think-tank called the Institute for 
Sustainable Development and International Relations that recently conducted research into 
what level of food production is actually required to meet the nutritional demands of Europeans 
(Poux and Aubert, 2018). They discovered that even if Europe cuts its crop yields by 30% on 
average, reduces the production of animal products by 40%, and replaces pesticides and 
fertilizers with sustainable farming methods, the region would still produce enough food to 
feed the 530-million people who will live there by 2050 (Poux and Aubert, 2018: 11). 
Much of this comes down to the study’s more realistic assessment of how much food 
humans really need. By comparing official recommendations for a healthy diet with actual 
food consumed in European countries, the researchers showed that there is a huge excess of 
unnecessary production on the continent, which could be curtailed to limit agriculture’s 
environmental impact. Part of this decline would be owing to the reduction in animal-based 
products, because Europe would therefore import much less soybean-based livestock feed, 
reducing the extent of global deforestation that is driven partly by soybean farming. Greener 
farming methods within Europe itself, such as restoring natural soil health in place of synthetic 
fertilizers, and incorporating trees, hedges, and ponds into farmland, would also boost the 
regional biodiversity of insects and birds, which have declined rapidly in recent decades in 
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Europe (Poux and Aubert, 2018: 11). The model of course can easily be applied elsewhere, in 
fact, everywhere, thus freeing up much needed space for the natural environment to thrive. 
3. Rewilding land, sea and human life 
 
Freeing up more space for the natural environment is referred to as ‘rewilding’. At face value, 
rewilding may seem like a focus of environmental rehabilitation of once wild spaces and wild 
beings. However, rewilding is not just about creating more natural spaces from agricultural 
land, or allowing nature to regrow (although it is that too), but it is a matter of rediscovering 
the human involvement with the wild environment. Part of a Merleau-Ponty-style conservation 
ethic is about humans rethinking the concept of wilderness and understanding the necessity to 
participate in the “ever-shifting [wild] relationship with each other and the natural 
environment” (Monbiot, 2013: 9). Prior & Ward (2016) maintain that ‘rewilding’ 
acknowledges “the implicit entanglement of non-humans and humans in conservation 
endeavors” (Prior & Ward, 2016: 134). In other words, rewilding does not mean anti-human 
fortress-like conservation. Dutch philosopher, Martin Drenthen, who has written extensively 
on rewilding in the European context, points out that the notion of rewilding may seem like an 
anti-human discourse, because the term seems to imply  rewilding only those things that ought 
to be wild, which discernibly excludes humans. However,  he stresses that rewilding “is not 
just a conservation practice and a discourse, but also implies a non-anthropocentric perspective 
on landscapes and the role of humans in nature” (Drenthen, 2018: 2), as I shall now discuss.  
 
3.1 Ecological rewilding 
 
From an ecological perspective, rewilding is not about keeping ecosystems in a state of arrested 
development, like preserving a jar of pickles, because wild life is dynamic, fluid, becoming, 
evolving and changing. Neither is it about forcibly restoring environments that have already 
been degraded into a human crafted area – manipulated to suit their aesthetic needs such as the 
construction of an African-themed safari park, complete with African wildlife, in China. 
Instead, rewilding is an approach that permits ecological processes to resume by themselves, 
like allowing trees to naturally repopulate deforested land; or assisting mangroves, salt marshes 
and seagrass beds to grow back after being destroyed (Monbiot, 2013: 10). Prior & Ward state 
that ‘rewilding’ is indeed an ecological restoration, but not to restore a landscape to an original 
state, but rather to ‘bring back’ natural processes and thus to highlight and foreground non-
 203 
human autonomy” (Prior & Ward, 2016). Drenthen’s understanding of rewilding entails that 
“rewilding is not presented as ‘pristine’ or ‘original’, but still as ‘genuine nature’…because it 
results from the workings of autonomous natural processes” (Drenthen, 2018: 3). Rewilding, 
therefore, is a concept that fundamentally recognises that the ecosystem restores itself, and that 
when left to their own devices, other living beings will tend to creating conditions for the 
flourishing of biodiversity. It is thus clearly not simply adding a collection of animals and 
plants to an area, as is often the case with private reserves and game ranches in South Africa, 
but rather, following Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm, of allowing their shifting relationships 
with each other and their surrounding environment to re-develop autonomously. Rewilding 
would thus be an example of showing respect for the encompassing land community to which 
we intrinsically belong. 
 
Essentially, the notion of rewilding is about ‘setting nature free’ to reproduce landscapes that 
resemble those that existed before human agricultural and urban construction. Often rewilding 
projects “include the removal of human artefacts and structures – dykes, levees, wooded banks, 
canals and other cultural artefacts – that are thought to impede ecological processes” (Drenthen, 
2018: 4). Once this is done, then nature is left to run its own course. In other words, an 
ecosystem is not understood as  a finished, static product, but instead as  a growing,  
continuously shifting, dynamic and relational process that must be left to evolve and adapt to 
changes over time. In essence, rewilding:  
 
is about resisting the urge to control nature and allowing it to find its own way. It 
involves reintroducing absent plants and animals (and in a few cases culling exotic 
species which cannot be contained by native wildlife), pulling down the fences, 
blocking the drainage ditches, but otherwise stepping back. At sea, it means 
excluding commercial fishing and other forms of exploitation. The ecosystems that 
result are best described not as a wilderness but as self-willed: governed not by 
human management but by their own processes. Rewilding has no end points, no 
view about what a ‘right’ ecosystem or ‘right’ assemblage of species looks like. It 
does not strive to produce a heath, a meadow, a rainforest, a kelp garden or a coral 
reef. It lets nature decide (Monbiot, 2013: 9-10). 
 
The mention of the idea ‘self-willed’ is clearly important in a phenomenological sense. This is 
not an objective landscape but one that consists of a multitude of living bodies all with their 
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own goals and purposes, their own meaningful interaction with their Umwelt,  who are yet  
intertwined and co-dependent. 
 
In the previous chapter, I wrote of the re-introduction of wolves in the Yellowstone Park and 
how they rewilded the landscape to its former glory. There are hundreds of such cases where 
similar aspects of rewilding have occurred. A particularly good example of an ecosystem 
rewilding itself is the 4,700 square kilometer Chernobyl disaster zone between the Ukraine and 
Belarus. Here, rare and endangered animals have thrived since it had been evacuated by 
humans in 1986. In a report for The Guardian, travel and environment writer, Tom Allen, who 
visited the site recently, says that it is possibly Europe’s largest rewilded area, and “the unlikely 
beneficiaries of nuclear disaster have been the wolves, bison and bears that now roam the 
depopulated landscape” (Allen, 28 May 2019). About 100 wolves have taken up residence on 
the Belarus side, and because there are no human hunters, they have lost their fear of humans. 
Allen notes that:  
 
We see the familiar creatures of town and farm dwindling, and animals long since 
pushed to the wild edges of Europe taking their place: the sparrows, rooks and 
white storks are giving way to white-tailed eagles, lynx and wolves (Allen, 28 May 
2019). 
 
The writer also spotted one of Europe’s rarest birds, the greater spotted eagle. According to 
Allen, Chernobyl is the only place where their numbers are rising. A local bird expert told 
Allen that the fields in the disaster zone are not the eagles’ typical habitat as they usually favour 
marshland. But the expert also said he is starting to wonder if it’s the other way around. The 
birder believes the eagles originally adapted to wet areas to avoid people (Allen, 28 May 2019). 
The raptors are particularly shy of humans, but now without people to harass them, they have 
‘rewilded’ themselves by coming back to the fields.   
 
Anthropogenic disasters aside, it is important to point out that it would be an injustice if land 
consciously set aside for rewilding was  taken away from humans who depend on that land or 
when rewilding projects take place in old cultural landscapes (Drenthen, 2018:4).  
 
In terms of the latter, rewilding projects have often encountered “stark opposition” especially 
in Europe when such projects have removed many cultural artefacts and identities (Drenthen, 
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2018: 4) Sheep farming in Britain is one such example where traditional and cultural practices 
of sheep farming, together with the old stone walls, mills and drainage canals associated with 
sheep farming are being dismantled to allow for rewilding (Monbiot, 2013). According to 
Dolly Jørgensen, in her critique of the rewilding projects in Europe, rewilding “seeks to erase 
human history and involvement in the land of flora and fauna”. This, she maintains, implies a 
“split between nature and culture [that] may prove unproductive and even harmful” (Jørgensen, 
2015: 482). In response, Drenthen states that “many traditional European cultural or half-
natural landscapes are under threat because they depend on land use practices that are rapidly 
disappearing due to economic and demographic developments such as urbanisation, growth of 
infrastructure, changes in land use such as intensification of agriculture, but also land 
abandonment in places with poor soils and low yields. Yet, these human cultural spaces are 
valued as part of a cultural or historical heritage and identity” (Drenthen, 2018: 5). Europe is 
littered with old and ancient cultural structures that are valued by archeologists, writers, 
historians and local communities. Rewilding, therefore, needs to include these human cultural 
and historical aspects too. Drenthen points out that “there is no prima facie reason why these 
different values of landscape [ecological and traditional human landscape structures and uses] 
could not be conserved at the same time (Drenthen, 2018: 9). Rewilding could certainly work 
“in places where traditional and cultural features have already been disrupted beyond repair”, 
such as “occasions where agricultural land use practices have become unsustainable due to the 
demands of the current global food market” (Drenthen, 2018: 9). Drenthen concludes that 
rewilding includes a movement that situates the history of human involvement together with 
the natural landscape (Drenthen, 2018: 26). These interwoven approaches are clearly in line 
with the eco-phenomenological insights that insist on breaking down the Cartesian hierarchical 
opposition between humans and nature.  
 
Recall in Chapter Two when I cited Brandt and Spierenburg’s research (2014) into former 
agricultural areas in the Karoo region of South Africa that were converted into wildlife ranches. 
Viewed from an African perspective, no eco-phenomenologically inspired project of rewilding 
can ignore people such as these  who had been farm labourers before they were displaced and 
fenced out in the name of conservation. I mentioned earlier examples when rural communities 
were removed from the land of their ancestors to make way for national parks. In the new 
conservation ethic, this process must be avoided. Rewilding is about interconnectedness of all 
beings. Monbiot himself stresses that rewilding land should only take place with the consent 
of those who work on the land and one must be careful that it does not threaten the livelihoods 
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of impoverished communities who work or otherwise depend on that land. There is also a 
current school of thought that posits that  indigenous and rural communities are best placed to 
protect and enhance rewilding processes (IPBES, 2018). I will deal with this last point in detail 
a little further on in this chapter.  
 
Ultimately, the main aim of rewilding is to take what land and sea one can get without coercive 
expropriation and dispossession and … 
 
to restore to the greatest extent possible ecology’s dynamic interactions. In other words, 
the scientific principle behind rewilding is restoring what ecologists call trophic 
diversity … enhancing the number of opportunities for animals, plants, and other 
creatures to feed on each other … expanding the web both vertically and horizontally, 
increasing the number of trophic levels (top predators, middle predators, plant eaters, 
plants, carrion and detritus feeders) and creating opportunities for the number and 
complexity of relationships at every level to rise. (Monbiot, 2013: 84) 
 
One can see how this description in many respects echoes a Merleau-Pontian  eco-
phenomenology, in that restoration of an ecosystem and conservation of wild animals go 
together, are interdependent on each other and ultimately rely on each other for their very being. 
So, instead of attempting to ‘manage wildlife’ for the benefit of some prized wild animals – as 
is prevalent in South African wildlife conservation practices38 – conservation ought to think in 
terms of the chiasmic relationship of animals in their wild environments  where every animal 
from dung beetle to elephant functioning in a self-willed way within its wild environment ought 
to be considered.   
 
3.2 Human rewilding 
 
Monbiot stresses that rewilding from a human perspective is not a romanticised and unrealistic 
return to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. He rightly points out that the modern human “without 
farming, sanitation, vaccination, antibiotics, surgery and optometry would be dead by now.” 
(Monbiot, 2013: 7) Certainly, it would be easy to predict the outcome if I was suddenly thrust 
naked, rudimentary spear in hand, into the depths of the Kalahari Desert. I would be in among 
 
38 Such as erecting fences, removing predators or elephants or vegetation and feeding wild animals. 
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the lions without the safety of my Land Cruiser laden with jerry-cans of fresh water (and some 
wine), crates of pre-packaged food, matches and firelighters, my ever-trusted potjie-pot and 
the protection of my tent at night. In the modern era, abandoning our civilized lives, especially 
our high agricultural yields to feed the seven-billion plus humans on the Planet, would be 
disastrous for humanity. Monbiot warns that any idea of going back to a hunter-gatherer 
lifestyle “would first require the elimination of almost all human beings” (Monbiot, 2013: 11). 
Given that much land still requires to remain under the plow or belong to livestock grazing, the 
land available for rewilding is quite modest, but Monbiot believes it would still constitute an 
important ecological and existential resource (existential in that it will be enough to support 
the food and water needs of all life). As  I demonstrated with the Poux and Aubert study, 
agricultural land can be reduced quite effectively and still feed the millions of humans decades 
into the future.  
 
As mentioned, rewilding does not exclude humans. Neither is it about conflict between humans 
and a natural environment. Anthropocene-era humans can  participate in a renewed, meaningful 
way with the natural environment while still enjoying the benefits of technology and 
civilization. Monbiot and others stress that humans need to relearn how to connect with the 
natural environment, the source of vitality, by doing activities that bring humans in bodily 
contact with it. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, maybe we could say Monbiot calls for activities that 
would activate and concretise for humans their fleshy existence as part of the ‘flesh of the 
world’. This could include a walk along a trail, a swim in a lake or ocean, a ski down a snowy 
slope, a climb up a mountain, a safari or a camping trip into a desert. Many humans in fact do 
this.  
 
Activities like these bring peace of mind, adventure and risk, as well as a psychological escape 
from the humdrum of the built environment of stress, pollution and noise. How many of us 
come back from such experiences feeling revitalized? It is no coincidence that almost all major 
cities have set aside bits of nature for human well-being. One only has to think of Central Park 
in New York, Hyde Park in London and, best of all, Table Mountain National Park in Cape 
Town. The latter is a perfect example of how human civilization remains interconnected to the 
wild environment. Almost half of the city remains natural thanks to the wisdom of the early 
town planners not to build above a certain altitude. Today thousands of people access this 
natural environment either hiking up and along the hundreds of trails; or, for the more sedate, 
by road or cable way. All do so to benefit from the spectacular views and to breathe in the fresh 
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fynbos-scented air. Most of Cape Town is surrounded by ocean and much of it has recently 
been set aside as a marine reserve. Again, humans gravitate toward this wild environment in 
the form of bathers, surfers, kayakers, sailors and scuba divers. All of these are examples of 
humans rediscovering and reconnecting with their own wildness by immersing themselves in 
wild nature.  
 
The benefits are even more tangible than simple aesthetics. The abstract of a new study in  
Behavioral Sciences, entitled Levels of Nature and Stress Responses (2018) states:  
 
Findings suggest that visiting natural environments can be beneficial in reducing 
both physical and psychological stress levels, with visitors to a natural environment 
reporting significantly lower levels of stress than their counterparts visiting a more 
urbanized outdoor setting or indoor exercise facility (Ewart and Chang, 2018). 
 
This study examined the question of human well-being from the perspective of what the authors 
call ‘levels of nature’. That is, data on levels of stress were collected from three sites, one site 
having wilderness-like characteristics, a second site representing a municipal-type park, and a 
third site representing a built environment (indoor exercise facility) within a city. Data were 
generated using biophysical markers and a psychological measure within a pre- and post-visit 
format. In addition to the other mentioned benefits, visitors to the wilderness areas had 
increased levels of joy; and significant decrease in cortisol levels. A similar study in Korea saw 
greater improvements in insulin sensitivity, pulse rates, stress hormone levels and oxidative 
stress in women who spent a half-day in a ‘wild forest’ compared to a ‘tended forest’ (Ju Lee 
et al., 2017). 
 
It is no wonder then that humans need the natural environment in terms of psychological, 
physical and even spiritual well-being, quite apart from our physiological dependencies upon 
natural processes. Our expression and communication of lived meanings as discussed in 
Chapter Five with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of language, are dependent on the natural world. 
Our basic physical needs from fresh air, clean water, healthy soils and lush rainforests are 
crucial for our survival. Our psychological well-being and spiritual stimulation are important 
too, as we saw with this 2018 study, and also when I provided the example of Ukama that 
speaks of the interdependence of all that exists. Ukama and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
both link to Leopold’s notion of thinking like a mountain, in that we need to consider the value 
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of all aspects of an ecosystem and how everything co-exists and interconnects in mutual 
dependencies. In fact, mountain landscapes feature prominently in human belief structures. 
Countless beliefs and religions have found something deeply spiritual in mountains. Robert 
Pirsig, author of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1974) writes on numerous 
occasions that mountains are the “high country of the mind”. The Jewish Bible features Mount 
Sinai, where Moses received the Ten Commandments, and successive cultures over the 
centuries in south-western Zimbabwe found the giant granite outcrops of the Matobo Hills  a 
deeply spiritual place (I myself had a deep sense of déjà vu when I visited, so apparently did 
Cecil Rhodes, who asked to be and was buried there). Even the unassuming Tsodilo Hills that 
seem to rise from nowhere in the Kalahari Desert are sacred to the San and Bantu peoples living 
in the vicinity. Mountains are so prevalent in human spiritual culture I could fill a dozen pages 
listing peaks around the worlds that humans revere in some form or another.   
 
Yet, preserving the natural environment goes much further than psychological, spiritual and 
physical well-being. The wild environment is essential for the survival of all life. It is 
imperative we set enough space aside for biodiversity to thrive. Failing to do so will not only 
doom wild animals, but all life.  
 
4. The imperative of increasing space for biological diversity 
 
Critically, and given that a phenomenological enquiry as purported by Merleau-Ponty insists 
on the chiasmic nature of species within their natural Umwelt, the successful conservation of 
wild species – and humans – comes down to just a single notion: increasing the space for 
biodiversity. And because this is a phenomenological pursuit, that notion is not a reduction to 
a single ‘thing’, because the very word biodiversity explodes into a myriad of beings – animate 
and inanimate – collectively known as ‘Earth’. Thus, an eco-phenomenological ethic based on 
Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of being interdependent with one’s surroundings is one that aims to 
conserve biodiversity above all else. Once achieved, the conservation of wild animals naturally 
follows. 
 
Sadly, we are reaching a point where it may be too late. The latest report by the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Service (IPBES, 
2019) found that one million species are currently threatened with extinction and that humans 
are undermining the entire natural infrastructure on which our modern world depends. 
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Significantly, the report found a strong interrelationship between climate change, the loss of 
biodiversity and human well-being.  
 
Sir Robert Watson, chair of the IPBES, and former chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), states the report shows that governments and businesses are nowhere 
close to doing enough and that the world is on track to miss the targets of the Paris Climate 
Agreement and the Aichi biodiversity targets (Watson, 6 May 2019). Climate change has been 
identified as the primary driver of biodiversity loss, but as Watson points out, the loss of 
biodiversity also contributes to climate change (Watson, 6 May 2019). When we destroy 
rainforests, we emit carbon dioxide, the major human-produced greenhouse gas. Crucially, the 
world needs to recognize that the loss of biodiversity and anthropogenic climate change are not 
just issues of the natural environment but human social, economic and moral issues as well. 
The future of humanity depends on the future of all life. 
 
In this current  section, I will show some applied methods of preserving the wild space, and the 
resultant conservation of wildlife. Section 4.1 will deal with non-instrumental justifications of 
wildlife that will include, in two sub-sections, the importance of preserving indigenous human 
languages in part of wildlife conservation (and vice versa) as well as the importance of 
increasing the natural space. The latter will be an assessment of how much of the wild 
environment we need to preserve in order to support the billions of lives currently and in the 
future of Planet Earth. 
 
4.1. Axiological (non-instrumental) justifications for preserving wild space 
 
Try as we may to remain apathetic, without the oxygenating force of vegetation, the insects, 
birds, plants and mammals that are vital for global food production, clean water and carbon 
sequestration it is quite conceivable humans will be joining the many other endangered species 
in dying out during the Anthropocene. Biodiversity is the variety of life on Earth, in all its 
forms and all its interactions and is the most complex feature of our planet, and it is the most 
vital.  
 
At the Sixth Global Environment Facility Assembly held in Vietnam in June 2018, the United 
Nations Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Christiana Paşca 
Palmer issued a sobering warning: 
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Biodiversity and ecosystems – nature – supports all life on earth. It’s not just about 
the wildlife and the mammals, it’s about all of us. Without biodiversity we will not 
exist on the planet (Paşca Palmer, June 2018: Vimeo). 
 
In an article in The Guardian in November 2018 Paşca Palmer reiterated her warning, stating 
unequivocally that with the current rates of biodiversity loss, humans could be the first species 
to document their own extinction (Watts, 3rd November 2018).  
 
Watson warns we have limited time to turn things around and it will not be easy. He points out 
that the turn-around requires “massive changes” like removing subsidies that lead to the 
destruction of biodiversity and continued warming of the Earth, enacting laws that encourage 
protection of biodiversity, reducing fossil fuel energy, consumption of natural resources and, 
following the notion of human rewilding, to “rethink the definition of a rewarding life” 
(Watson, 6 May 2019). In line with the Poux and Aubert study, Watson believes we have 
enough food to feed the global population, but our current agricultural practices are wasteful 
and destructive. He notes that in 2019 815-million people go to bed hungry, 38-million more 
than in 2015. Watson writes further: “If food waste were a country, its emissions would rank 
third in the world, after China and the US, producing 8% of manmade emissions” (Watson, 6 
May 2019).  
 
His solution is to direct government subsidies towards regenerative farming that absorbs carbon 
and reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases. This means reducing the great monocrops, 
especially those like soy production on the Amazon rainforest basin for livestock feed; and 
non-essential crops like tobacco that are so prevalent yet so unprofitable and blanket vital 
arable land in countries like Malawi and Zimbabwe. Of course, ending or limiting livestock 
farming itself, as suggested by Poux and Aubert, would greatly reduce greenhouse emissions. 
Humans need to turn more toward a plant-based rather than a meat-based diet. Becoming vegan 
is probably one of the best contributions to biodiversity and climate stability. 
 
Inadvertently deploying a Merleau-Pontian reversal or chiasmic scenario, Monbiot in an article 
entitled The Natural World Can Help Save Us from Climate Catastrophe (3 April, 2019), stated 
that biodiversity affects climate and in return climate affects biodiversity. Currently, the 
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world’s governments discuss the climate crisis and the ecological crisis as separate entities, 
when both disasters should be addressed together. 
 
The question is how does one effectively do this?  
 
As we have seen, the simple answer lies in allowing and supporting nature to do its thing. This 
is especially the case if wild animals are allowed to live and flourish autonomously within their 
wild environments. Wild elephants and rhinos in Africa and Asia, and tapirs in Brazil are 
natural foresters, maintaining and extending their habitats, as they swallow seeds of trees and 
spread them across many miles in their dung. White rhinos are adept at preventing runaway 
fires in African savannahs since their grazing prevents dry grass build-up and predators like 
lions and wolves would stop as much carbon being released every year as 30 to 70 million cars, 
simply by doing what they do best, namely controlling herbivore populations (Monbiot, 3 April 
2019). This is not to mention all the  multitudes of little creatures, like dung beetles that aid in 
seed germination from elephant dung, or predatory crabs and fish in salt marshes and estuaries 
controlling herbivorous snails and crabs from wiping out all the plants that keep the system 
together. By allowing wild animals to function as they should – self-willed and free – the wild 
environment is enhanced, and global warming is reduced. Mangroves, salt marshes and 
seagrass beds absorb carbon forty times faster than rain forests (Monbiot, 3 April 2019). For 
Monbiot, allowing nature to expand and restore itself is a no-brainer – not only is this a simple 
solution but it is also ridiculously cost effective (Monbiot, 3 April 2019). Conservation of 
wildlife, therefore, cannot exist without expanding the natural environment in which wildlife 
thrives. Of course, it is not just animals that preserve biodiversity but indigenous humans too, 
sometimes in surprising ways. 
 
4.1.1. Preserving indigenous languages preserves biodiversity (and vice versa) 
 
The 2018 IPBES report highlights the fact that indigenous people and local communities have 
created a successful diversity of polyculture and agroforestry systems, which, in turn, have 
increased biodiversity and shaped landscapes. In the previous chapter I have already provided 
the example of Ukama, the African worldview that sees everything in the world as 
interdependent. However, the decoupling of lifestyles from their local environments and 
landscapes has eroded, for many, their sense of place, language and indigenous local 
 213 
knowledge, including knowledges of  how to live within a land ethic. For example, more than 
60% of the languages in the Americas, and the cultures associated with them, are dying out 
(IPBES, 2018). 
Considering Merleau-Ponty’s views of language, it is interesting to discover that languages 
decline as biodiversity decreases. This is according to researchers from the Zoological Society 
of London and George Wright Society who have established a correlation between the 
extinction of species and the disappearance of languages spoken by communities who had 
inhabited the wild environment along with those species. (Loh & Harmon, 2014) One in four 
of the world's 7,000 languages are now threatened with extinction, and linguistic diversity is 
declining as fast as biodiversity – about 30% since 1970 (Loh & Harmon, 2014). 
Of the 7,000 languages spoken worldwide, half now have fewer than 10,000 speakers, and 
these 3,500 languages are spoken by only 0.1% of the world's population. At the other end of 
the spectrum, because of colonisation, globalisation and the worldwide move to cities in the 
last 30 years, a handful of global languages increasingly dominates: 95% of the world's 
population speaks one of just 400 languages, each spoken by millions of people, and 40% of 
us speak one of just eight languages: Mandarin, Spanish, English, Hindi, Portuguese, Bengali, 
Russian and Japanese (Loh & Harmon, 2014). Languages do not usually go extinct because an 
entire population of speakers dies out, but because the speakers of a minority, usually 
indigenous, go through a language shift to a more dominant language and, typically within a 
few generations, lose their mother tongue. Migration, urbanisation and national unification 
policies have been the primary drivers of language shift and language loss in Africa, Asia and 
Europe. In the Americas and Australia, the primary driver has been migration, but in reverse – 
where the migrants, mainly European, greatly outnumbered the indigenous populations (Loh 
& Harmon, 2014). 
Along with the languages, the traditional knowledge of these cultures is being forgotten. The 
names, uses, and preparation of medicines, the methods of farming, fishing and hunting are 
disappearing, not to mention the vast array of spiritual and religious beliefs and practices, often 
rooted in the land, which are as diverse and numerous as the languages themselves (Loh & 
Harmon, 2014). This shows how important Leopold’s concept of local land ethics and co-
operative land communities is  in preserving the wild environment. Loh and Harmon maintain 
that if the world wants to save nature it may be vital to conserve cultures too. “The vast store 
of knowledge that has evolved and accumulated over tens of thousands of years could be lost 
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in the next 100 years,” says one of the report’s researchers, David Harmon. "While linguists 
have made efforts to archive as many of the endangered languages as possible, and 
ethnobiologists have attempted to record the traditional use of plants, the most important 
conservation takes place on the ground as part of a living culture"(Vidal, 8th June 2014). The 
report found that both biodiversity and linguistic diversity are diminishing as a result of human 
population growth, increasing consumption and economic globalisation which are eroding the 
differences between one part of the world and another – the link between human culture and 
biodiversity is clear, because it is the indigenous peoples of the world who have mostly 
conserved nature through intimate knowledge of local biospheres (Loh & Harmon, 2014). 
As one of the researchers, biologist Jonathan Loh told The Observer (8th June 2014): “If you 
fell the trees then you destroy human culture as well as the birds of paradise. People depend on 
the forest and the forest has always depended on us. We are as one” (Vidal, 8th June 2014). 
4.1.2. Half-Earth 
Giving nature enough space to function, and ultimately avert humanity’s mass suicide, is 
essentially the only answer.  
Amid dawning concerns among policy-makers, in 2010 the world’s nations at the Tenth 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP10) to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
in Nagoya, Japan, promised to at least halve the loss of natural habitats, ensure sustainable 
fishing in all waters, and expand nature reserves from 10% to 17% of the world’s land by 2020. 
(CBD, 2010) But many nations have fallen behind, and those that have created more protected 
areas have done little to police them (Watts, 3rd November 2018). The issue remains low on 
the political agenda. Compared to climate summits, few heads of state attend biodiversity talks. 
The United States refused to ratify the treaty and only sent an observer. Along with the Vatican, 
it is the only United Nations state not to participate (CBD, a.). 
Even if the goals of 17% of the land mass set aside for wild nature are achieved by 2020, which 
is unlikely, there is still an argument that it is not nearly enough. Many leading biologists 
maintain that at least half the planet’s surface must be set aside for wild nature. One of the 
world’s leading biologists, Edward O. Wilson, argues that the situation facing us is too large 
to be solved piecemeal: 
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There is just so much water left for fracking, so much rainforest cover available for 
soybeans and oil palms, so much room left in the atmosphere to store excess 
carbon. The impact on the rest of the biosphere is everywhere negative, the 
environment becoming unstable and less pleasant, our long-term future less certain 
(Wilson, December 2016). 
Wilson maintains that only by committing half of the planet’s surface to nature  “can we hope 
to save the immensity of life-forms that compose it” (Wilson, December 2016). The rich 
language of the biologist’s Half-Earth proposal is less that of a scientist and more that of an 
eco-phenomenologist: 
Each ecosystem — be it a pond, meadow, coral reef, or something else out of 
thousands that can be found around the world — is a web of specialized organisms 
braided and woven together. The species, each a freely interbreeding population of 
individuals, interact with a set of the other species in the ecosystem either strongly 
or weakly or not at all. Given that in most ecosystems even the identities of most 
of the species are unknown, how are biologists to define the many processes of 
their interactions? How can we predict changes in the ecosystem if some resident 
species vanish while other, previously absent species invade? At best we have 
partial data, working off hints, tweaking everything with guesses (Wilson, 
December 2016). 
By dedicating  half the earth’s space to wild nature, Wilson argues “life on Earth enters the 
safe zone. Within that half, more than 80 percent of the species would be stabilized.” 
What does knowledge of how nature works tell us about conservation and the 
Anthropocene? This much is clear: To save biodiversity, it is necessary to obey the 
precautionary principle in the treatment of Earth’s natural ecosystems, and to do so 
strictly. Hold fast until we, scientists and the public alike, know much more about 
them. Proceed carefully — study, discuss, plan. Give the rest of Earth’s life a 
chance. Avoid nostrums and careless talk about quick fixes, especially those that 
threaten to harm the natural world beyond return (Wilson, December 2016). 
Eco-phenomenology is also about unlocking new (and old) forms of knowledge, of new 
approaches in understanding and therefore preserving the biosphere. The declining world of 
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biodiversity will certainly be mostly lost if conservation continues to be treated as a luxury or 
an anthropocentric item in national and international policy. Wilson insists that the ongoing 
mass extinction of species, and with it the extinction of genes and ecosystems, ranks with 
pandemics, world war, and climate change as among the deadliest threats that humanity has 
imposed on itself. Most wildlife is destroyed by land being cleared for cattle, soy, palm oil, 
timber and leather. Most of us consume these products every day, with palm oil being found in 
many foods and toiletries.  
5. Saving South Africa’s biodiversity  
 
Despite their continued persistence with sustainable development policies, South African 
policy makers have in fact recognized that an increase in the natural space will benefit both 
wildlife and humans. By the close of the 20th century, there was a growing awareness by South 
African legislators in a White Paper presented by the Department of Environment and Tourism 
(May 1997) that indigenous forests in the country had declined by half, and an estimated 25% 
of South Africa’s land has been transformed from its natural state. Riverine habitats were 
fundamentally changed, and very few naturally functioning freshwater systems remained. Half 
of South Africa’s wetlands have been lost completely through transformation to other land uses 
and virtually all ecosystems in South Africa have been modified or transformed by human 
activities (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, May 1997). The government, 
realising that this needed to be reversed, stated an objective of increasing the natural area.  
 
5.1. Transfrontier Conservation Areas 
 
One of the more positive, if not ambitious programs to expand wilderness areas is the 
development and partnership with neighbouring countries in establishing what is known as a 
Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA). TFCAs encompass transboundary ecosystem 
management, and  integrate into conservation programmes, local human communities as part 
of a cultural (non-instrumental) heritage. South Africa has six TFCAs that it shares with all six 
of its neighbours – Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  
 
The posterchild of the TFCAs is the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park which united the Gemsbok 
National Park in Botswana and the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in South Africa into a 
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single ecological unit of 3.7 million hectares. Here is the somewhat phenomenological 
description of it as described by the South African Department of Environment: 
  
Spectacular parallel dunes of both red and white sands, separated by grassy dune 
valleys, characterise much of the landscape. Shrubby dune bushveld of scattered 
shrubs of grey camel thorn, grasses, sparsely scattered trees of camel thorn, 
shepherd's tree and false umbrella thorn predominate. The vastness of the 
conservation area allows the nomadic herds of herbivore populations and their 
predators to maintain themselves in perfect balance with their desert environment 
with little need for human management intervention… (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, website) 
 
The interesting thing about the creation of this TFCA is the successful inclusion of 
humans in the conservation of the natural area. The Khomani San have long occupied 
this region as did a mixed-race group that referred to themselves as ‘Basters’ (literally 
meaning ‘Bastards’ in Dutch). This latter group were made up largely of runaway slaves, 
illegitimate offspring of their Dutch masters, renegades and outlaws that escaped the 
Dutch colonial yolk at the beginning of the nineteenth-century. They established an 
independent state called Mier in what is now the South African side of the transfrontier 
park (Cruise, 2016). They and the San practically lived off the land without any 
agriculture, despite its inhospitable nature, simply because wildlife somehow thrived in 
the area. However, when the park was proclaimed in the 1930s, both the San and the 
Basters were forcibly removed (Cruise, 2016). Essentially, the new TFCA, which was 
launched on 12 May 2000 by President Festus Mogae of Botswana and President Thabo 
Mbeki of South Africa, aimed to restore these peoples’ place in the wild landscape. It is 
an effective South African version of rewilding humans and desert ecosystems. This 
draws together many of the ideas put forward in this  dissertation, in that both the 
indigenous human way of life and the conservation of wildlife are effectively brought 
together. This is a good practical example of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of living bodies 
(human and other animal) immersed in and interdependent with the wild environment.  
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5.2. Biosphere Reserves 
 
Another interesting move forward is the government-led expansion of ‘Biosphere Reserves’. 
Biosphere Reserves in South Africa are generally formed around an existing core conservation 
area to include greater expanses of biological diversity in partnership with human communities.  
 
The first one was created and registered with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1998. This was the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve near 
Cape Town. This 100,000-hectare reserve has high floral diversity, endemism and spectacular 
scenery, and is an important water catchment area for Cape Town. The core area is Kogelberg 
Nature Reserve, and the biosphere includes an important wetland, five towns, various 
settlements and resorts, agricultural land (particularly fruit orchards) and commercial forestry 
plantations. The 376,900 hectares Cape West Coast Biosphere Reserve is another example, 
which includes a number of threatened vegetation types and important bird breeding sites such 
as the Langebaan Lagoon (West Coast National Park), the Berg River, Rietvlei Nature Reserve 
and a coastal area.  
 
Another is in the north of the country, the Waterberg Biosphere Reserve. This covers 1.4 
million hectares, with the core conservation area being the Marakele National Park. 
Surrounding this is an additional 28,000 hectares of state land which is being converted into a 
private community venture, three provincial reserves, private game fames and a 5,000 hectare 
‘tribal reserve’ owned by the Masebe community.  
 
And finally, the belle of the ball, is the Kruger-to-Canyons Biosphere Reserve. This huge 
biosphere reserve covers more than 3.3 million hectares, spanning  across two provinces. The 
core areas consist of thirteen declared protected areas, with a major portion of the Kruger 
National Park as the largest core area.  
 
5.3. Marine Protected Areas 
On Thursday, 23 May 2019, the government declared twenty new Marine Protected Areas. 
(South African Government Gazette, Issues 42478 and 42479). This represents a giant leap for 
ocean protection in South Africa. According to the South African National Biodiversity 
Institute (SANBI), this “will considerably advance South Africa’s efforts to protect our ocean 
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heritage for future generations. They will help fisheries resources to recover, contribute to food 
and job security, help maintain resilience in ecosystems that are under stress from climate 
change and support marine tourism” (SANBI, 24 May 2019). 
The new Marine Protected Areas add approximately 50 000 km2 to South Africa’s protected 
area, an area more than twice the size of Kruger National Park. Still, it remains just 5% of 
South Africa’s coastline, but will concentrate on sensitive areas like the muddy ecosystems on 
the west, south and east coast, and protection of the marine environment around South Africa’s 
iconic Robben Island. 
As one can see from the creation of these TFCAs, biodiversity and marine reserves, that 
humans and nature are included together in the process – another sign that government policy 
is recognizing the imperative of preserving biodiversity, including human diversity. TFCAs 
and biodiversity reserves provide sound eco-phenomenological alternatives to the conservation 
practices based on weak anthropocentrism that are currently prevalent in South Africa. Eco-
phenomenology highlights the necessity of including all humans and all wild animals within a 
wild environment. Ethically and ontologically, this overrides the flawed concepts of 
instrumental valuation and sustainable development in conservation (as demonstrated in 
Chapter Two) that preserves some wild animals purely for the limited well-being and 
gratification of some humans. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This last chapter demonstrates what can measurably be done with a Merleau-Ponty-constructed 
eco-phenomenological concept to conserve wildlife. This chapter offers practical solutions to 
the phenomenological insight that everything on the Planet is chiasmically intertwined and 
interdependent. Wild species cannot be successfully conserved singularly or treated 
instrumentally for anthropocentric benefit and well-being, without resulting in the destruction 
of other species and the wild environment as a whole. Conservation of wildlife, as has been 
demonstrated, includes conserving every animate and inanimate link in the chain of life, and 
that includes humans immersed among them. Break any link in that chiasmic chain and the 
entire biosphere begins to collapse. As is now palpably clear from the latest IPBES report, 
centuries of anthropocentric exploitation have broken so many of those links that a million 
species are on the brink of extinction, a process that will soon include our own.  
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In Chapter One I discussed the currently dominant utilitarian view that wildlife and the natural 
environment is taken as a store of consumable goods that meet human needs and desires. This 
view underlies the mainstream conservation ethos. I also deliberated on a second, ostensibly 
opposing notion of moral consideration of wild animals – more particularly, the view of animal 
rights theorists such as Peter Singer who insist that animals’ moral consideration is paramount 
when it comes to conserving them. Both these notions were found in Chapter Two to be 
foundationally flawed and wholly inadequate in conserving wildlife. It is a third notion, the 
one developed from Chapter Four onwards, using a Merleau-Pontian version of 
phenomenology, that finally provides the best approach to wildlife conservation. This view 
takes human and wild animals as actively, dynamically and physically integrated and 
inseparable from the wild environment. Eco-phenomenology sets itself apart from other 
theoretical and philosophical disciplines by its unique capacity for bringing active expression 
to the human interrelationship with the wild world as well as to the relation between (wild) 
animals and their meaningful worlds. This new position is neither anti-human nor is it human-
centred. It is a view that the natural environment’s health must be protected at all costs, because 
it supports all life on Planet Earth, including human life. As Holmes Rolston III points out: 
 
Humans depend on airflow, water cycles, sunshine, photosynthesis, nitrogen 
fixation, decomposition, bacteria, fungi, the ozone layer, food chains, insect 
pollination, soils, earthworms, climates, oceans, and genetic materials. An ecology 
always lies in the background of culture, natural givens that support everything 
else. Some sort of inclusive environmental fitness is required of even the most 
advanced culture (Holmes Rolston III, 1988: 3). 
 
Ultimately, the conservation of wildlife is not about attaching instrumental value or moral 
consideration to wild animals or species, but of staving off a crisis that threatens every living 
one of us from a microbe to a blue whale, by conserving as much of the natural world as 
possible in its vast, complex, chiasmic entirety.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since phenomenology is about being-in-the-world as we experience it in real-time, it 
automatically is an applied concept. Phenomenology is the study of experience, action, activity 
and physical acts. An eco-phenomenology follows this process too, as we saw with Merleau-
Ponty’s later work in The Visible and Invisible. Merleau-Ponty’s insights into and descriptions 
of the intersubjective interrelatedness of living bodies with the world were  in fact based on the 
in-field studies of wild animals by the biologist Jakob von Uexküll. But perhaps what makes 
Merleau-Ponty’s concepts most appealing is that they lend themselves directly to the formation 
of both a land ethic and an applied approach to conservation. The formulation of this ethic we 
could already discern in Aldo Leopold’s descriptions of a functioning ecosystem and the 
human involvement and attachment to that ecosystem. Even our linguistic capacity, , as 
described by Merleau-Ponty and later phenomenologists, such as Jacques Derrida, as well as 
traditional belief systems like the Zimbabwean worldview of Ukama, speaks of a practical 
approach to and the human interconnection with the natural environment in a real world.  
 
Most importantly, the successful conservation of wild species comes down to just a single 
notion: recreating the space for all biodiversity to thrive. Eco-phenomenology therefore is 
about the commitment toward and the protection of the entire system, which includes all living 
beings (plants, wild animals and humans) and even non-living entities (water, soil and air). 
Eco-phenomenology is a new conservation approach in that it wholly abandons any 
anthropocentric constructs based on instrumental value and Cartesian dualism in conservation. 
Consequently, it avoids all the resultant pitfalls of anthropocentrism (as discussed in Chapter 
Two). Eco-phenomenology is instead ontological in that it concerns itself with the existence 
and well-being of the entire natural environment. Thus, it is the protection of ‘wildness’ that is 
key to an eco-phenomenological pursuit. 
 
Crucially, the governments and other policy-makers need to recognise that the loss of 
biodiversity will not only harm the natural environment, but will cause human social, economic 
and cultural collapses as well. The future of humanity depends on the future health of the 
natural environment. Such practical strategies are to expand the space for biodiversity to thrive, 
not by removing humans entirely, but by rewilding land over-exploited through agriculture. 
Cutting down space that feeds livestock like cattle (soybean farming in the Amazon basin) and 
thinking of better ways to feed humanity (eating less meat and avoiding biodiversity-harmful 
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products like palm oil is one such strategy. Reforming our language, much as feminism did, is 
another. Language reform helps humans think of (other) animals as essential members of the 
biotic community in which humans too are an integral part. Language conservation, as I hope 
to have shown, is also crucial to those impoverished communities around the world that rely 
on the natural environment for their own survival and well-being.  
 
Ultimately, eco-phenomenology based on the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognises 
that all living beings are not stand-alone entities to be taken individually (either as 
instrumentally or intrinsically valuable), but together as a great interconnected web of life that 
depends on each other for their existence. At the heart of an eco-phenomenology is the 
wildness-of-being. It is wildness that drives our existence and keeps us alive. Ultimately, if 
humans are successfully to conserve species in the era of the Anthropocene, we need to 
preserve the house that keeps us all alive – the wilderness.  
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